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The traditional monopoly of politics and international relations on theorizing power, 
authority and legitimacy has eroded in the late modern era. The complexity of these 
domains has been compounded in a strongly interconnected, post-Westphalian world, 
where sovereignty and statehood are increasingly negotiated, where centres of power 
and authority have shifted and where new configurations of governance have come to 
the fore. The conventional conceptual toolbox of inter-national relations has been slow 
to adapt, and so the need to embrace insights from other disciplines never greater. The 
study of legitimacy in particular has been hamstrung by conventional drawings of both 
sovereignty and authority. Public authority, in the Weberian idealist sense, is the 
legitimated exercise of power. The study of power has broadened considerably in this 
timeframe; legitimacy, or rather the practice of legitimation, must mirror power’s 
analytical expansion. Even where the need to broaden our conceptualization of 
legitimation has been conceded, its empirical content has remained woefully thin. The 
question of how political actors legitimate their authority to act thus remains under-
theorized and under-researched. 
This thesis contributes to contemporary debates regarding power, legitimation and 
authority in two key respects. The first is in theorizing legitimation as practice: the everyday 
‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ (Adler & Pouliot 2011, p3) that render power 
authoritative. This practice-based approach, benefitting in particular from the legacies of 
Foucault and Bourdieu, moves firmly away from accounts of legitimacy as ‘inputs’ and 
‘outputs’ towards a more processual account. The second is in locating these everyday 
practices beyond formalized institutions, undertaken by a range of actors in a range of 
forums. The increasingly blurred ‘non-state’ operates in the margins between global and 
local; national/international; public/private and indeed state/non-state, whilst 
nonetheless sustaining a claim to publicness. These ‘twilight’ institutions (Lund 2006a) 
include the non-government organizations in Tanzania on which this thesis is focussed. 
It draws on extensive critical ethnography in locating everyday governmental and non-
governmental legitimation practice, whilst linking the local to the global. This is not 
solely about facilitating the travel of international relations to its hitherto geographical 




experienced in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). It asks, in short, how NGOs, as non-
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Practising legitimation  
 
Legitimacy, or rather legitimation, lies at the heart of this thesis and it is therefore 
fundamentally a work of politics. Legitimation is the practice of accumulative claim-
making. It infuses the exercise of power with symbolic capital: norms, institutions and 
material resource that render it ephemerally authoritative and rightful. The ‘right’ to 
govern others is one of the most elemental debates within political theory and as such, 
this thesis remains inextricably bound to it. The limits of politics and International 
Relations (IR) theorizing, however, at least as conventionally drawn, on the breadth and 
depth of legitimation in the everyday, solicits substantive insights from elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, this thesis departs from politics and IR only ultimately to return to it. It 
aspires, therefore, to come in from the perceived conceptual, and indeed geographical, 
margins of the IR discipline. Through this, it aspires to contribute something broader to 
the perennial political question regarding the conditions of public authority, as the 
recognized and sanctioned use of power. 
It is therefore imperative to acknowledge from the outset how IR’s traditional framing 
of legitimacy has artificially restricted the realm of its enquiry. Legitimacy, or rather 
legitimation, does not just appertain to the exercise of power via political institutions in 
a formalized setting; it also relates to informal governing practices in everyday life. It 
pertains to any claim of authority over the conduct of others, as well as compliance with 
and contestation of such claims. Indeed, the term ‘legitimacy’ infuses everyday speech in 
interpreting and contesting the actions of others. The prevalence of the term is 
reflective of the relevance of legitimation and its conditions in all areas of social and 
political life. Questions of ‘legitimacy’ are not just levelled at the bodies of the UN or 
the national government of the day. We pose questions of the legitimacy of 
organizations that act in the name of the public, whether for profit, religion and/or civil 
society. This is not a simple misappropriation of the term legitimacy, but a reflection of 
the validity of such questions as we scrutinize the institutions, formal or otherwise, that 




Conventional IR has proven exclusionary in a second, but related, sense. The over-
centrality of the (legitimate) sovereign ‘state’ in the production of Inter-national 
Relations (IR) theory has been duly noted and rigorously appraised by critical 
scholarship. Indeed, as the movement of people, resource, ideas and information 
become ever more ‘globalized’, the dissonance of the sovereign state as the key 
repository of rights, protections and indeed of legitimacy has become increasingly 
conspicuous. Nevertheless, the state has endured as the default entity via which 
international politics is depicted, understood and explained. Furthermore, the sovereign 
state-as-actor, with assumed exclusive legitimacy to govern, was founded on a particular 
snapshot of European history; indeed, it is as much normative prescription as empirical 
reality. The reification of the state, itself a Westphalian ‘myth’ (Carvalho et al. 2011; also 
Walker 1993), served to exclude large swathes of the globe from the field of IR. Such 
areas, particularly in Africa, were deemed as without order, characterized by ‘absence’ or 
dysfunction. As such, the structural hierarchy of IR itself had long mirrored, and indeed 
reproduced, global hierarchies of colonial and post-colonial power. 
In keeping with a growing body of literature that rejects that Africa as exceptional or a 
challenge to IR, therefore, I seek to explore evolving, complex forms of governance that 
have notable resonance throughout ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). The 
nominally state and non-state increasingly overlap, at times co-producing public 
authority; this is borne out at scales in this thesis’ focus on Tanzania. The case, while 
uniquely Tanzanian, provides a microcosm of the reconstituting public, as experienced 
globally. I focus predominately on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as they 
skilfully straddle public/private, government/non-government and global/local divides. 
Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations since its 
‘liberalization’ in the 1990s. This has reinserted the global into the local and vice versa, 
in new and adaptive ways. Tanzania, in addition, hosts a rich supporting literature 
regarding the historical blurring of state and society, from which to springboard its 
empirical work. The thesis looks at both district and village levels, which provide both 
contrast and, unexpectedly, continuity in legitimation practice across three settings. 
This thesis thus gives empirical content to lateral and vertical legitimation practice at 
scales in Bagamoyo district, coastal Tanzania. In doing so, I examine the everyday, 




against, which NGOs legitimate their presence under the rubric of ‘development’. These 
practices are curated into symbolic sets of practices, introduced below, which run 
through each empirical chapter. Through this, I challenge the default understanding of 
legitimacy as formalized, contractual exchange between citizen and state in favour of 
legitimation as ongoing practice, undertaken by an array of increasingly ambiguous 
institutions as they (re)produce and compete for public authority. It is an iterative 
process that demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of 
such claim-making. It is spatialized, demanding symbolic proximity and distance, the 
entreaty and repudiation of Others, as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ 
(Lund 2006b, p699), which resonate beyond the African continent. I ask, in short: how 
NGOs as non-state actors legitimate their authority to act within contemporary configurations 
of governance. 
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
This reconstitution of the public has rearticulated verticalized development hierarchies: 
the ‘brokerage’ chain (Bierschenk & Sardan 2003, p163; also Lewis & Mosse 2006) or 
‘contracted cosmopolitanism’ (Mercer & Green 2013). It has also led, however, to 
pronounced lateral collaboration and competition between organizations, particularly at 
the district level, thus precipitating similar forms of legitimation. Legitimation, as will be 
expounded in detail, is not simply about upwards ‘incorporation’ (Li 2013) into a global 
governmentality architecture; it holds substantive lateral as well as downward aspects. 
The empirical chapters place these lateral (Chapter Three) and downward dynamics 
(Chapters Four and Five) at their heart. These aspects of course interrelate; there are 
situated hierarchies at district level that admits of a verticalized dynamic. Similarly, 
village leaders and volunteers are not solely upward-inclined, but rather authority to 
intervene and its supporting legitimation negotiated and contested laterally by peers. 
Nonetheless, these distinct and, at times, defining logics are distilled into respective 
chapters. 
In building up to this enterprise, the thesis goes through a number of steps. Chapter 




reviews recent developments in the debate on legitimacy/legitimation from a number of 
disciplines that have unsettled, but also enriched, IR theorizing. There have been 
common developments across social enquiry that, despite epistemological differences, 
have lent themselves to more fruitful avenues of study. The first is a movement from 
normative to empirical enquiry in the study of legitimation. The second is a movement 
away from the state as the primary locus regarding political legitimacy. The third is the 
burgeoning field of ‘practice-based’ enquiry, which spotlights the practices through 
which power and authority are exercised and their conditions (re)produced in the 
everyday. The chapter reviews the corpus of academic work in these areas, forging the 
methodological basis for the case studies. It ultimately rests on a practice-based 
approach, drawing in particular on the legacies of Bourdieu and Foucault, as the most 
fertile with which to explore legitimation as practice, albeit with substantial 
qualifications. 
Chapter Two takes up this mantle of practice-based enquiry and its epistemologies, 
marrying it to the methodology of critical ethnography. It is motivated by the efficacy of 
such an approach in linking ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider social 
structures and systems of power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). The thesis, however, 
is also motivated by a moral concern in locating the research ‘subject’, often obscured in 
structuralist, or indeed post-structuralist, analyses. The actions of such subjects are far 
from determined or ‘produced’ by structures far removed from their lives. Individuals 
are of course authors of their own actions, even in the face of powerful, often 
profoundly oppressive, constraints. Agency has as much of a role in institutional 
reproduction and continuity as it does in moments of change, which is true of 
legitimation practice as a whole. The chapter makes a case for an inductive, fluid form 
of critical ethnography in this regard, before speaking to the methods of data collection 
and analysis that formed the basis of the next three empirical chapters. 
Chapter Three is the first empirical case, taking as its lateral ‘field’ the district of 
Bagamoyo itself. Bagamoyo has a distinct social, cultural and political context, much 
maligned in modern(ist) history. Nevertheless, Bagamoyo district forms a microcosm of 
recent development politics in Tanzania. The political economy of aid to Tanzania 
precipitated an increase in development initiatives in Bagamoyo. Mushrooming numbers 




lateral legitimation becomes pronounced. The impetus to explore a district, local 
government-oriented case study is thus two-fold. The first is political in the 
conventional sense, in that Local Government Authorities, or ‘the district’, are 
ascendant decision-making bodies and administrative hubs, around which elites are 
increasingly centred. The second is epistemological, whereby lateral legitimation has 
been rendered invisible to date. The chapter thus embraces the full ethnographic 
impulse to look laterally at the complex, overlapping institutional field in which NGOs 
negotiate and entrench their presence. This includes relations between local 
government, the civil society umbrella organization and NGOs themselves. Whilst 
relations are formally hierarchical, legitimation discloses shifting and situational 
hierarchies as well as striking commonalities in development disposition. This chapter 
also introduces in depth the legitimation practices that run through the thesis. 
Chapters Four and Five form the second and third empirical case studies respectively. It 
moves from the district level to focus on two, quite contrasting, village/ward 
environments: Kerege and Kibindu. Bagamoyo is a large administrative area, spanning 
almost 10,000 square kilometres, with these two villages located at opposite ‘corners’. 
Kerege, in the southeast, borders the burgeoning Dar municipality and is well-served 
according to many metrics. Kibindu in the northwest, by contrast, takes five to seven 
hours to reach from Bagamoyo town, is sparsely populated, under-served and has a 
dearth of development activity. Whilst there is some overlap in the legitimation practices 
undertaken by NGOs and local government in these two contexts, there is a discernible 
divergence in emphasis and degree, as actors legitimate themselves under very different 
conditions. Similarly, the negotiation of such claims on the part of those with whom 
they engage also diverges in these two contexts. 
The final chapter draws together the legitimation practices as actualized in these 
different contexts. It examines, specifically, the interrelationship between themes, with 
pairs at times in opposition and at others in congruence. Legitimation practice is thus 
situational, its framings historically contingent and its product ephemeral. It may 
fluctuate and reconfigure over the course of a single encounter. The specificity, 
however, of legitimation in Bagamoyo does not prohibit generalizability. The concluding 
coda returns to Africa’s international relations and the centrality of legitimation as 




configurations of global governance, increasingly permeated by non-state actors, have 
attendant fluid, informal legitimation practices, both laterally and vertically, which have 
been often rendered invisible by analysis to date. 
 
Legitimation practices: an overview 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to contemporary debates on power and 
authority in two key respects. The first is in legitimation as practice, giving it extensive and 
grounded empirical content in this regard. The second, related respect is in locating 
these legitimation practices in the everyday, beyond formalized institutions, undertaken and 
negotiated by a range of actors in a range of forums. To these two ends, the research 
identifies a number of key legitimation practices over the course of empirical research. 
Some will be familiar to those working within the anthropology of the state, but they are 
grounded and reworked in new ways. These practices were present throughout, 
although they varied in configuration and intensity. These practices, crucially, are not 
reducible to individual actions, as determined by material interest. Ideas matter; their 
power runs through each theme and, therefore, the thesis as a whole. 
The first of these themes is extensity, expanding on Held et al.’s term (1999), to include 
the projection of ‘scale’,1 whether in space or time. Temporal extensity, encompassing 
claims of institutional continuity and embeddedness over time, is something that 
Bourdieu himself references as part of legitimation (1984b, p104). Extensity also holds a 
strong spatial element, as NGOs project expansive coverage, or ‘encompassment’ 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002), across the district, echoing the architecture of the 
omnipresent Tanzanian state. This, in addition, conveys the NGO as part of the district 
institutional ‘furniture’. This bolsters authoritative claims with its capacity to operate at 
scale, but also conversely to differentiate such NGOs from smaller players who fail to 
extend to the outreaches of the district. 
Extensity, however, is not universal in its application, with some NGOs also exercising 
forms of territoriality. Territoriality, through its supporting claims, is the demarcation 
                                                             




of social boundaries of inclusion and exclusion: a turf. It is invoked by NGOs in their 
efforts to construct groups or communities as having particular needs, thus conditioning 
intervention. Territoriality as legitimation practice is thus decoupled from the state’s 
traditional monopoly on its conceptualization. It thus resonates with Sack’s broader 
conception of drawing boundaries as a fundamental human strategy to affect, influence 
and control the behaviour of others (1986, p2). Territoriality admits of scales, either 
geographical in its direct cartography of coverage, often following in Tanzania the grain 
of administrative boundaries but also indirectly, through the delineation of groups of 
volunteers, constituents and/or beneficiaries within a particular domain. Territoriality in 
the cases provided sits in tension with extensity, but often in concordance with claims to 
represent key populations more effectively, although not uniformly so. 
The counterpoint to non-state territoriality and its competing claims to representation is 
thus the extensive state and its enduring symbolism in the Tanzanian political 
imagination. Extensity echoes the ubiquitous state architecture in actors’ bids to institute 
themselves as resilient and reputable players. Tanzania, in its sixth decade of single-party 
rule, houses little daylight between ‘government’ and the organs of the ‘state’, with 
government (serikali) proving the default linguistic referent. Relations with the state, via 
serikali, are often invoked directly by NGOs, citing formal partnerships with the district 
or national government, or by the assumption by NGO staff of key advisory or 
governance roles within government bodies. This is part of what Green calls 
‘legitimation as being part of government’ (2010, p19), in accentuating claims of vetting, 
partnership and/or endorsement of NGOs on the part of government staff. The state, 
as will be explored, continues to command considerable symbolic capital. Its post-
independence founder Julius Nyerere, via his Ujamaa brand of African socialism, casts a 
long shadow in contemporary Tanzania. Strong notions of duty, citizenship and sacrifice 
still infuse political language, despite the rapidly transforming, and increasingly unequal, 
political economy. Positionality vis-à-vis the state, however, is fluid and situational. 
Other NGOs, particularly those drawing on capital from the international sphere and 
templates of good governance, use distance from government: legitimation as part of its 
negation. 
State/government relations, therefore, have an ambivalent relationship with the fourth 




the omnipotent, universal representative of the development and welfare of ‘the people’. 
Since his lost grip on power in the 1980s, however, inequality, corruption and 
disillusionment grew apace, contemporaneously with neoliberal reforms, thus leveraging 
space for NGOs to question the representative efficacy of the state. Some NGOs claim 
a unique position as proximate to the people, particularly those on the margins, in the 
face of a distant, self-interested and unresponsive state. Some NGOs, alternatively, 
highlight their ability to service more remote areas alongside ubiquitous government, to 
distance themselves from the run of urban-based development entrepreneurs. Such 
claims are often again a call back to the authenticity of Nyerere’s virtuous project in the 
face of elite opportunism, and to the expansive state machinery deemed necessary to 
achieve it. Development actors, however, as their colonial predecessors, are ultimately 
bound to the need to reconcile claims of proximity to stand for the people with those of 
distance in having to act for them on their behalf. 
The next practice is that of voluntarism. Voluntarism, certainly with regards to Western 
political theory, strongly coincides with a liberal conception of civil society, as citizens 
associate freely to counterbalance the excesses of state and market. New NGOs, 
therefore, often aligned with the neoliberal good governance agenda, assertively 
promote their voluntary nature, either through its staff or its village recruits, as 
pushback against an over-zealous, at times corrupt, state machinery. The situation in 
Tanzania, however, is more complex, with voluntarism having played a key historical 
role in Nyerere’s state- and nation-building efforts. Invoking voluntarism, therefore, 
calls forth at once the symbolism of the state and that of (neo)liberal conceptions of 
civil society, which are not always concordant. Voluntarism, in addition, underwrites 
other forms of legitimation for NGOs, such as extensity in recruiting a village-level 
social infrastructure; territoriality, in demarcating exclusionary turfs via particular 
groups; and/or representation, in invoking subtle ideas of consent and reciprocity. 
The final practice relates to material and informational resource: the ‘politics of 
distribution’ (Ferguson 2015). This practice interweaves the five that preceded it, and is 
most familiar to proponents of neopatrimonial, clientilist analyses of African politics. 
Indeed, extensity, territoriality, representation, voluntarism and, of course, the ostensible 
state, all have discernible material costs and are subject to such distributive politics. 




reducible to material interest. The ‘public’, in the name of which authority is 
(re)constructed, layers the ideational on to the material. Material resource, with an 
affinity to Bourdieu’s ‘economic capital’, is not the sole building block of social, cultural 
and, ultimately, symbolic capital. Ideas matter. The symbolism of the state, and its 
noted overlap with voluntarism, representation and extensity, looms large in the 
Tanzanian political imagination and is an important factor in effecting the behaviour of 
others. At the same time, intervention in the name of development must afford mutual, 
if unequal material benefits and people have a keen sense of the limits of NGOs’ 
legitimation in the absence of this exchange. Furthermore, information and data 
gathered on particular groups are also fungible, convertible with competency into 
funding. NGOs, as well as those they work with, experience the everyday politics of 
information distribution as keenly as that of brute resource. 
To summarize, if new understandings of the workings of power have been conceded in 
the study of politics in the late modern era, then the study of legitimation must broaden 
accordingly. This study is paramount as new, competing and complex ‘entanglements’ 
(Hönke & Müller 2012, p385) of state/non-state, private/public, local/global actors 
come to the fore, demanding attendant complexity of legitimation. This broadening can 
only enrich the study of politics and international relations. This is not solely about 
facilitating the ‘travel’ of IR to its hitherto geographical, and indeed theoretical, margins 
(Death 2013; also Cornelissen et al. 2012). It is rather to return with vigour to the 
centrality of legitimation as experienced by the governed: to Africa as ‘global condition’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, p125). Questions of legitimacy, therefore, must move 
away from their hitherto confines of deficit and redress. Rather, legitimation as practice 










Legitimacy and legitimation: a broadening 
landscape  
 
The traditional monopoly of politics and international relations (IR) on a number of 
theoretical domains, from the nature of power to state-building to legitimacy, has been 
eroded in the late modern era. The complexity of these domains has been compounded 
in an interconnected, post-Westphalian world, where sovereignty and statehood are 
increasingly ‘negotiated’ (Hagmann & Péclard 2010), where centres of power have 
shifted and where new configurations of (global) governance have come to the fore. 
The conventional conceptual toolbox of inter-national relations has been slow to adapt, 
and the need to embrace insights from other disciplines never greater. A fundamental 
case in point is the study of legitimacy, or rather the practice of legitimation, hamstrung to 
date by conventional drawings of both sovereignty and authority. Public authority, in 
the Weberian idealist sense, is the legitimated exercise of power (1968; also Bulkeley 2012, 
p2429; Lake 2010; Lund 2006a). Legitimation, therefore, must mirror power’s analytical 
expansion. Even where the need to broaden legitimation has been conceded, its 
empirical content has remained woefully thin. Thus, the study of how political actors 
legitimate their authority to act remains under-theorized and under-researched. 
This chapter thus makes the case for understanding contemporary legitimation as practice, 
as the accumulative ‘making of claims’ (Barker 2001, p2), drawing on a range of 
disciplines to do so. This reworking of legitimacy has implications, therefore, not just 
for IR and political theory, but for multidisciplinary debates regarding the very nature of 
contemporary power and authority. Three developments in particular lay the intellectual 
groundwork for such an enterprise. The first of these, specifically on the topic of 
legitimacy, is a movement away from normative towards empirical enquiry. This is 
arguably the most challenging, particularly within political theory, whereby the 
conditions of legitimacy are simultaneously critiqued vis-à-vis intrinsically normative 




raising questions of state, legitimacy and justice, has persistently melded what a 
legitimate state is with what a legitimate state should be. The most recent ‘wave’ of 
legitimation scholarship (Barker 2001, p13) strives to entangle the two. 
The second development is a movement away from the state as the primary locus 
regarding (political) legitimacy/legitimation. This has come more naturally to some 
disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, than to others, such as IR. 
Nevertheless, there has been an increased concordance in the late-modern era that 
public authority is not limited to, nor contained by, the purview of the state. Non-state 
actors, with their evolving, hybrid forms of governance and authority, should not be 
probed intermittently, but rather they embody changes in the construction of the public 
sphere. New hybrid forms of authority, straddling public and private, local and global, 
state and society, encapsulate what is a broader phenomenon. Legitimation, 
furthermore, is not an insulated practice of elites that exists in isolation. It is an iterative 
process that demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of 
such claim-making. It is intrinsically spatialized, demanding symbolic proximity and 
distance, the entreaty and repudiation of Others, as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing 
currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699). 
The third, related development is the burgeoning field of ‘practice-focused’ enquiry. 
This is by no means a uniform trend, but rather that methodological space has opened 
up in all relevant disciplines to spotlight the practices through which political power is 
exercised and its conditions (re)produced. This kind of enquiry is often rooted in the 
‘micro’, or everyday realm, in a broader understanding of political ‘governance’ and in a 
more relational conception of power, with the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu 
particularly prominent. There has thus been a productive, if eclectic, concordance 
around practice-based enquiry, as a ‘fertile “focal point”’ for a wide range of disciplines 
(Adler & Pouillot 2011, p3). The conceptualization of practice as ‘competent 
performances’ which ‘simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background 
knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (ibid. p4), pertains strongly to 
contemporary legitimation. The ideational melds with the material, engendering the 





This chapter, therefore, uniquely integrates these three key developments into the theory 
and study of legitimation as practice. Practices, following Adler & Pouliot, are ‘socially 
meaningful patterns of action’ (ibid.). Legitimation practice is the everyday rendering of 
power authoritative, and of reproducing that authority once in place. This chapter 
advocates for an empirical, practice-focused enquiry, centred on the evolving 
legitimation of public authority, which increasingly includes non-state actors. This is not 
to disregard the role of the state in legitimating public authority: far from it. It is rather 
an acknowledgement that public authority is produced, shared and contested by an 
increasingly disparate range of actors, converging around ‘templates’ (Lund 2006a, p675) 
of action. As such, authority, via its supporting legitimation, has never been more 
ambiguous or fluctuating in form. The chapter concludes that whilst this phenomenon 
may be particularly pronounced in parts of Africa, it is not unique to that continent. It is 
part of a broader reconfiguration of how modes of governance are actualized in ‘most 
of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004).2 
The chapter addresses these three developments in turn. The first section sets out the 
case for locating the practice of legitimation in the everyday, escaping the age-old 
impasses of conventional legitimacy theory, prising its empirical study from its 
normative roots. I probe legitimation as Barker’s ‘making of claims’: a process both 
conditional to and constitutive of the exercise of public authority. It is not, however, a 
mere ‘self-referential’ practice of elites (ibid. p13); it is operationalized within everyday 
‘fields’ and infused by a range of economic, social and, ultimately, ‘symbolic’ capital. The 
second section broadens these fields of legitimation beyond its hitherto state-centric 
confines. I argue that ‘territorialism’ in the study of legitimacy discloses an enduring 
ideology of the state, foreclosing fruitful avenues of study. The neglect of non-state 
actors, in this instance NGOs, as part of new configurations or ‘assemblages’ (Collier & 
Ong 2005) of power and authority, is a case in point. The third and final section 
spotlights insights from practice-focused enquiry, exploring its potentials and limits, 
paving the way for the subsequent methodological chapter. In summary, the chapter 
navigates what the thesis looks at, who inhabits its field and how to study such. It provides 
                                                             
2 Post-colonial writers lead the most recent charge against African exceptionalism (e.g. Acharya 2011; 
Chowdry & Nair 2002; Hönke & Müller 2012; Paolini et al. 1999). This project distances itself 
from Africanists who claim a ‘bottom up’ approach towards understanding the African context, but 
ultimately compound exceptionalism (for example Clapham 1996; Dunn & Shaw [eds] 2001; 




a unique confluence of theoretical threads, paving the way for an in-depth examination 
of contemporary legitimation. 
 
Legitimacy to legitimation: prising the empirical from the normative 
 
The topic of legitimacy, as the conditions of political authority within a given territory, is 
one of the founding debates of political philosophy. The earliest theorizing around 
legitimacy centred on the conditions of political stability and the (rightful) use of power 
within city territories (Zelditch 2001, p42).3 In the post-Westphalian era, it was state 
territory, power and the stability of the inter-state system that became entrenched as 
primary concerns of nascent IR theory. As such, Weber’s renowned definition of the 
state as ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (1970 [1919], p78, 
emphasis in original) grafted neatly onto a presupposed inter-state system. States 
recognized in this system are assumed to hold exclusive domestic authority backed by 
physical force, however covertly. The study of the state’s endurance, therefore, in a field 
where it is both the ontological departure and endpoint, proved something of a self-
affirming enterprise (Ashley 1988; Walker 1993). As such, the state persisted as the 
primary, at times solitary, legitimate political actor in the inter-national system. 
In this way, from legitimacy’s earliest framings, its debate conflated the conditions of 
political power with state power. The state is legitimate force: ergo legitimacy is the 
state. To pose questions of legitimacy is thus to pose questions of a state and/or regime 
(e.g. Buchanan 1999; Copp 1999; Stillman 1974). The ‘state-as-given’, however, signifies 
as much an ideology as an empirical realm of enquiry. Scholte highlights the pervasive 
hold of ‘methodological territorialism’ on political enquiry as a whole (2000, p66; also 
Agnew 1994; 2005; Murphy 1996; 2010), in its conflation of state, society and territory. 
Non-state actors, like NGOs, represent a deviation from the established, indeed 
endorsed, division of political space. Their location at the confluence of the 
global/local, public/private, state/society, has spurred particular consternation as to 
                                                             
3 Thucydides gave particular attention to the issues of the (moral) external use of force on a free state 
(in reference to the revisionist Athenian empire)(432 BCE [transl. Bohn 1848]. Aristotle was 
concerned with the just state, as a unique form of political community and the nature of consent 




their presence on the world stage.4 Conventional constructions of legitimacy, centred on 
Westernized democratic ideals of elections and open government, fall down when 
applied to the NGO.5 This is why much of the literature that addresses NGO legitimacy 
studies either seeks to redress the ‘democratic deficit’ through good governance and 
accountability (e.g. Edwards 2000; Gourevitch et al. 2012; Grzybowski 2000; Nelson 
2002; Slim 2002), or theorize NGOs’ essentially supplementary role on the inter-
national stage (e.g. Atack 1999; Benner et al. 2004; Dubash 2009; Gordenker & Weiss 
1995; Ossewaarde et al. 2008). This offers no challenge to the state-centred 
nomenclature: the ‘National Order’ of things (Malkki 1995; also Walker 1993).  
Westernized democratic norms have thus been transposed onto the realm of NGO 
governance, buried under the rhetoric of good managerial practice.6 Legitimacy is 
reduced to a number of ‘objective’ criteria, to which NGOs subscribe and/or are held 
to account. This ‘tickbox’, attributive brand of legitimacy is attained through discrete, 
rule-based processes, or ‘throughputs’ (Schmidt 2012), such as audits, meetings and 
evaluations. As such, the NGO legitimacy debate has assumed the language of ‘new 
public managerialism’: a ‘technical’ (Lister 2003) tweak to the inter-state system. Yet, 
given the Westernized brand of democracy that underwrites such a project, this is an 
intrinsically normative enterprise of how NGOs should be constituted, particularly vis-à-
vis the state. It is at the expense of our understanding as to how NGOs create the space 
in which to operate and in which to govern. It neglects the role that NGOs play in the 
production and reproduction of subtler forms of legitimacy in their everyday work. 
Legitimacy, or rather the practice of legitimation, demands substantial, albeit less visible, 
work and indeed creativity on the part of NGOs, As such, this is an exercise in ‘craft 
over compliance’ (Dodworth 2014, p22). 
The pervasive conflation of the descriptive and normative, in this case in theorizing 
legitimacy, reflects a tension, as Flyvbjerg argues, in the modernist project itself (1998, 
                                                             
4 Lister (2003) makes a similar point. 
5 Collingwood argues such a comparison ‘fails to recognise the extent to which states themselves 
consistently fail to meet liberal democratic standards of representation, accountability and 
transparency’ (2006, p452). The point is that any such comparison is essentially a normative 
debate, portrayed as established practice. 
6 Oxfam’s statement on legitimacy, for example, merges issues of accountability, process, 
organizational structure, expertise and their (assumed legitimate) goals of poverty reduction 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/accounts/legitimacy.html. Grzybowski’s piece also merges 
NGO location within civil society with goals, structures and expertise (2000). Gourevitch et al. 




p211). It is encapsulated by the partial adoption of Weber’s claim by the state to the 
‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’ (1970 [1919], p78): the touchstone of 
modernist politics. His renowned three-part typology holds that there are 
charismatic/traditional/rational-legal sources of legitimacy, or more precisely legitimate 
domination (ibid., p79). Ironically, whilst Weber claimed to challenge the 
Enlightenment’s positivist legacy, his ‘rational-legal’ formulation of legitimacy has 
become its de facto definition, but also its normative evaluative frame in political theory. 
On this conception, legitimacy resides in the rules and laws that underpin the formal 
institutions of a state and public participation thereof. These rules codify the rational, 
conscious exchange of power for protection (and other public goods) between self-
interested actors. A legitimate state, therefore, is a good in itself, freely chosen, and 
participated in, by its citizens.7  
This, what I term ‘transactional’, conception of (state) legitimacy as a rational exchange 
of compliance for liberties and protections, of ‘input’ and ‘output’ (Easton 1965), is a 
key part of the Enlightenment’s legacy. It owes much to the Lockean idea of consent as 
the basis of the citizen’s contract with the state. Society, as Locke outlined in his Second 
Treatise, comes together to form ‘one body politic’ (1948 [1689], p44), thus authorising 
society to decree laws to protect its citizens from over-zealous state incursion. Consent 
to abide by such laws is given either expressly or tacitly, through even the most passive 
participation in a particular society (ibid., p60). This conception of consent/exchange 
has proven central to subsequent legitimacy theorists’ seminal works. For Lipset, 
legitimacy is the capacity of formal institutions to engender the belief (or rather the 
concession) that they are the most ‘appropriate’ to safeguard public interests (1963 p77). 
For Dahl, an initial reservoir of legitimacy, forged on the consent of the masses, can be 
continually replenished through discrete events such as elections (1971). Consent is 
inferred from a perceived lack of disorder but also retroactively applied, masking the 
violence of oppression, conquest and colonization.8 Questions of legitimacy are only 
valid, therefore, in times of visible crisis or unrest.9 
                                                             
7 Taylor makes a similar point in that this conception of legitimacy is founded on a (Westernized) idea 
of bargaining and exchange (1971, p34). 
8 Webber & Macleod’s collection (2010) provides thoroughly historicized accounts in this regard. See 
also Galtung’s seminal work on structural violence (1971). 
9 Bourdieu makes a similar point, drawing on Hume, in his fullest exposition of (state) legitimation: 




Locke’s philosophy is, of course, explicitly normative in its prescription of natural law 
and in the rightful power of the civic body to institute such laws. As is common in 
subsequent libertarian, Enlightenment-inspired writings, however, the full extent of its 
normativity is somewhat obscured. The valorization of a rather restrictive, indeed 
materialist brand of ‘rationality’ is an affirmation, rather than mere identification, of this 
logic of human behaviour. This move is reductionist in its portrayal of social interaction, 
leading to the denigration of other conditions and motives of action. The extension of 
this has been to ascribe rationality, in its fictional, idealized form, to both state and non-
state in the West. The civic body, its government and its laws have been properly 
formed and so, as long as it remains rule-compliant, the business of government may 
ensue. The modern, read Western, state has reached this point of equilibrium, forming the 
blueprint for others, including NGOs. Locke’s condescension towards societies in their 
‘infancy’ (1948 [1689] p56), clinging blindly to autocratic leaders without the political 
sophistication to contest them, still inheres in regime typologies today. 
The subsequent use of Weber to add weight to this political cartography is, to some 
extent, based on a selective reading of his works. Firstly, specifically on the topic of 
legitimacy, he expounded other forms, charismatic and traditional, which inhere in all 
contemporary modes of governance. Weber was himself apprehensive regarding the 
‘iron cage’ of rationalization (1970 [1905]; 2001 [1930]) as a societal endpoint, whereby 
technology and routinization indeed promote efficiency but in the service of goals 
which are increasingly devoid of any real meaning. Whilst political writers, therefore, 
have been quick to embrace rational-legal conceptions of legitimacy in the name of 
Weber, it is not always clear whether his own intention was to rank forms of legitimacy 
or rather curate them. Indeed for some, Weber’s aim to structure empirical 
investigations into the subject was not evaluative enough (Grafstein 1981, p456; also 
Barker 1990; Blau 1963). In addition, as Bourdieu states in his reading of Weberian 
‘types’, albeit in a different context, ‘one must accept the existence of all the empirically 
observable intermediate stages between these conceptual types, which are themselves 
mere summations of distinctive features’ (1987, p120). As Weber notes himself, ‘pure 
types are rarely found in reality’ (1970 [1919], p79). 
Secondly, the reification of Weber’s rational-legalism is also selective in its focus on the 




The greatest legacy of late modern writers, including Weber, Habermas and Foucault, 
has been to broaden our understanding of power relations and, in turn, the parameters 
of the political realm. For Weber, legitimation is a sociological exercise grounded in 
existing beliefs and social practices; ‘legitimations of domination’ are ultimately ‘inner 
justifications’ (1970, p78). Habermas, in Legitimation Crisis (1976 [1973]), highlights the 
diminished capacity of the state to overcome contradictions in the capitalist system. This 
can only be overcome through practical discourse within civil society (1990), of which 
NGOs form a part, against the backdrop of a particular ‘lifeworld’ (1987). It is therefore 
necessary to locate socialized understandings of legitimacy against a wider milieu of 
norms, beliefs and practices. Foucault critiques the ‘juridico-discursive’ (1979 [1976], 
p82) conception of power, whereby legal norms and the ‘procedure of law’ mask the 
autarchy of elites, legitimated through the language of regulation and arbitration (ibid., 
p86). Whilst there are epistemological divergences, each of these theorists highlights 
how boundaries between political and social; public and private; power and knowledge; 
are not neatly drawn.10 
The prescriptivism of the transactional, rational-legal state has been most discernible 
where such mechanisms are deemed absent, notably in post-colonial Africa. Scholars 
drew directly from Weber’s patrimonialism (a sub-form of traditional authority) in 
spotlighting antithetical ‘neopatrimonial’ regimes (e.g. Eisenstadt 1973). These were 
defined by the exercise of authority through ‘personal patronage, rather than ideology or 
law’ (Bratton & Walle 1994, p458). Such work highlighted the absence of rational-legal 
governance, drawing instead from Weber’s traditional form of legitimacy in shoring 
regimes. Bratton & Walle echo Roth’s earlier assertion that neopatrimonial regimes are 
essentially ‘private governments of…[the] powerful’ (1968, p196). Neopatrimonialism, 
and its near relative ‘personal rule’ (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; 1984; also Roth 1968), are 
determined by informal, clientilist networks that facilitate material exchange between the 
few at the expense of the many. Forms of personal and patrimonial rule are argued to 
have taken pervasive hold in post-independence Africa in the absence of strong 
institutions, the rule of law and formalized civil society, including in Tanzania 
(Englebert 2000; Hyden 1999). Such regimes have failed to develop into fully fledged, 
                                                             
10 Barker argues that political legitimacy is a distinct relationship ‘between government and governed’ 
(1990, p20), not to be confused with the broader usage of the term. It is not made clear, however, 




functioning states and are prone to less ‘rational’ behaviour (Jackson & Rosberg 1982, 
p9). 
Pitcher et al. (2009) suggest the conflation of legitimacy type with regime is another 
misappropriation of Weber’s work. This element has indeed been strongly amplified by 
the teleological, or as Pitcher et al. put it, ‘evolutionist’, undercurrent to neopatrimonial 
analysis. Personal rule dominates these nascent states due to a lack of the strong 
institutions and civic life associated with the modern state. The democratization wave in 
Africa is ‘incomplete’ (Bratton & Walle 1994, p453), allowing despotic modes of 
governance to flourish. Patrimonialism is the survival and revival of the ‘pre-modern’ in 
the modern era (Theobald 1982, p549, drawing on Roth 1968), and this evolutionist 
thread has pathologized what are seen as specifically African modes of governance.11 
Pitcher et al. try to distance Weber from this charge, arguing that he is not prima facie 
ranking these forms of legitimacy. They argue, drawing on Callaghy (1988), that Weber 
is antievolutionist and patently not deterministic about the trajectory of capitalism nor 
its relation to the state. It is difficult, at times, to maintain this line, given the sense of 
time and progression that clearly does permeate Weber’s articulation of traditional, 
patrimonial legitimacy. The ‘authority of the “eternal yesterday”’ and the ‘prince of yore’ 
contrasts markedly with the functional ‘competence’ and ‘rationality’ of rule-based 
systems (1970, p78). Weber goes so far as to pronounce the ‘technical superiority’ of the 
rational bureaucracy (1968, p973) embraced in the West. As such, Weber often struggled 
to disentangle his ideal types from prescriptivism. Campbell indeed declares that the 
‘value-free’ study of legitimacy has been rendered impossible (1986, p207). He argues, 
convincingly at times, that Weber accepts the ‘truth’ of rational-legal legitimacy whilst 
distancing himself from more alien forms. This is at odds with Weber’s own claim to 
identify, rather than evaluate, the beliefs of others (ibid., pp218-220). 
The fact that Weber at times failed to meet his own standards of enquiry is not, 
however, sufficient to discredit his contribution. It is possible to embrace certain 
‘thinking tools’, whilst distancing oneself from the modernism Weber himself viewed 
with intermittent apprehension.12 Where Pitcher et al. offer particular insight is their 
                                                             
11 Englebert, for example, deems the illegitimacy of some African states ‘insurmountable’ in some 
contexts (2000, px), Kaplan famously decried Africa’s inherent lawlessness (1994) and Reno 
identifies an intrinsic between weak African states and warlordism (1998). 




return to Weber’s assertion that all forms of legitimation inhere in all regimes (2009, 
p137). On this point Weber was unequivocal; ‘the three basic types of domination 
cannot be placed into a simple evolutionary line: they in fact appear together in the most 
diverse combinations’ (1968, p1133). Furthermore, all three may be productive, 
contributing to diverse but viable forms of governance. Lastly, and where Pitcher et al.’s 
critique of the neopatrimonial school is most incisive, is that such formulations neglect 
the role of broader society in affording or contesting legitimacy in everyday life. All 
Weberian forms of legitimacy require iterative interaction with the intended subjects of 
rule. As Pitcher et al. put it, the ‘collective…is frequently missing from contemporary 
discussions of African patrimonialism’ (2006, p140, emphasis in original). They draw 
‘states without people’ (Mustapha 2002, p2). As such, neopatrimonialism reduces 
political action to the material interests of elites, leaving this sphere inhabited solely by 
‘criminals and cranks’ (Mustapha 2002, p4). 
This, uniquely ‘African’ brand of patrimonial legitimacy is projected onto all political 
actors, including those that act in the name of civil society. Clearly, there are clientilist 
networks that interlink NGO, government and corporate elites at local, national and 
transnational levels; that is not in dispute and duly warrants examination.13 Bayart’s 
‘Politics of the Belly’ (2009 [1993]) has enduring relevance, encapsulated by the 
perennial debate as to ‘who eats first’ in the development hierarchy. The point is rather 
that the matrices for action, in the NGO world or any other, are not reducible to 
material exchange.14 There are indeed elements of predation on the part of elites, but 
also resistance on the part of non-elites. There is a whole range of motivations for 
action on the part of NGOs and those who interact with them. There is indeed a 
discernible and deliberate blurring of the public and private spheres in Africa, in which 
NGOs are complicit. This is hardly, however, a phenomenon unique to the continent. 
Those discourses that pathologize modes of governance as specific to Africa, in 
summary, raise the question as to whether normative templates have truncated empirical 
                                                             
13 See Gray (2015) and Lofchie (2014) for accounts of intra-elite dynamics in Tanzania. 
14 Bayart’s own attempts to circumvent this charge of ‘reducing African social actors to no more than 
glutinous enzymes’ (2009, p242) are undone by his exclusive empirical focus on rapacious elites. 





enquiry.15 Neopatrimonial studies do not embrace the breadth and richness of, as well as 
contradictions in, motivations for action in public life. 
It is at this juncture, therefore, that the empirical study of legitimation practice must 
dovetail with the normativism regarding what constitutes a legitimate regime. It is a 
difficult division to maintain, but I disagree that it is intrinsically impossible. My window 
into this phenomenon is the legitimation practices of primarily NGOs, as an accumulative 
process of ‘claim-making’, located and contested in the everyday. This process is curated 
into sets of symbolic practices throughout the empirical chapters. The efficacy of these 
claims is not, contrary to the neopatrimonial school, reducible to economic rents or 
material resource, although these are still present. These practices are rather informed by 
a more nuanced conception of accumulated ‘capital’ - economic, social, cultural and, 
ultimately, symbolic (Bourdieu 1983; 1984; 1986) - as resources on which actors draw.16 
Bourdieu, as I return to, advanced these forms of capital as an antidote to the assumed 
asocial, rational, interest-maximizing individual that exists independent of history (1986, 
p241). As such, a broader conception of legitimation provides a lens into the complex 
matrices of action and governance beyond the monotonous narrative of predatory elites 
in Africa. 
This conception of legitimation as everyday practice returns us full circle to Weber and 
his original writings. Whether Weber’s ideal types had a modernist telos is possible, but 
without doubt, they have been wielded as a discursive weapon in a manner removed 
from his declared philosophy of enquiry. Weber’s models were designed as tools to help 
us probe real life situations. His rational-legal bureaucracy is a type that does not exist, 
by definition, anywhere in the world. To normalize his ideal types ‘obscures as much as 
it illuminates’ (Migdal 2001, p15). Different forms of legitimation practice thus sit 
alongside each other; Weber was as concerned with messy sociological process as with 
definitive political outcomes. As Barker remarks, ‘Weber is not talking about some 
abstract quality, “legitimacy”, but about an observable activity in which governments 
characteristically engage, the making of claims’ (2001, p2). Legitimacy is the ephemeral 
                                                             
15 Mustapha (2002) forcibly argues this point, taking aim primarily at Bayart et al.’s The 
Criminalization of the State in Africa (1999) but also Englebert (2000) and Reno (1998). 
16 Bourdieu, as I return to, defines economic capital as material wealth directly convertible into money 
or property (1986, p242); social as relationships of acquaintance and recognition linked to 
membership in a group (p248); cultural as the acquisition of knowledge, education and other 





product of legitimation, and hence proven elusive to quantify. Barker goes so far as to 
call it a ‘fiction’, ascribed to situations where people seemingly accept the claims of their 
rulers (ibid., p19). 
Whilst embracing Weber’s empiricism, however, it is important to highlight as a final 
note that this thesis does not emulate his project of interpreting legitimacy as belief. 
Firstly, this is an acknowledgement that this endeavour has long precipitated a 
‘methodological impasse’ (Beetham 1991, p9), whereby such beliefs are not accessible or 
directly related to action. More substantively, however, as O’Kane points out, a belief in 
legitimacy merely begs the question on which grounds such beliefs are legitimated (1993; 
also Grafstein 1981). Rather than seeking to ground legitimacy elsewhere, however, as 
these theorists, this thesis has moved firmly away from a foundational account. Each of 
the practices is thus firmly historicized, rearticulated and appropriated in new ways on a 
daily basis. When constructed as practice, in addition, legitimation may be conscious, 
and even strategic, but the belief systems and capital on which it draws may not. Indeed, 
if public authority is legitimation’s ephemeral product, there is not necessarily the time 
or space for legitimacy belief to crystalize. 
To conclude this section, I situate myself in Barker’s most recent, fourth ‘wave’ of 
legitimation scholarship in examining the process of making claims to authority (2001, 
p13). This project owes a debt to Weber, but to his social science over his renowned 
attributive forms of legitimacy. Legitimation is rather a process that marks a ‘central 
feature of governing’ (ibid.). The necessary, and indeed extensive, addendum to Barker, 
however, is that legitimation is not an insulated, ‘self-referential’ practice of formal 
rulers that exists in isolation. It is undertaken by a range of political actors in a range of 
forums. It is, furthermore, an interactive process, which demands the insertion of the 
broader ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of such claims. The move to embrace 
the full breadth of political legitimation has, to date, been confounded by conflation of 
‘governing’ with ‘government’. However, as I next explore, governing is not restricted to 
the organs of the state. The shifting global order has accelerated the entry of new actors 





Letting the ‘non-state’ in: the politics of legitimacy and the legitimacy of 
politics 
 
Non-state actors have shaped global politics long before the modern state came into 
being. Few IR scholars dispute such, or that such actors have had a discernible and 
enduring influence on the international system. As noted, however, a certain ‘ideology’ 
of the state underpinned IR as a discipline, with the conventionally drawn sovereign 
state its departure and endpoint. It is this epistemic deadlock that caused the slow 
inclusion of non-state actors into the topography of international politics. This 
reluctance disclosed unease with the changing contours of the ‘international’, but also 
regarding certain disciplinary domains (e.g. Ashley 1988). The role of non-state actors, 
with their rival claims to ‘legitimacy’ to influence global politics, marks a challenge to the 
state’s traditional monopoly of authority. The affirmation of legitimacy in one sphere 
thus represents a challenge in another. The politics of distribution of the legitimacy 
debate itself, therefore, has proved something, to borrow the hallmark language of IR, 
of a zero-sum game.  
Global social and economic transformation, however, has marked a profound change 
both in the ordering of political space and its modes of governance.17 Rosenau 
comprehensively defines governance as ‘spheres of activity at all levels…that amount to 
systems of rule in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control’ (1997, p145). 
These levels have undoubtedly compressed under globalization. Power has diffused 
across boundaries, be they geographical or conceptual, as global structures have become 
increasingly characterized by a ‘disaggregation of authority’ (Rosenau 2003, p228). This 
is not to argue that the state has lost its position of prominence; disaggregation is 
followed by reconstruction. It is rather that the traditional armoury of state-centric 
political science has been left wanting. ‘Naturalized’ dichotomies between the national 
and international, public and private, economic and political have been unsettled (see 
                                                             
17 The abundant globalization literature of the last two decades points towards a substantive ‘spatio-
temporal’ shift in the contemporary era, precipitated by an increase in the ‘extensity’ and 
‘intensity’ (Held et al. 1999) of global information and resource flows across borders. This has 
been described as a ‘stretching’ of modes of connection between social contexts (Giddens 1990, 
p63), a ‘thickening’ of interdependency networks (Keohane & Nye 2000, p108) or 
‘deterritorialization’, where globality provides the fourth spatio-temporal dimension (Scholte 
2000, p46). This in turn has precipitated commentary on new transnational forms of governance 




e.g. Hall & Biersteker [eds] 2002; Migdal & Schlichte 2005; Sassen 1996; 2006; Strange 
1997). Allen, more recently, discusses the ‘distorted reach’ of agents of power, beyond 
conventional territorial boundaries (2016). 
The question, therefore, is not whether non-state actors are new, but whether their 
recent propagation captures something new in contemporary governance. There has 
been a reluctance to concede that the rules of the game have changed; that public 
authority is intrinsically more ambiguous; that there are forms of legitimation that 
pertain to both ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ action. Such a concession would undermine the 
urge to redress challenges to, or anomalies within, the inter-state system. This urge to 
redress is typical of ‘legitimacy deficit’ argumentation, which, as noted, scrutinizes 
NGOs for gaps in procedural, or ‘throughput’ (Schmidt 2012), legitimacy and 
accountability (e.g. Edwards 2000; Grzybowski 2000; Scholte 2007; Slim 2002). It is 
couched in the language of liberal democratic norms and its transactional account of 
legitimacy, providing a tacit endorsement of the division of political space in the inter-
state system. It has presented, therefore, no fundamental challenge to the conventional 
framing of IR legitimacy debates. At the same time, however, it fails to capture new 
dynamics of (global) governance and its changing patchwork of actors and action. 
This is not, however, to claim that all IR has stood still.18 Some scholars have presented 
this transformative change not as a challenge to the status quo but as a springboard to 
explore new forms of mobilization and contestation. Such scholars thus seek to explore 
new forms of legitimacy that inhere in emergent systems of governance and authority in 
the new global ‘order’ (Clark 2003; 2005; also Barker 2001; Bulkeley 2012; Erman & 
Uhlin [eds] 2010; Held 1995). Clark argues not for what constitutes legitimacy of this 
order but within it (2003, p75), insofar as such an order exists. As such, non-state actors 
do not mark an anomaly in the system but an integral extension of it. This path has 
demanded a shift in the perspectives, and therefore the methodological conventions, 
that have traditionally defined IR scholarship.19 Best and Gheciu, for example, moved 
                                                             
18 Brown (2006) makes the important point that much critique is primarily levelled at (neo)realist IR 
theory and that IR’s conceptual toolbox can expand to embrace the breadth of global institutional 
life. 
19 Critical and poststructuralist theorists have espoused the need for a more ‘global’ standpoint, from 
which to critique the ‘natural’ or rather ‘National’ order of things (Malkii, 1995). Such critique 
may derive from critical IR theory (e.g. Ashley & Walker 1990; Cox 1981; Linklater 1992; Scholte 




recently to redefine the resurgent ‘public’ in global governance not as a bounded sphere 
but as ‘an evolving set of practices’ (2014, p15; also Abrahamsen & Williams 2014; 
Porter 2014). Collier and Ong (2005) and Sassen (2006) explore ‘global assemblages’, 
whereby abstract, mobile ideas and systems of governance become operationalized 
within specific fields. Such analyses foreground not just types of actors but particular 
clusters of activity around the template of public action at any one time. 
The majority of scholarship on Tanzania, however, has been more affiliated with the 
multidisciplinary African area studies than IR. African studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
settled too on the state as the main repository of public authority. Its key concern in this 
period was the prospects for order following the wave of independence in the 1960s. As 
such, it placed considerable emphasis on state-building and how to formalize, as well as 
‘indigenize’, state-associated institutions. Comparisons against Western blueprints 
disclosed an implicit teleology, whereby African institutions were portrayed as 
underdeveloped and deficient. Jackson and Rosberg infamously claimed African states 
to be empirically ‘empty’, propped up solely by external recognition (1982; also Clapham 
1996; Englebert & Hummel 2005). The tendency towards reductionism and pathology, 
however, eventually gave way to more nuanced examinations of the diversity and 
complexity of institutional life in various African contexts (e.g. Kelsall 2008; Lund 
2006a; Menkhaus 2007; Nkiwane 2001; Tripp 2000). Statehood is ‘negotiated’ by a 
multitude of actors (Hagmann & Péclard 2010; also Boone 2003; Ferguson & Gupta 
2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006), as indeed is the legitimation of authority. The 
dichotomies of Western political philosophy, therefore, were abandoned earlier, and 
more emphatically, than within IR. 
Studies on the workings of power and authority in Tanzania neatly illustrate this shift in 
African studies. There is now a rich body of literature on the complexity of relations 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’ in post-colonial Tanzania, in contrast to earlier fascination 
with the state’s machinations of control. Its authoritarian regime, and its relative stability 
post-independence, had hitherto served as the main focus of study. Its political 
landscape has indeed been dominated by the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]): a ‘one-party hegemonic regime’ (Hoffman and Robinson 2009, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
powerfully, from critical ethnography (Appadurai 1988; 1991; 1996; Bhabha 1996; Gupta & 




p125; also Phillips 2010) formed from both the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) and the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party in 1977. Counting from TANU’s 
assumption of power in 1961, CCM is now the longest ruling party on the African 
continent (Paget 2017, p154). ‘Government’ is not readily discernible from party or 
state. The sustained scholarly emphasis on its authoritarianism, however, in a sense 
reaffirmed the detachment of state from society, urban from rural; centre/periphery; 
elite/peasantry; ruler/subject; modernity/ tradition; town/village. It restricted 
conceptual space to foreground the ‘negotiation’, at times co-production, of state 
authority. These spheres, most notably espoused by Mamdani (1996), echoing Ekeh 
(1975), became distinct, or ‘bifurcated’. Whilst the latter is dependent on the former, the 
two do not interact on a daily basis. Indeed, it was argued, this very separation allowed 
both colonial and post-colonial order to endure.  
Mamdani’s macro-analysis of the continent, whilst it does not entirely neglect localized 
forms of resistance, slid towards a mechanistic portrayal of the state and its architecture. 
Pockets of anti-state resistance, of ‘indigenous civil society’ (1996, p21), collapsed under 
the weight of state subjugation, reaffirming the authoritarianism it sought to explain. 
This purported division between state and society has since been forcefully taken to task 
in the Tanzanian context. It precipitated interpretivist-oriented scholars to step in, 
drawing on ethnographic and/or historical fieldwork to highlight the fluidity of state–
society relations, or their ‘reciprocities’ (Tripp 1997, p198; also Dill 2013). Such work 
has suggested looking elsewhere for ‘resistance’ (Becker 2013; Tripp 1997, 2000; Kelsall 
2000b; Pels 2002). It spotlights localized forms of accountability and civil society over 
imported ones (Geiger 1997; Kelsall 2003; Tripp 1997; Mercer 2003). It emphasizes 
informal practices over formal institutions as critical to understanding Tanzanian politics 
(Becker 2008; Brennan 2006; 2012; Boone 1998; Dill 2013; Kamat 2008; Schneider 
2006; Harrison 2008). Even the state monolith itself can be unpicked; Costello examines 
resistance to reforms by bureaucrats from ‘within’ (1996). Lastly, it embraces recent, 
‘revisionist’ (Englund 2013, p672) efforts to rehabilitate the ‘public’ and its civic 
sensibilities in African studies: the often untold ‘concerns for the public good’ (Werbner 
2004, p2; also Englund 2012; Gewald et al. 2011; Hunter 2015; Routley 2012). 
This fluidity in content and form, however, allows in turn for fluid positionality. 




proximity as well as state and society. Distance, prominent in both state and non-state 
claims, manifests itself in the need to act for a constituency due to barriers to self-
development, long embedded in Tanganyika’s colonial and post-colonial discourse 
(Green 2014; Hunter 2015; Schneider 2006). Proximity, in contrast, conveys 
resemblance: shared norms, traits or interests, allowing governors to stand for those 
excluded by the chauvinist mainstream. Both distance and proximity, however, engender 
conditions for intervention. Agencies from the colonizing north, ‘state’ or otherwise, co-
produced enduring divisions between civilization and barbarism, developed and 
undeveloped, presence versus absence, success versus failure. This ‘Othering’ of swathes 
of the globe, linking systems of education and cultural production to geo-political 
influence, has been, following Fanon (1967) and Said’s lead (1978), vigorously 
deconstructed by post-colonial thought (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Coronil 1996; Cohn 1996; 
Doty 1996; Mbembe 2001; Ngũgĩ 1981; 1986; Paolini 1999; Thomas 1994). Crucially, 
however, the post-colonial condition is replicated at numerous scales by numerous 
actors (Dodworth 2016; also Powell 2003). 
Whilst the state/society division does not, therefore, hold much analytical scrutiny, it 
nevertheless continues to serve as a ‘template’ (Lund 2006a, p675) for action in 
Tanzania’s contemporary development context. Legitimation and its spatialized 
practices work though, by and indeed against the state, in crafting the space to govern. 
Tanzania, as the ‘paradigmatic development state’ (Green 2014, p17; also Dill 2013, 
p30), has itself been made possible by ‘the transfer of resources, policy templates and 
expertise’ (ibid. p3; also Lofchie 2014, pp105-116) from external agencies, both state and 
non-state, since colonial times. The idea of the omnipotent, benevolent state was 
paramount during Tanzania’s socialist engineering of the village community. In 
development’s most recent iteration, manifest through neoliberal reforms, which 
precipitated the ballooning of registered NGO and community based organizations 
(Tripp 2000; Mercer 2003; Kelsall 2004), assistance has been increasingly administered 
in the name of societal scrutiny of the state. The ‘community’, as a separate, 
homogenous, idealized space, has thus been strongly and continuously operationalized 
in Tanzania (also Marsland 2006).  
Green and Dill’s respective monographs mark important work in this vein regarding 
Tanzania’s contemporary development landscape (2014; 2013). Both explore, combining 




societal action via ‘community development’. For Green, the appropriation of 
community development by internationally funded NGOs maintains the ‘vertical 
topography’ of the state (2014, p32) and beyond. Similarly, Dill argues the state/society 
division, via community based development, serves to enhance rather than temper the 
idea of the state and its claims to the legitimate use of force (2013, pp4-5, echoing 
Mitchell 1991). Both explore developmentalism at scales, with the idealized community 
‘interstitial’ between the state and its backward subjects (Green 2014, p28; Dill 2013, 
p12). Both deconstruct contemporary development as the Foucauldian ‘mastery of 
techniques’ (Green 2014, p180): a highly verticalized form of governmentality working 
against the emergence of a more genuine form of politics (ibid. p182). Where they differ 
is that, for Green, the appropriation of community labour by external agencies represents 
colonial-like continuity (also Green 2010; 2015; Mercer 2003), whereas for Dill the shift 
to community as ‘both object and agent of development’ (2013 p7) marks a departure 
from the state-led model. Nevertheless, for Dill, the use of community still bolsters, 
legitimates and/or ‘fixes’ the state (also Hunter 2008; Jennings 2007; Moore 1988). 
This type of work typifies developments in African area studies more broadly, 
challenging boundaries between domains through the commonality of practices that 
constitute them. It is a direct response to the portrayal of African states as vacuous 
spaces, devoid of institutions or ‘empirical’ statehood (Jackson & Rosberg 1986). It 
aims, in contrast, to disclose the diversity and vibrancy of institutional life across the 
continent. It contributes to the continuing broadening of the conceptual toolbox from 
that which historically defined power, authority and civil society in the West (Chabal & 
Daloz 1998; Death 2013; 2015; Ferguson 2006; Kelsall 2000a; 2003; Lewis 2002; Mercer 
2003; Tripp 1997; 2000; also Bayat 1997; Chatterjee 2004; Li 2007; Mosse 2005 for 
notable studies outside Africa). Whilst contemporary African studies has sustained a 
clear interest, however, in recognizing new forms of power and authority across 
increasingly blurred domains, it has housed a healthy scepticism of NGOs as yet 
another Westernized import. Where the analysis becomes more interesting, therefore, is 
where the NGO, as a hybridized template of political action, becomes localized, 
indigenized and melds with existing forms of power and authority (e.g. Bierschenk & 
Sardan 2003; Lewis 2002; Lund 2006a; Tripp 2013). NGOs are shaped by, and shape, 
the power context in which they operate. 




has had to make room for new understandings of governance, authority and therefore 
legitimation. NGOs in particular, in virtue of their ‘Janus-face’ between imagined public 
and private spaces, are thriving in these ambiguous, competing and overlapping modes 
of governance. NGOs, with their publically-oriented face, borrow heavily from a 
conception of the public good, via outputs such as ‘development’, ‘empowerment’ or 
‘poverty reduction’. It also invokes procedural ideas; inputs/throughputs such as 
‘representation’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Crewe 
and Harrison 1998) invoke a state-like rationality. There is also, however, increasing 
symbolic capital afforded by NGOs’ private-oriented aspect, towards other non-state 
actors, industry and commerce. This borrows from neoliberal, market-like metaphors 
such as ‘innovation’, ‘demand-led’ and ‘efficiency’. These ‘mobile’ regimes of 
governance (Collier & Ong, p4) operate ‘in the twilight between state and society, 
between public and private’ (Lund 2006a p678). 
In contrast to these more established disciplines, NGOs were rapidly incorporated 
within nascent development studies. Development studies is a rather unique enterprise, 
which places social, political and economic change, often melded with advocacy, at its 
heart. The default ‘legitimacy’ in development studies, therefore, lay less in procedural 
accounts than in claims to further the provision of perceived public goods. This output 
legitimacy was supplemented with claims of representation of and solidarity with the 
poor and marginalized, not adequately represented by the inter-state system. NGOs 
were thus at first lauded as a democratic developmental solution in contexts perceived 
to be institutionally weak (e.g. Chataway 2000; Clark et al. 1998; Devetak & Higgott 
1999; Korten 1987; 1995). Optimism, however, gave way to scepticism by the 
millennium, embodied by Slim’s critique ‘By What Authority?’ (2002). Subsequent 
practitioner-facing scholars responded over time to Slim’s call for improved NGO 
legitimacy, addressing how ‘throughputs’ might be improved in this regard.20 
Development studies, of course, is not monolithic. In opposition to the development 
industry (although in a sense dependent on it), there grew a significant corpus of radical 
critique, which views these intervention cycles as part of wider power/knowledge 
structures. The development industry is the extension of neo-colonial, Eurocentric 
power (e.g. Brohman 1995; Cardoso 1977; Escobar 1995; Manji & O’Coill 2002; Petras 
                                                             




1999), foreign policy instrument (Akram 2003; Tvedt 1998; Woods 2005) or of global 
neo-liberal techne through which to constitute, govern and control the populace (e.g. 
Crush 1995; Dillon 2004; Duffield 1999; 2010; Ferguson 1994; 2006; Goldman 2001; 
Gupta & Sharma 2006; Rojas 2004; Stern & Öjendal 2010; Williams 1993). The insights 
of Foucault, via the ‘global governmentality’ and postcolonial schools, mapped neatly 
onto geographical, class, race and gender divides. NGOs are thus an integral part of 
governmental techne through their co-production of ‘rational’ development subjects. 
Such work resonates strongly with that of Green (2014) and Dill (2013) in the 
Tanzanian context. It sheds considerable light on the power/knowledge nexus, and the 
role of discourse in enacting subtle but profound interventions into the very 
subjectivities that shape lives and livelihoods. 
Whilst such insights are fruitful in their clear location of material interests behind 
discourse, the governmentality school, as explored in the final section, can at times 
mask, if not denude, individual agency of real people, particularly via its ‘productive’ 
conception of power. This power is diffuse and becomes physically enacted and 
embodied, serving to ‘constitute[s] agents rather than being deployed by them’ (Gaventa 
2003, p1 – emphasis added). NGOs, as echoed in Green’s work, are construed as 
extensions of a broader neoliberal project, whose architect is unseen. Those NGOs 
work with are drawn as passive objects of such productive power, which brings their 
ideas of (self)development and change in line with the neo-liberal worldview. As such, 
Foucault’s key concepts have been applied to their limits within critical development 
studies (e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson 2006; Green 2012; 2014; Li 2007), where global 
hierarchies are indeed so visible. What this has inadvertently neglected, however, is where 
NGOs become appropriated, contested and reassembled within local contexts and new 
modes of authority crystalize. Furthermore, an unmoderated governmentality overstates 
the finite role neoliberal institutions have in people’s lives and livelihoods. 
There is, however, a ‘middle way’ in applying insights from Foucauldian-inspired critical 
theorists, whilst affording methodological space to legitimation in the everyday, 
inhabited by real, multi-dimensional people. This way, as explored in the final section, is 
captured by the shared vocabulary of practice-based enquiry, uniting Foucault with 
Bourdieu (Reckwitz 2002; also Schatzki et al. 2001). To conclude the debate in hand, 




mushrooming NGO sector in Tanzania is relatively new in its political landscape.21 
These NGOs, however, are not a failed expression of civil society, or co-opted workings 
of post-colonial state power. They do not necessarily constitute an extension, or 
‘surrogate’, (Jennings 2008; also Hoffman and Robinson 2009) of the state, nor a 
groundswell of popular, ‘democratizing’ opposition (Tripp 2000; Snyder 2008). There is 
considerable variation in how NGOs position themselves in these regards. What unites 
them, however, is their agency in constructing their own authority: a ‘contested process 
of assertion, legitimization and exercise’ (Lund 2006a, p678; also Hilhorst 2003) in a 
recalibrating global order. Such ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699) thus form 
the empirical mainstay of this project. 
I have, in this section, traced the shifting conceptualization of public authority and 
legitimation across the key disciplines that pertain to its study, with particular reference 
to NGOs. There has been a movement towards the exploration of how public authority 
has become more diffuse across types of actors and indeed action, albeit at different 
rates. There has been a degree of ‘politics’ in relinquishing the realms of the 
legitimacy/legitimation debate to include non-state phenomena. At this juncture, non-
state actors, in this case NGOs, are no longer construed as an anomaly of, threat to, or 
extension of, the conventional state-based division of space. Their proliferation is 
indicative of more transformative change in the global political topography, which 
affords new opportunities for entrepreneurs within new constellations of governance. In 
a sense, therefore, the expansion of NGOs in Tanzania is part of the reconstituting 
public. The survival of these organizations depends on the continual exertion of 
legitimation in the everyday: the making of claims to craft the space in which to govern. 
 
Legitimation as everyday practice: crafting the space to govern 
 
I have argued for a broader, multidisciplinary conception of legitimation as practice: that 
is, meaningful pattern of actions that are performed with competence, embodying 
existing knowledge and rooted in the everyday. Such a project lies at the margins, both 
geographical and thematic, of much of mainstream IR. This framing is not, however, 
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without earlier precedent in classical political theory. The idea of legitimation as ongoing 
practice, rather than legitimacy as attribute, resonates with a Machiavellian, conflictual 
understanding of power and governance (1940 [1517]). This continual technique is 
deployed to maintain a façade of voluntary submission by the ruled. This technique 
entails the deliberate merging, assimilating and ‘grafting’ of prima facie unacceptable uses 
of power onto pre-existing acceptable beliefs, practices and procedures (Zelditch 2001, 
p42). Legitimation is not, therefore, conformity with the legal pre-conditions of 
governance but rather, foreshadowing Foucault, the exercise of more tacit forms of 
ideational power. What we once assumed to be the rational, self-interested action of 
individuals, therefore, is unveiled to be something quite different. 
Such Foucauldian-esque governmentality plays out globally, by way of example, via 
dominant development discourse and how its ideas are practiced, projected and 
communicated. The critical development school, as noted, takes rightful aim at the 
ahistorical assumptions of development practitioners, unveiling deficient suppositions 
regarding human agency. According to the practitioner, if the conditions of 
development are present, governments, individuals and/or communities will freely 
engage with these processes and the realization of public goods will ensue.22 Individual 
agency and rationally-informed interests are paramount and ontologically precede any 
knowledge thereof. For the (global) governmentality school, however, the production of 
knowledge is intricately bound to the interests of the most powerful, manifest through 
the construction of particular societal ‘problems’ and attendant prescriptivism. In this 
instance, development knowledge, via categories such as ‘poverty’, ‘risk, ‘governance’ 
'rights', is the exercise of more subtle, subjugating forms of power at once to design and 
construct such populations. These techne thus produce the very subjectivities of those 
upon whom development agencies strive to intervene. 
The govermentality conception of legitimation as practice offers a more accurate picture 
of the daily activity of governing. Its major pitfall, however, is in affording seemingly 
unqualified power to an implicit, unified elite over the subjugated masses. Insights into 
the hidden workings of power are well-taken, but the strong verticality and unilateralism 
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of some presentations (e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson 2006; Green 2012; Li 2007) 
unexpectedly reminiscent of the elite-dominated forums they aim to critique. The 
actions that replicate this bifurcation of power are lost in the very structures it seeks to 
explain. And yet, for Foucault himself, power is often misunderstood to reside within 'a 
group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a 
given state’ (1979 [1976], p92). Clearly, Foucault’s conception of power is not simplistic 
in its instantiation nor its explication. He was explicit, however, that it not attributive in 
form, to individuals or institutions, but is relational within each ‘complex strategic 
situation’ (ibid., p93). As such, Foucault is speaking to Machiavelli's relational conception 
of power, but expounds the need to 'remove the persona of the Prince' (ibid., p97) in 
that there is no single, stable source, or indeed object, of subjugation. 
Nevertheless, at least under the purview of politics, the study of legitimation has 
remained almost entirely focused on elites, as conventionally drawn, and nowhere more 
so than on the African continent. There is a recurrent drive to subsume such 
legitimation politics under elite-driven logics, such as neo-patrimonialism, extraversion 
or incorporation, focusing primarily on material accumulation and the ‘politics of 
distribution’ (Ferguson 2015). This drive, as noted, reproduces an unhelpful conceptual 
gulf between state and society; the elites and the masses; the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, 
crowding out politics in the everyday. Mamdani’s focus, as previously noted, at times 
proved too narrow in its neglect of informal, politicized practices. Schneider helpfully 
points to other ‘frames of legitimation’ (2006, p106) beyond formal institutions in 
Tanzania. Placing such practices at the forefront of analysis, continually contested and 
negotiated, circumvents the curation of types of actors into those with the power to act 
and those without. It is thus more helpful to curate types of practice: how they reaffirm 
and contest each other. 
Michael Schatzberg’s seminal work, specifically on political legitimacy and governance in 
central Africa (2001), aims to speak to this gap. It is a detailed, nuanced study with clear 
empirical foundations. His in-depth examination of eight countries across central Africa 
seeks to illuminate the culturally rooted ‘moral matri(ces) of legitimate governance’ (p1) 
through which people understand (and accept) the legitimacy of institutions, ideas, 
policies and procedures. One such matrix is the metaphor of family, at once drawn on 




same time resonating with existing norms regarding the extended family. For 
Schatzberg, the poverty of existing conceptual tools lies in their exclusion of culture, 
literature, linguistics and spirituality in understanding how legitimacy is communicated 
by the powerful (ibid., p4). As such, Schatzberg marks a clear improvement on 
Englebert’s quantitative-oriented analysis that deploys African states’ intrinsic ‘legitimacy 
deficit’ (2000, p11) to account for neopatrimonialism’s pork and interminable economic 
stagnation. 
Whilst Schatzberg’s contribution is clear, despite his claims to enter the daily ‘lifeworld’ 
of society, his emphasis nonetheless on the actions of elites in imparting particular 
symbols to their various publics endures. He focuses on newspapers, manifestos and 
policy statements than on how such communications are interpreted and contested. 
This is symptomatic of a broader lack of methodological attention to the tensions within 
strong constructivism regarding the structure/agency divide. On the one hand, most of 
our thoughts are pre-theoretical and passively received; on the other he defines 
legitimacy as what is ‘politically thinkable’ (p32): a conscious deliberate act. Thus those 
deemed without power are at once passive consumers and active participants in the 
matrix of political legitimacy. His own brand of culturalism ultimately veers towards the 
structural, with the form and content of such deliberate action left unclear. It is not, 
therefore, only the ‘usual suspects’ of the (neo)patrimonial school who fail to provide a 
comprehensive, interactive account of legitimation, agency and action. 
The study of legitimation, therefore, even when framed as a political process, has tended 
to exclude the ‘everyday’, and/or overstate the role of elites in its authorship. Even the 
late modern theorists whose work informs this thesis, when discussing legitimacy/legitimation, 
return to state power and its elites. Bourdieu, for example, cites the state as the 
dominant source of ‘doxic submission’ (1994, p15). It is the ‘site par excellence of the 
concentration and exercise of symbolic power’ (ibid., p9; also 1984, p27), his formulation 
of legitimation. Foucault is more equivocal on legitimation, ‘disowning’ it (Doxiadis 
1997, p531) in his avoidance and yet, like Bourdieu, legitimation arguably becomes his 
ultimate problematic. Governmentality is indeed conduct that solves the problem of 
legitimation (ibid. p514; also Dean 2010). This is codified for Foucault in juridico-legal 
discourse, which reifies the liberal democratic order and its keystone of sovereignty. 




itself legitimated. This is despite the fact that ‘the legitimacy of this sovereignty…deeply 
permeates our images and theories of the state’ (Dean 2010 [1999], p35). When 
Foucault does take direct aim, it is at government elites and their representations of 
power, whether his contemporaneous French administration, post-war Germany or 
Iran’s pre-revolution Shah (see e.g. Dean 2010; Doxiadis 1997; Gordon 2014). Whilst 
such late modern writers have therefore, on the one hand, indelibly changed the course 
of how we study the political sphere, their recapitulation of the state as the main locus 
of productive power, rather counterintuitively, truncated avenues of study.23 
This thesis, therefore, rather than being reliant on the analytically implicit, brings the 
core work of everyday legitimation to the fore. It is intrinsically multidisciplinary in its 
approach, drawing on the strengths that particularly sociology, anthropology and 
political geography bring to bear. Such a framing embraces the processual elements of 
legitimation, within which the realm of the everyday marks continuation rather than a 
perceived inversion of the field of study.24 It embraces the primary unit of legitimation 
analysis as, rather than the state, institutional fields more broadly, as well as the 
interactions of those who inhabit them. It thus allows for a fuller account of the 
interaction between individual actors and the environments, or fields, in which they 
operate. Thus, the social, cultural, economic and, ultimately, symbolic legitimation 
resources, or ‘capital’, on which actors draw, both give and are given meaning through 
iterative interaction with their intended audiences. As such, this approach is as pertinent 
to institutional reproduction as it is in moments of rupture. 
Such an eclectic formulation draws therefore most prominently from the works of 
Foucault and Bourdieu. With regard to Foucault, there has been a fruitful broadening of 
his approach by his scholars into an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 2010 [1999], p3, 
emphasis added; also Rose 1993; 1999), now expansively defined. This allows for ‘an 
assemblage of rationalities, technologies, and agencies’ (Dean 2010. p10; also Collier & 
                                                             
23  Clearly late/post-modern writers, most obviously Habermas, are giving a much broader 
historiography of the political, or ‘public’, sphere and in tracing their formation also highlight their 
confines. The point is, ultimately, they return to the prospects for state governance and 
transformation, with Legitimation Crisis (1976) a case in point. 
24 This draws on a large, established body of organizational sociology that analyses legitimation as 
process (e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Berger et al. 1998; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Neilsen & Rao 
1987; Ridgeway & Berger 1986; Suchman 1995; Thomas et al. 1986; Walker et al. 1986, Zelditch 
& Walker 1984. There is similarly an extensive sociology of the ‘everyday’ (e.g. de Certeau 1984; 
Douglas 1970; Goffman 1969; Jacobsen 2009; Smith 1988), although its limits must be noted as a 




Ong 2005), underscoring the heterogeneity of political action in the everyday. It also 
allows for a broadening of the notion of government, more explicitly than in some of 
Foucault’s own work, into a ‘calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge’ 
(Dean 2010, p18, emphasis added). Such a Foucauldian-derived approach, centred on 
regimes of practice allows Foucault not just ‘to travel’ to the geographical margins of 
contemporary politics and IR (Death 2013), but to return with vigour to the centrality of 
legitimation and its ‘how’ (see Chapter Two) as experienced in any part of the globe. 
With regard to Bourdieu, the debt of this thesis to his ‘vocabulary for asking questions 
about power’ (Leander 2008, p11, emphasis original) is more pronounced. Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on state elites’ legitimation notwithstanding, his analysis melds the sociological 
sphere with the political, turning ‘sociology into a means of continuing politics by other 
means’ (cited in Leander 2002, p606). Bourdieusian analysis claims to focus on both the 
formal and informal practices and interactions that inhabit a particular social sphere, or 
‘field’. A field is clearly structured and retains identity over time through a shared logic 
or ‘sense of the rules of the game’ (Salter 2013, p85), even if such rules evolve 
incrementally. Relations within this field are determined by the distribution between 
players of his different forms of capital. Whilst such language suggests prima facie a rather 
atomistic individualism, Bourdieu is explicit on the importance of habitus: how practices 
become internalized or ‘second nature’ (1990b, p56) over time. Whilst the actions of 
individuals are always visible, it is true to say that the Bourdieusian project as a whole 
privileges structure over agency. Whilst there are therefore challenges in its full 
application (to which I return), Bourdieu’s endowment to practice-based enquiry 
nonetheless offers a number of assets. 
The first is the notion of the field itself, which has the potential to embrace the diversity 
and multi-faceted nature of socio-political life. Consequently, pertinent to this project, 
the field must retain a lateral landscape in scrutinizing the practices of a range of actors 
who, whilst differentiated within the field hierarchy with respect to the capital they bear, 
retain at least a similar aspect as to their key relationships and audiences. In this sense, 
the rules of the game are indeed shared to an identifiable degree. When the field is 
invoked in this way, it allows a necessary counterbalance to the verticality of 




governmentality school. This is not a self-evident reading of Bourdieu, in that his 
constraining brand of structuralism returns in the final analysis to that of class structure, 
specifically the domination on the part of elites. This current reading is thus a more 
pragmatic one, allowing the sensibility of the field to encompass the breadth of inter-
agential relations. This sensibility, furthermore, supports the exploration of positionality, 
locale and the spatialized practices of legitimation. Such symbolism, interwoven with 
forms of materiality, ran through each of the practices that curate the empirical chapters. 
The second, as noted, is Bourdieu’s expansion and refinement of the concept of capital, 
which, via habitus, captures the weight of time. ‘The social world is accumulated history’ 
and as such demands the ‘notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its efforts’ 
(1986, p241). Bourdieu appropriates this quintessentially economic language by 
broadening the notion of capital to admit of social, cultural and, most importantly for 
this thesis, symbolic forms, as distinct from brute materiality. He defines economic 
capital, as noted, as material wealth directly convertible into money or property (p242); 
social as relationships of acquaintance and recognition linked to membership in a group 
(p248); cultural as the acquisition of knowledge, education and other hereditary 
advantages over time (pp243-8); and symbolic as prestige, or recognition ‘as legitimate’ 
(1990, p118)25. Symbolic capital, therefore, is crucial to the work of legitimation and is 
patently not, as the empirical case studies will show, reducible to material wealth. 
Bourdieu advanced his broader conception of capital as an antidote to the dominant 
representation of the ahistorical, interest-maximizing individual (1986, p241), but also to 
expose how materiality alone cannot account for entrenched inequality. As such, his 
conception of the social world is distinctly richer for it. 
Whilst Bourdieu, as noted, increasingly reserves symbolic capital to the lofty process of 
state legitimation (e.g. 1987; 1994), his capital inhere in everyday, symbolic legitimation 
practice as explored in this thesis. The ideational thus melds with the material, 
engendering the multi-faceted and variegated matrices of public action. Furthermore, his 
conception of capital as ‘accumulated labour’, either material or ‘embodied’ (1987, 
p131), neatly captures the considerable work and accretion on the part of non-state, as 
well as state, actors over time. Each form of capital can be ‘converted’, depending on 
                                                             
25 Again, I distance myself from understanding legitimacy as belief, via recognition or similar. 
Recognition can rather be read as a conscious, even strategic affirmation but, as noted, there may 




competency, into another (ibid. p252). To apply this reading to NGOs, organizational 
symbolic capital (prestige) can potentially be converted into economic capital (funding) 
and vice versa but neither is reducible to the other. An NGO’s ‘name’ or reputation, 
therefore, is existentially critical and must be closely guarded (Gent et. al 2015). The 
changing distribution of capital, therefore, regulates the choices open to actors at any 
one time as well as ‘determining the chances of success for practices’ (Bourdieu 1986, 
p242) which they embark on. As such, competition for symbolic capital, for recognition, 
in Tanzania’s institutionally saturated ‘fields’ becomes pronounced. 
At the same time, there are limits to, and indeed contradictions within, the application 
of the full Bourdieusian project. The initial attraction of its seemingly comprehensive 
framework gives way to areas of ambiguity when applied in its entirety. The analytical 
nub, according to Bourdieu, lies within the structure of the field, in turn determined by 
its distribution of capital. A field, therefore, is ‘a structured space of positions in which the 
positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds 
of…capital’ (1990a, p64). The use of capital is only given meaning through interactions 
within the field so structured. Given Bourdieu’s structuralist emphasis over agency, 
however, this analysis is in practice corroded by its circularity. The distribution of capital 
is firstly methodologically difficult to identify without quantitative measures, meaning 
theorists tend towards mere acknowledgement that certain forms of capital are present. 
Secondly, and more substantively, when Bourdieausian analysis is scrutinized more 
closely, the distribution of capital is never evidenced in determining the rules of the 
game; indeed, such rules often appear to be structured by forms of power elsewhere. 
In this way, analyses affiliated with Bourdieu within conventionally ‘political’ fields, 
often do not undertake his project in its entirety. Anna Leander, for example, more 
purist than most as to Bourdieu’s IR ‘potentials’ (2011), dispenses with capital 
completely in her analysis of private military companies (2005, p812), unnecessary in 
identifying the rules of the game. Such rules, it transpires, are determined by the 
‘epistemic power’ of such companies to influence security and its discourse, seemingly 
in collusion with the state. Their practices ‘constitute what counts as legitimate 
expertise’ (p825), and yet symbolic capital, which Bourdieu deems as essential in 
understanding legitimation, is not invoked at all. Indeed, Leander’s conclusion could 




knowledge and its resultant practice. Epistemic power, decidedly located beyond the field, 
is suffice to structure the fields of operation in the first instance. 
Williams and Abrahamsen, also in the field of private security, afford more attention to 
the distribution and accumulation of capital (2010). The authors argue clearly how 
economic, cultural and symbolic capital are not the same, nor one reducible to the other, 
but rather how each manifests itself and plays a different role in the security field (social 
capital has dropped out of the analysis). At the same time, the actual distribution of 
capital is not quantified – a task nigh impossible in any case if its different forms are not 
directly fungible and thus incommensurable. In its place is a strong and persuasive 
account of how such forms are manifestly present. In a similar vein Neal (2012), 
examining the UK parliament, clearly demonstrates the entrenched inequalities of this 
field but with reference primarily to symbolic capital, which again begs understanding 
beyond the field alone.26 
This is not, however, a symptom of incomplete applications of Bourdieu: the issue 
inheres in Bourdieu’s own work. In his analysis of the academic field in Homo Academicus 
(1984), the demographic and academic metrics of those who inhabit it are detailed and 
meticulous (pp43-6), but his presented forms of capital inconsistent, their transmutation 
implicit and their legitimation presumed.27 Bourdieu argues, again rather circularly, that 
the distribution of capital structures the field of power (p40). Yet it does not appear, nor 
indeed cannot be, the distribution of capital that determines the field per se. It is, rather, 
the acknowledgement of such capital that allows academic elites to wield very real forms 
of power. It is the symbolic ‘recognition of status’ (p93) that allows this field to 
function: of academics between themselves but also recognition of the field itself by 
other holders, or rather relations, of power. It is not, therefore, the distribution of 
capital that has determining value, but rather the skilful aggregation of capital by its 
most successful actors (in this case into the rather nebulous ‘academic capital’ p84). This 
recognition, however, their crucial legitimation, is dealt with only in passing (p48; p63; 
p98-9), when it is in fact analytically central to the functioning of the field itself. 
                                                             
26 Neal appeals to the ‘latent legitimation’ of parliament in its continuity and presence over time 
(2012, p363), but this itself requires understanding of political culture beyond the field. 
27 Bourdieu introduces, for example, further capital of scientific power and prestige, of intellectual 
renown, of academic power, of political power (pp43-6), as well as the more familiar forms of 




Symbolic capital, therefore, confers recognition vis-à-vis its broader resonance with the 
historical, political and social context beyond the field. Bourdieu’s answer to such 
structuration comes in the form of doxa. Doxa, for Bourdieu, embodies a ‘primordial 
political belief’ (1994, p15) but yet it is simultaneously one borne out of relations of 
domination. It represents the ‘point of view of the dominant’ (ibid.), when presented as 
universal or ‘self-evident’ (1977, p164). The term doxa, however, is employed more 
intermittently still by Bourdieu-affiliated analysis, and indeed by Bourdieu himself.28 Its 
diminished utility, when compared to his more prominent ‘thinking tools’ (see Leander 
2008), is perhaps symptomatic of its deficiency in capturing the nature of structure and 
agency. Doxa, in its deficiency, fails to apprehend the full, interactive dynamics of 
recognition, and therefore the specific problem of legitimation. 
Bourdieu’s work, therefore, whilst placing increasing analytical weight on recognition, 
via symbolic capital and the legitimation it supports, nonetheless falls short in fully 
articulating legitimation.29 Indeed, legitimation through symbolic capital was initially 
introduced as something of an auxiliary form of capital: the privilege of those who could 
simply buy it (1990b p119). Over time, however, and indeed symptomatic of his rather 
mechanical conception of agency, it emerges as his core analytical problem. 
Legitimation, however, is patently not determined by field interactions alone and thus 
the urge to ground it remained. Bourdieu looked increasingly to the state as holding the 
‘monopoly over…symbolic violence’ (1994, p16) in order to ground legitimation 
beyond the particularities of the field. Doxa, however, as the rather unthinking 
acceptance of the norms and ideas as articulated by the most powerful, does not do this 
process justice.30 Legitimation is negotiated and contested; as such it does not signify the 
unmediated view of the most powerful, nor its automated, ‘primordial’ consumption. 
                                                             
28 The previously cited Bourdieusian-inspired analyses do not draw on doxa (Leander 2005; Neal 
2012; Williams & Abrahamson 2010). Doxa is not invoked by Bourdieu himself in understanding 
the structural reproduction of the academic field (e.g. 1984, pp40-1; p53): that work is given to 
habitus. Doxa does not enter the fray until Chapter 5 of Homo Academicus. 
29 Bourdieu firstly expounded on first cultural and social capital in 1977, more fully developed in his 
‘Forms of Capital’ (1986). Symbolic capital was first mentioned in Distinction (1984) but not fully 
developed until In Other Words (1990a) and his later work on symbolic power and violence (1991; 
1994). 
30 This line of argument is central to Archer’s renowned critique of Bourdieu (e.g. 1995; 2012), in that 
human action in late modernity is highly reflexive and self-aware. Some Bourdieusian purists in 
response try to highlight the more ‘generative and creative aspects of habitus and action’, as 
opposed to habit (Akram & Hogan 2015, p610 drawing on Bourdieu 1977; also Adams 2006; 




Legitimation, to summarize, is a core component of the construction and contestation 
of the everyday authority to act: of crafting the space to govern. It is the symbolic 
rendering of power authoritative, and reproducing that authority once in place. It is 
symbolically spatialized, demanding the negotiation of inside and out; proximity and 
distance; entreaty and repudiation; Us and Others. Rather than leaning on implied 
content and form, however, this thesis places legitimation’s constituent practices front 
and centre. It draws, methodologically and substantively, on eclectic insights into 
legitimation practice, using these to scrutinize the practices of NGOs: their enactment 
and contestation at nested scales. It is informed by the legacies of Foucault and 
Bourdieu, and their contribution to practice-based enquiry, but solicits a more pragmatic 
adoption of their central ‘thinking tools’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p83; also Leander 
2008; see Dean 2010 on Foucault). It thus settles on Adler and Pouliot’s key rendering 
of world politics ‘through the lens of its manifold practices’ (2011, p1), sharing their 
optimism of a productive concordance around practice-based enquiry (ibid. p3), 
interweaving the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu. 
Practice, as ‘competent performances’ which ‘embody, act out, and…reify background 
knowledge…in and on the material world’ (ibid. p4), thus pertains to legitimation. Its 
exploration through the arsenal of critical ethnography tempers the urge shared by 
Foucault and Bourdieu to reduce legitimation to the transmission and consumption of 
predominantly state-generated ideology. This is not, as noted, to disregard the role of 
the state in legitimating public authority. It is rather an acknowledgement that public 
authority is produced, shared and contested by a disparate range of actors in world 
politics. Critical ethnography, as explored in the next chapter, draws on the richness and 
proximity of ethnographic data whilst adding ‘wider social structures and systems of 
power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). This allows us to move away from the vertical 
production and consumption of knowledge towards analysis that explores the 
complexity of fields within which ‘public’ interventions take place. It affords time to 
looking ‘sideways’ and ‘upwards’ at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and 
interactions that shape and constrain such activities at different levels. The horizontal 
'noise' of the field that is routinely filtered out is the very context within which NGOs 
negotiate and legitimate their presence. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
from this secondary literature, however, is that it takes a considerable amount of additional work to 




My field of Bagamoyo district, Tanzania, as examined in the next chapter, serves as a 
microcosm of the ever-reconstituted public, rapidly inundated by development activity 
at various scales. Whilst, therefore, my Bagamoyo case study is uniquely coastal 
Tanzanian, where there has been particular contestation regarding outsiders and their 
efforts to ‘develop’ reticent locals, there is nothing uniquely Tanzanian, nor African, 
about legitimation per se. The empirical data has been garnered from ordinary 
conversations with ordinary people situated, as far as possible, in their everyday lives. It 
is a modest attempt to explore the complexities that motivate people to act in an 
environment that is particularly saturated with NGO activity. Material interest, as 
Bourdieu convinced, is but one of a range of political, social, cultural and symbolic 
phenomena that intersect in new constellations of governance concerning NGO 
activity. This is reflected in the excerpts from the lives of people, from a diverse range 
of backgrounds, who continue to negotiate their position, livelihoods and security in 
competitive, often precarious environments. 
 
Conclusion: gaps and opportunities 
 
This chapter has laid the conceptual groundwork in order to explore how NGOs, as non-
state actors, legitimate their authority to act within contemporary modes of governance. The thesis 
seeks to curate legitimation practices into symbolic sets of practices, imbued historically 
with forms of capital. These resonate with the specific cultural context but also provide 
an insight to the changing production of authority in the contemporary world. It has, in 
order to do so, identified a number of gaps in existing literature but also opportunities 
within exciting new avenues of enquiry. Such opportunities are part of a 
multidisciplinary concordance around practice-based exploration of the ‘political’, a 
wave which in turn is broadening and enriching the study of politics and IR, to which 
this thesis will ultimately return. 
The first opportunity is the drive, against a backdrop of shifting global governance, to 
understand how public authority is indeed produced, shared and contested by new 
constellations, or ‘assemblages’ (Collier & Ong 2005), of actors. Legitimation as a 




capital, is part of that (re)production of authority. It provides the basis on which the 
wielding of such is negotiated, contested, or indeed accepted. Legitimation comprises a 
diverse, highly symbolic set of practices. It is deeply performative in creating and 
sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through the symbolic positioning vis-à-vis other 
actors. The challenge, in this respect, is to extricate the normative from the empirical, in 
a subject area that has long melded the two. I have argued for a cautious return to 
Weber’s original aims, via practice-based enquiry, before Weber’s musings on legitimacy 
were commandeered by political and IR theorists, looking to consolidate a discipline 
(see Walker 1993). 
The second, related point is that evaluations of legitimacy/legitimation, especially that of 
non-state actors such as NGOs, have overly emphasized the global or international 
realm. This relates, as explored, to state-based territorialism, and its concern for 
implications for the inter-national system. The toolbox for such evaluations tends 
towards the technical, but techne that embody the rational-legal state normativity. This 
reaffirms the predominance of this ideal type, but also neglects the considerable work 
that NGOs undertake, both ‘international’ and ‘local’, in crafting the political space to 
govern. NGOs are not just products of the global; they are appropriated, contested and 
reassembled within local contexts amid new modes of power and authority. This is not, 
therefore, to disregard the importance of the global domain, but rather to highlight 
reciprocities between it and the local. It is a response to Walker’s renowned call to 
undertake world and local politics at once (1993, p9), hamstrung to date by the 
conventional drawing of sovereignty (also Ruggie 1993). 
In addition, the default analysis of the global sphere reaffirms a certain ‘verticality’ bias 
in the study of NGOs and their legitimacy. NGOs’ core constituencies, to which they 
must legitimate themselves, are located primarily upwards to typically international 
organizations, and secondarily downwards to their purported beneficiaries. Whilst these 
dynamics do indeed form a core part of legitimation practice, duly reflected in this 
thesis, this overlooks an additional domain of activity: that of lateral legitimation. NGOs 
must also legitimate themselves to their peers, collaborators and competitors, both 
government and non-government, as well as to other interested outsiders. As such, they 
are as immersed laterally in localized ‘fields’ as they are vertically, in what is now a highly 




The third related point is that the study of legitimation, when under the purview of 
politics at least, has tended to exclude the ‘everyday’, overstating the role of elites in its 
authorship. The neglect of the micro-level thus overlooks both the everyday discursive 
production of legitimacy but also, by extension, its negotiation in the everyday. This 
neglect has been particularly pertinent to studies on the African continent, amidst a 
recurrent drive to subsume such processes under elite-driven logics. African studies, 
alongside the global governance literature, has in the past denuded large swathes of 
groups of their agency and capacity to negotiate, contest and indeed reject, the authority 
of the non-state and/or state to intervene ever more deeply into their lives. The rebuttal 
from governmentality studies has provided only half an answer, in revealing the extent 
of the hidden workings of power but neglecting its limits. 
The final opportunity is that of the promise of practice-based enquiry and its continuing 
enrichment of PIR. This research, in spotlighting legitimation practices in a shifting 
global context, firmly embraces this new avenue in IR theorizing. This is categorically 
not to reject the continuing efficacy of state power in the global system. It is rather an 
acknowledgement of new nexuses of governmental practice, within which both state 
and non-state actors participate. Indeed, as a practice-based enquiry, definitive 
typologies of the state and non-state spheres carry less analytical weight than the ideas, 
norms and practices such concepts give rise to. The ideational melds with the material, 
bringing ‘out in the clear’ (Taylor 1985, p104) the multi-faceted and variegated matrices 
of public life throughout the globe. There is potential in such an approach to embrace 
complexity but also to avoid pathology. It is more helpful to consider not what is 
exceptional about Africa, but what phenomena may be characteristic of broader shifts in 
the global order of things. The privatization, and indeed criminalization, of the ‘state’; 
the blurring of public and private; the ambiguity of public authority; are ascendant 
forces in many parts of the globe (see Mustapha 2002; also Comaroff & Comaroff 
2012). The difference is the prejudicial drive to universalize such as the curse of the 
African condition. 
This thesis, in its empiricism, aims to pull together these diverse theoretical threads and 
their new opportunities in a contribution to legitimation practice. Whilst such threads 
speak to each other in part, there has not been an attempt to bring them together in this 




practices’ and their attendant politics, in Africa or elsewhere, the empirical content of 
what that looks like in the everyday has remained thin. With this in mind, and with a 
view to return to the politics of legitimation as a whole, it is to the methodological 










Knowing legitimation:  
The ‘how’ of contemporary governance  
 
This thesis, as set out in Chapter One, examines how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate 
their authority to act. Legitimation is a practice: an accumulative process of claim-making 
that is negotiated and contested in the everyday. This process admits of both state and 
non-state actors, given the ‘disaggregation of authority’ (Rosenau 2003, p228) and its 
reassembly at various scales. Legitimation, in this case on the part of NGOs, requires a 
considerable amount of work, and indeed creativity, rendered invisible by some 
methodologies to date. A practice-based approach serves to bring both author and 
audience to the fore, moderating the verticality of some readings of Foucauldian 
governmentality or indeed Bourdieu’s structural forms of domination. To this end, I 
adopt a critical ethnographic approach, linking ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to 
wider…systems of power’ (Harvey 1990, p6). The locality of ethnography, and its 
attention to the complexity of every day social practices, lends itself in this regard. This 
approach laid the epistemological and methodological groundwork for the bulk of 
fieldwork in Tanzania. 
The case, while uniquely Tanzanian, provides a microcosm of the reconstituting public. 
Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations since its 
‘liberalization’ from the 1990s. This has reinserted the global into the local and vice 
versa, in new and adaptive ways. NGOs, as such, must skilfully negotiate public/private, 
government/non-government and global/local divides. Bagamoyo district, in turn, has a 
distinct social, cultural and political context, much maligned in late modern(ist) history. 
Nevertheless, Bagamoyo encapsulates much of recent development politics in Tanzania. 
Mushrooming numbers of NGOs, alongside other development interventions, have 
moved into the district, forming competitive fields in which both vertical and lateral 
legitimation is pronounced. The thesis thus embraces the full ethnographic impulse to 




NGOs entrench their presence. NGO staff, however, are not the sole authors of their 
authority; legitimation is an interactive phenomenon that demands the insertion of the 
collective. The thesis duly examines both district and village levels in this regard, which 





My main block of fieldwork comprised twelve months over an eighteen-month period 
2012-2013. I draw additionally on formative discussions that took place in 2011 as part 
of my Masters by Research. In the main block of fieldwork, I undertook approximately 
62 days’ observation, mainly of NGOs at work at village, ward and district levels, but 
with additional shadowing of governmental and private consultancy programmes.31 This 
comprised field visits, training workshops and inter-organizational and governmental 
meetings. I interviewed representatives of 33 NGOs as part of a ‘mapping’ exercise in 
conjunction with Bagamoyo’s civil society umbrella. This provided a springboard for 
follow-up interviews and observation, as well as generating secondary literature in the 
form of NGO reports, baseline surveys, minutes, profiles and so forth. I spent an 
additional six weeks living in two seemingly contrasting villages: Kiharaka and Kibindu. 
This comprised the observation of various interventions and their negotiation but also 
interviews and informal discussions. Lastly, I conducted a small number of ‘elite’ 
interviews, both with Bagamoyo district staff and NGO managers in Dar es Salaam. 
This main block of fieldwork, in sum, provided a rich and varied data set with which to 
explore the claim-making process. 
In this chapter, I first outline the research’s epistemological assumptions, drawing on 
the strengths of critical constructivist thought, and specifically interpretivist praxeology. 
I review what critical ethnography offers, in this regard, and the data collection methods 
it comprised. I then examine the issues of research ethics and access, not purely from 
the perspective of ethical review, but also from that of the researcher’s identity and 
welfare, given the ‘multipositionality’ this thesis simultaneously examines and invokes. 
                                                             




Lastly, I look at the data analysis process, more iterative than sequential, and how it both 
informed and was informed by, the study’s methodological and epistemological 
underpinnings. Whilst the chapter is disaggregated as per convention, the issues of 
epistemology, methodology and the ethics and politics of research are of course 




My research agenda speaks to two, intersecting sets of epistemological issues. In the 
first, I argue how, in placing legitimation as practice central to this study, I embrace the 
broader ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki et al. 2001) in social constructivist thought. This turn 
has been influenced by diverse theorists such as Taylor, Giddens, Bourdieu and 
Foucault, who hold very different epistemologies. Nevertheless, they share at least a 
movement from the social totality to ‘social practices ordered across space and time’ 
(Giddens 1984, p2): an interest in the ‘how’ as much as the ‘why’. In the second, I 
challenge the ‘vertical’, at times extractive, epistemologies that reside within not just 
development politics and its problem-solving, but also the mono-dimensional, elite-
focused studies of legitimacy more broadly. Such theorizing has not embraced the 
breadth and diversity of legitimation practice: its negotiation and contestation in the 
everyday. 
Taking practice seriously 
Practices are ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ that, when performed competently, 
embody existing knowledge in acting on the world (Adler & Pouliot 2011, p4). The 
practice turn, therefore, emphasizes how the performance of social and political 
practices ‘not only organize the world – they are also the raw materials that make it up’ 
(Adler 2013 pp25-6). Practices, in other words, are not the inevitable outcome of 
premeditated calculation, but are constitutive of the social world itself. An interest in the 
performing of practices unites what are prima facie incommensurable, or 
‘incommunicable’ (Callewaert 2006, p76), projects in social research, whether Bourdieu’s 




subjective meanings they are constitutive of, are the fundamental ‘pre-theoretical 
understanding’ of what goes on in society (Taylor 1983, p93). 
The fact that Taylor, Giddens, Bourdieu and Foucault seldom engaged with each other’s 
writings obscured their concordance around practice-based enquiry. Taylor, in ‘Social 
Theory as Practice’ (1983), did remark, if perfunctorily, on the similarity of his project to 
that of Bourdieu (1977). Giddens’ ‘theory of structuration’ and Bourdieu’s 
‘constructivist structuralism’ also bear more than a passing resemblance, in their move 
to explain the continuity and transmutation, through practices, of societal structures 
(Bourdieu 1984; 1989; Giddens 1984). They are similarly reproachful of Foucault, for 
his perceived amorality, over-abstraction and collapse into relativism. For Giddens, the 
‘mastery of the language is inseparable from mastery of the variety of contexts in which 
language is used’ (1987, p200). For Bourdieu too, Foucault’s abstraction is circular, 
seeking the ‘source of understanding of cultural productions in these productions 
themselves’ (cited in Callewaert 2006, p77). Giddens and Bourdieu, therefore, hold 
much in common. And yet, despite contemporaneity and congruity, Giddens and 
Bourdieu did not enter a substantive dialogue. 
To incorporate Foucault, the epistemological chasm is more challenging. His critical 
historiography of ideas using the tools of deconstruction and discourse analysis to reveal 
the power/knowledge nexus was central to his analysis. He was sceptical of any claim to 
access or represent practices directly, particularly via the project of rationalist social 
science. His project, however, still engages with historical modes of thinking by virtue of 
the fact that they precipitate particular institutionalized practices or techne.32 As such, the 
written text that takes centre stage in Foucauldian-inspired thought remains a ‘practical 
intervention’ of a kind (Callewaert 2006, p91). There is, in addition, a second area of 
Foucauldian inspired work, which places localized political and social practices more 
central to the field of analysis. This is not a bid to bolster or qualify policy-making, but 
rather a reversal of dominant, vertical epistemologies or, as Foucault puts it, the 
‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (1976, p990). As O’Malley et al. point out, this 
element of Foucault’s work had been hitherto neglected (1997); indeed it is difficult to 
                                                             





see how the researcher might examine localized practices without the arsenal of critical 
ethnography. 
This project, therefore, whilst mindful of these epistemological differences, locates itself 
within common praxeological ground. I focus on mainly informal, discursive practices 
on the part of NGOs, but also how these practices are negotiated, contested and 
appropriated by their intended audiences. Praxeology paves the way for critical 
ethnography, which explores ‘sideways’ and ‘upwards’ at the multiplicity of actors, 
institutions and their legitimation. It links the global with the local, without 
compounding unhelpful binarisms. In doing so, it enables a productive exploration of 
the interface between structure and agency, foregrounding the research subject as 
negotiator of the constraints and opportunities around them. Lastly, praxeological 
ethnography brings questions of ‘how’ to the fore, typically eclipsed by the ‘why’ in 
political science hypotheses (Dunn 2008; Gusterson 2008). As Dean argues, ‘[h]ow 
questions lead us to problems of the techniques and practices…identities and agencies 
by which governing operates’ (2010, p39). Ethnography, however, must ultimately share 
a confidence, albeit qualified, that a reality exists beyond our ‘egocentricity’ (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2000, p3), and indeed one that can bear data. It is thus an empirically 
grounded ‘how’ that runs to the heart this thesis: how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate 
their authority to act. 
 
‘Vertical’ research and its epistemology 
As Taylor argued, ‘[t]he identification of the subject…may be one of the most difficult 
problems, an area in which prevailing epistemological prejudice may blind us’ (1971, p5). 
In rural Tanzania, the construction of the research subject has historically been 
dominated by a developmental framework, with two contemporary, seemingly opposed, 
manifestations. The ‘practitioner’ constructs the target of intervention as actor, capital 
or asset to be supported, enabled or ‘empowered’, echoing waves of colonial 
intervention before him. The ‘critical’ school, however, tends to appropriate the subject 
as object: as victim, recipient, oppressed, subjugated through wider systems of power 
that are entrenched by the accumulating weight of development theory and practice.33 
                                                             




As such, neither school engages substantively with the key tenets of the other, beyond 
nods of acknowledgement. In another sense, however, and at the risk of caricaturing 
both positions, there are some shared tendencies. In developing their respective 
epistemologies, both schools cast roles on their 'subject' at a distance. Both draw upon 
and sustain hierarchies of their own, abstracted from the socio-political ‘noise’ that 
characterises the messy world of social interaction. These hierarchies manifest 
themselves in different ways with regard to research approach. 
The practitioner school is highly empirical, often quantitative, using the tenets of 
scientific enquiry to depoliticise the content of their research. The large-scale 
development industry, currently focused on poverty reduction and which incorporates a 
wide array of government, non-profit and corporate entities, neatly intertwines theory 
and practice, problematization and policy. Yet, from a wider, politicized perspective, the 
hierarchies of power become apparent. The development agenda is inevitably forged in 
geo-political spaces far removed from their spheres of intervention. This agenda pre-
sets the parameters of research, reaffirming this stratification of power. Human 
experience is captured and evaluated only in relation to particular programmatic 
objectives, either past or future. In this way knowledge, or ‘ways of knowing’, remain 
highly verticalized, oriented towards development power centres and shaped by the 
weight of future policy-making.34 
In contrast, the critical school, insofar as it adopts unmoderated Foucault, is highly 
politicized in placing its own formulation of subjugating power central to its analysis. It 
can be devoid of empirical fieldwork, preferring the tools of historical deconstruction 
and discourse analysis to reveal the hidden workings of the power/knowledge nexus. 
There is also, however, an inevitable move to ‘reconstruct’: in this case an enduring 
power structure that pervades development in its entirety.35 Domains of study become 
fixed and all-encompassing: a new meta-narrative usurps the old (Jameson 1984; 
Agarwal 1996). This reductionist move inadvertently reifies those very systems, 
amplifying the interests of the few at the expense of the agency of many. We are left 
with ‘politics without actors’ (Larner & Walters 2004, p4) and a politics over-determined 
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by the past. In this way knowledge, or ‘ways of knowing’, remain as hierarchical and 
dehumanising as the modes of governmentality this school rightly seeks to challenge. 
A practice-based, interpretivist approach is well-placed to challenge those 
epistemologies that privilege or project social systems as a unified entity.36 It is bolstered 
by at least the ‘vocabulary’ of Bourdieu (Leander 2008, p11), as well as the Foucauldian-
derived ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 2010, p3), broadly defined. Moving from the 
totality of grand theory to the ordering of social practices enables a movement away 
from the vertical production and consumption of development knowledge in favour of 
analysis that explores the complexity of interventions as part of a wider socio-political 
environment and through this can still be critical. This requires attending to look 
sideways and upwards at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and interactions that 
shape and constrain developmental activities at different levels. The horizontal 'noise', 
routinely filtered out through vertical epistemologies, is the very context within which 
NGOs negotiate, legitimate and entrench their presence. 
This is not, as a final comment, to presume ‘the native point of view’, as forewarned by 
post-structuralist challenges (Marcus & Fischer 1986, p25). This thesis is not social 
realist, holding a mirror to the beliefs of those who engage with NGOs. Firstly, this is 
mindful, as noted, that legitimacy as belief has long precipitated a ‘methodological 
impasse’ (Beetham 1991, p9), whereby such beliefs are not accessible or indeed related 
to action. Indeed in Tanzania, there would have been an additional difficulty whereby 
soliciting frank and direct opinion could transgress cultural norms. More substantively, 
however, as O’Kane points out, a belief in legitimacy merely begs the question on which 
grounds such beliefs are legitimated (1993; also Grafstein 1981). Rather than seeking to 
ground legitimacy elsewhere, this thesis has moved away from a foundational account. 
When constructed as practice, legitimation may be conscious and even strategic, but the 
belief systems and capital on which it draws may not. If public authority is legitimation’s 
ephemeral product, there is not necessarily the time or space for legitimacy belief to 
crystalize and endure. Critical ethnography brings such practices to the fore. 
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As outlined, the thesis examines the how of NGO legitimation, including the intended 
audiences of such claims. Its empirical content, therefore, is the claim-making process, 
as well as its negotiation and contestation. Ethnography as a methodology is 
distinguished by similar objectives, which are ‘to understand the social meanings and 
activities of people in a given ‘field’ or ‘setting’’ (Brewer 2000, p11; also Hammersley 
1998, p2). Ethnography is defined by its flexibility, locality and its attention to the 
complexity of everyday social practices as much as its various research methods, which 
extend beyond observation alone. In this way, one can speak of the ‘ethnographic 
sensibility’ (Schatz 2009, p5), of ‘deep hanging out’ (Gusterson 2008, p93 citing 
Rosaldo), in its approach to understanding the social world. 
Ethnography, however, and its anthropological heritage, is not monolithic and has gone 
through a radical period of self-critique and indeed fragmentation.37 Epitomized by the 
‘Writing Culture’ moment (Clifford & Marcus 1986; also Marcus & Fischer 1986; 
Turner & Bruner 1986), writers began to view ethnography as part of the wider power 
structures it sought to describe. It questioned the capacity of the discipline, with its 
particular fascination with writing and textual representations of social life, to access or 
aspire to some notion of ‘truth’. ‘Ethnographic truths are…inherently partial’ (Clifford 
1986, p7), which in a sense poses a threat to the basis of empirical fieldwork. How can a 
methodology be purely interpretative and yet present its account as authoritative? How 
can ethnography answer questions with regard to replicability, generalizability and 
validity? Or if we, like Wedeen (2010), abandon the authority of the narrator, what can 
replace it? 
Rather than entering embattled debates about whether ethnography is scientific, there 
are convincing arguments that undermine the metaphor with the natural sciences in the 
first instance. The ‘Newtonian’ conception of cause and effect has little relevance in the 
messy, complex and unpredictable world of the ‘sciences of man’ (Becker 1996; Taylor 
1971). In addition, pertinent to critical ethnography, epistemologies rooted in 
rationalism are weighted towards the isolation and empirical measurement of such cause 
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and effect, to the neglect of other kinds of knowledge and indeed the key ‘problems of 
our day’ (Taylor 1971, p45; also Agar 2004; Jackson 1996). The strengths of 
ethnography lie is its proximity to a particular ‘system of relationships’ (Becker 1996, 
p3), its reflexivity in making one’s own objectives and roles explicit, and its flexibility in 
accommodating the unpredictable or ‘atheoretical’. These strengths bring new 
conditions of validity, in ‘sense-making’ from experiential meaning, in a way that still 
resonates with, rather than abstracts from, those experiences (e.g. Giddens 1976; 1984; 
Schutz 1964; Taylor 1971). In this endeavour, I share Latour’s optimism that there is 
scope for in-depth, critical empiricism beyond textual deconstruction (2004). There is 
value in varying perspective and approach to how we study the institutions and activities 
that intervene deeply into people’s lives.  
The specific issue of generalizability, however, warrants a more detailed response. This 
is not in the scientific sense, which prevents generalising on the basis of a single case, 
but in relation to the ability of research to explore aspects of the ‘global’, or ‘macro’, via 
the ‘micro’, insofar as such geography holds.38 There is certainly a level of optimism 
amongst critical writers as to the value of such approach in revealing the wider workings 
of power. This is evident in responses to Nader’s renowned call to ‘study up’ (1972) 
and/or study wider relations of power and governance ‘through’ localized microcosms. 
This connects the local to the ‘translocal’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003, p172; also 
Appadurai 1996; Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Englund 2006; Rizzo 2017; Shore & Wright 
1997): the village to the district and the district to the national/international. Indeed, as 
Ley argues, the division of such realms can itself prove delimiting; ‘the optic of 
transnational global spaces should not conceal the intersecting reality of circumscribed 
everyday lives’ (Ley 2004, p151). 
Whilst care should be taken to avoid obscuring the research subject, critical ethnography 
links ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider social structures and systems of 
power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). As such, it is located at the interface between 
the micro and macro. A study of the practice of NGO legitimation, whereby different 
actors draw on different resources nested at scales, encapsulates this. In this way, multi-
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site ethnography, in ‘imagination’ as much as geography, examines where different 
ethnographically conceived sites meet (Marcus 1998, pp3-4). It is characterized, 
therefore, by not just a plurality of conventional ‘sites’ but by ‘spatialized…difference’ 
(Falzon 2009, p13). Such a sensibility supports an alternate way of mapping and 
understanding power and practice (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003).39 Care should also be 
taken to ensure IR’s entanglement with ethnography is not about churning out data to 
‘make constructivism whole’ (Vrasti 2008, p290). This sidesteps ethnography’s now 
established concession that the text must ultimately distort the reality that it so desires to 
capture (ibid. p291). 
Vrasti’s strong post-structuralist charge is difficult to overcome, given that this thesis 
has not been visibly radical in its methods or presentation, or perhaps provocative 
enough in its conclusions (see e.g. Comaroff & Comaroff 2003; Denzin 2017; Marcus 
2009). Nevertheless, I readily concede that this account of legitimation practice has 
indeed been partial. Certain voices, including my own, certain relationships and 
dynamics have taken a more central role than others, and the project not directly 
emancipatory in its aim. Legitimation practices, their interrelation and product are 
themselves contingent, and indeed temporarily configured, and so cannot be 
universalized. The broader, analytical thrust of this thesis is rather that legitimation 
practice, and its replication at different scales, remains decidedly absent from those 
disciplines which seek to ground legitimacy in universals, including IR. And when 
practices are absent, those who undertake and negotiate them are also absent, whether 
or not I can ‘represent’ them as truth. 
In embracing critical ethnography as a window to practice, therefore, I cautiously affirm 
the insights it has offered new areas such as international relations and global 
governance (e.g. Ahmed & Shore [eds] 1995; Coles 2004; Schatz [ed.] 2009; Shore & 
Wright [eds] 1997), the deepening ‘aidnography’ of the development industry (e.g. 
Anders 2005; Crewe & Harrison 1998; Dill 2013; Dorman 2005; Englund 2006; 
Ferguson 1994; 2015; Gould 2005; Green 2014; Hilhorst 2003; Igoe & Kelsall 2005; 
Kelsall 2000a; Lewis & Mosse 2006; Li 2007; Mosse 2005; 2006; Sardan 2005; Watts 
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2001), as well as ethnography’s enduring centrality to African studies. Such work draws 
on interactionist, interpretivist methodologies to examine the conditions of social and 
political action, its negotiation and contestation. It is ‘multi-positioned’ (Marcus 1995) in 
its perspective, in an attempt to interweave divergent accounts of legitimation practice: 
the macro with the micro. As such, the research is ethnographic in sensibility, whilst 
forsaking ambition to know or represent any culture or structure holistically. 
 
Methods & Data Collection 
 
Overview 
My main block of fieldwork comprised of twelve months over an eighteen-month 
period between January 2012 and June 2013, with short trips back to the UK every three 
months. The first three months focused primarily on Swahili language training, in 
preparation for conducting observation and interviews. The majority of this language 
training, however, took place within my fieldwork site of Bagamoyo and thus offered 
additional time to familiarise myself with the context and establish networks. I also draw 
on informal, formative discussions that took place in May 2011 as part of my Masters by 
Research (see Appendix A), as well as a brief follow-up visit in September 2013. 
In the main block of fieldwork I undertook an estimated 62 days’ observation, mainly of 
NGOs at work at village, ward and district levels, but with additional shadowing of 
governmental and private consultancy programmes.40 This included field visits, training 
workshops and inter-organizational and governmental meetings. I met and interviewed 
representatives of 33 NGOs May-October 2012, many more than once, as part of a 
‘mapping’ exercise in conjunction with Bagamoyo district’s civil society umbrella 
organization. I spent an additional six weeks living in two separate villages: Kiharaka 
(October/November 2012) and Kibindu (May 2013), unattached to any NGO. This 
generated data both in observing various programmes and initiatives (as part of the 62 
days) and also via interviews and informal discussions. 
                                                             




Lastly, I conducted a small number of 14 ‘elite’ interviews, both with district staff in the 
District Commissioner, community development, water, health and planning offices, as 
well as NGO managers based in Dar es Salaam. Whilst the majority of interviews and 
interactions were recorded by hand, I digitally recorded just shy of 9 hours’ audio in 
Swahili and 11 hours in English, which were subsequently transcribed by paid services 
and analysed by myself. In summary, I undertook 84 interviews (see Appendix B), as 
well as 47 sets of informal discussions alongside the 62 observation dates, which are 
thus cited as part of ethnographic fieldnotes. This provided a rich and varied data set 
with which to explore the claim-making process, its negotiation and contestation. 
Field site selection 
As argued, critical ethnography allows us to explore the global through an in-depth, 
proximate examination of the particular. As ethnography delves into the micro, 
however, the problem of justifying case selection intensifies. Global political, 
institutional and policy processes refract and proliferate, resulting in infinite interactions, 
interpretations and representations ‘all the way down’. Conversely, local institutions 
reflect and/or appropriate macro power structures in a multitude of ways (e.g. 
Schatzberg 2001). In this way, the search is not for a substantive case of ‘x’ or point of 
comparison ‘y’, but for an alternate way of mapping and understanding power and 
practice. This kind of ethnography could take place anywhere where political actors and 
institutions converge, where ‘ethnographically conceived sites [are] juxtaposed’ (Marcus 
1998, p4). As such, ethnographic research is inherently weak in (multi)site selection, but 
this does not necessarily compromise quality (see Mosse 2006). 
If, however, paying heed to conventions of site justification, the Tanzanian state 
provides an interesting case given the recent proliferation of non-government actors in 
an apparent burgeoning of civil society. The founding president Julius Nyerere and the 
ruling TANU party’s inward drive towards autonomy, which had hitherto squeezed this 
space, gave way to the resurgence of international influence following economic crisis in 
the 1970s. The disintegration of Nyerere’s grip on power and his departure in 1985 
paved the way for political pluralism in 1992, which, despite the remarkable resilience of 
the de facto ruling party (now CCM), nominally broadened space for civil society (Green 
2010; Hyden 1999; Tripp 2000). Since then, Tanzania has been cited a ‘good 




as the consummate reformer (Mercer 2003, p749; also Hyden 1999; Rizzo 2017). 
Despite bullish growth, it remains a recipient of high levels of international assistance, 
with aid comprising a third of government expenditure (Green 2014, p3), Tanzania has 
consistently ranked low on human development indices (UNDP 2016).41 ‘Lived poverty’ 
for the masses continues to rise (Afrobarometer 2012). Tanzania continued to slide the 
wrong way down corruption indices in the 2000s, at the time civil society seemingly 
propagated.42 
Given, therefore, that the countenance of reform has not necessarily been matched by a 
meaningful transformation in the day to day lives of many, there would seem to be 
something prima facie in Mamdani’s thesis of the limitations of reform and the 
hollowness of civil society engagement (1996; also Hyden 1999). Certainly, whilst the 
numbers of NGOs have burgeoned, there is considerable scope to be sceptical, given 
the parameters of their engagement were initially carefully policed by the state 
(Aminzade 2013; Hyden 1999; Shivji 2004; 2007). Aberrant NGOs were censured or 
deregistered. Trade union movements repeatedly struggled to get off the ground, lagging 
well behind the numbers of NGOs, with the first formal organization coming a full six 
years after multi-party politics (Shivji 2004). These unions struggled to gain meaningful 
autonomy from the governing party, again enforced by the sanction of deregistration 
(Tripp 2000, p202). Indeed, there are indications of returning to the authoritarian 
control of dissent under President Magufuli’s new ‘bulldozer’ administration (Paget 
2017). 
In the face of Tanzania’s resurgent centre, however, contemporary modes of 
governance fuse globalized templates such as ‘civil society’ with more localized 
phenomena. In the case of Tanzania, localized phenomena include that of 
‘districtization’ (Kelsall 2000b; also Green 2010; Harrison 2008), whereby political elites 
have reconfigured around district centres. A district-level case study thus provides an 
important backdrop to the question of how (global) governance is actualized in 
Tanzania. Local government authorities (LGAs) form key decision-making and 
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administrative hubs, around which situated elites, including those of NGOs, are 
increasingly centred. The extent to which district councils wield real power is 
circumscribed, whilst financial oversight remains concentrated at the centre.43 
Nevertheless, there has been a substantive and symbolic shift towards the district since 
local government reform was enacted from 1999 (ibid.; also Green 2010). District 
councils, rather than presidentially appointed commissioners, have been on the 
ascendency as locus of local political power and, at times, house antagonistic relations 
between its constituent elected and bureaucratic officials.44 The district of Bagamoyo 
thus forms the geographical and notional field for the first of the three empirical 
chapters. 
Bagamoyo encapsulates recent development politics in Tanzania. It is one of 127 
administrative districts in Tanzania and one of six in the coastal region Pwani. The 
district is notable in several respects. Its population has grown rapidly since the 
completion of the sealed 65km road to Dar es Salaam in 2002, rising 26% to 290,000 by 
the end of 2012 (Bagamoyo District Profile 2011). The road extended the commuter 
corridor to Dar, bringing new wealth as well as land and housing pressures to the area. 
Bagamoyo has long been a popular area for tourism, with several historical sites relating 
to early Swahili culture, as well as the ivory, missionary and infamous, if overstated, slave 
trade (Fabian 2013) eras. There is a vibrant music and creative arts scene with residential 
music and arts colleges. Crucially, however, the incumbent president at the time of 
research, Jakaya Kikwete, hailed from the district. As such, Bagamoyo had returned into 
the political limelight as development agencies mushroomed, pilot development 
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level – a ‘state guy’ (interview 82, Advocates International programme coordinator, 1 June 2013). 
The district council has both an elected and bureaucratic component, the latter divided into the 
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initiatives, institutes, building works sprung up and a new international port, signed off 
by the Chinese premier, had been steered into the region.45 
These factors contributed to the continuing mix of cultures, local and transient 
populations, visitors, tourists, students as well as an influx of development and para-
statal agencies that have marked Bagamoyo’s history over centuries.46 They have 
contributed to the complex and saturated aid environment, particularly with respect to 
NGO activity. As a rough indication, there were 124, mainly local, NGOs registered 
with Bagamoyo District Council at the time of research, a high number compared to 
other districts.47 A number of factors contributed to this. Firstly, the proximity to Dar 
encouraged the registration of NGOs within Bagamoyo as an extension of their 
Tanzania operations, giving donors and other stakeholders the impression of increased 
outreach.48 Secondly, there was an increased flow of professionals, consultants and 
entrepreneurs to and from Dar seeking opportunities in Bagamoyo, which performs 
poorly with regard to key human development indices.49 Thirdly, interest in Bagamoyo, 
given its historical legacy, arts scene and proximity to Dar and Zanzibar, has precipitated 
a steady flow of overseas visitors. This has led to a number of self-styled ‘saviour’ 
NGOs, established by Western expatriates with a piecemeal flow of volunteers and 
funding. Lastly, although it is difficult to verify, several informants suggested that 
President Kikwete’s roots in Bagamoyo influenced the flow of funding to the district, 
leading to a mushrooming of small NGOs. There is a certainly a correlation, given the 
majority of Bagamoyo’s NGOs have registered in that timeframe.50 
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The impetus to explore a district, local government oriented case study is thus two-fold. 
The first is political in the conventional sense, mapping the power dynamics that 
accompany ‘districtization’. These dynamics are intriguing, given the authoritarian 
history of the state, but also, more importantly, central to the legitimation strategies of 
district-based development actors. The second point is more epistemologically 
substantive, running throughout the empirical chapters. As noted in Chapter One, there 
is a focus within empirical studies of NGOs on their role within verticalized hierarchies. 
NGOs legitimate themselves downwards via macro global developmental discourses, or 
‘policy templates’ (Mercer & Green 2013, p106). At the same time, they legitimate 
themselves upwards through proximity to the ‘grassroots’, or micro, inserting the 
purported interests, perspectives and ‘voice’ of the poor and marginalized into global 
agendas. NGOs, therefore, play a verticalized interstitial role, transmitting, infusing and 
adapting interests, ideas and norms between actors and discursive regimes (Green 2003; 
2012; Lewis 2002; Mercer & Green 2013; Williams & Young 2012).  
Verticalized analysis thus typifies two key empirical omissions. The first is the interstitial 
work of NGOs in legitimating themselves to other NGOs and, crucially, to local 
government. This work forms the empirical backbone of Chapter Three. Contrary to 
the assertion, as per Mercer and Green, that NGOs’ interactions with local government 
are deliberately rendered invisible (2013, p113), NGOs’ lateral positionality vis-à-vis the 
district, as well as other key players, is a deliberately visible legitimation strategy. The 
second omission, addressed in Chapters Four and Five, is how legitimation practices are 
interpreted, affirmed and/or contested by ‘beneficiaries’, or the subjects of such will to 
improve (Li 2007), typically at the very bottom of the ‘vertical model’ (Mercer & Green 
2013, p107). This omission inadvertently overstates the role of elites in legitimation’s 
authorship. This tendency has been pertinent to studies on the African continent, 
amidst a recurrent drive to subsume legitimation under elite-driven logics. This has 
denuded the many of their agency to negotiate, contest and indeed reject, the authority 
of development actors, both state and non-state, to intervene ever more deeply into 
their lives.  
In Bagamoyo district, six key players emerged in the district as the most active from 
which the majority of interviews and observations are drawn, namely: Advocates 




Youth Health (YH); Gender-Net; Eco-Coast (all pseudonyms). The first two of these 
organizations were formally international but all depended on international financing. 
Most of the organizations focus on health objectives but all engage in ‘good governance’ 
and/or rights based work. All six NGOs had strong district presence, a relatively robust 
funding portfolio and evidence of delivery. There was therefore an element of self-
selection as these organizations were happiest to open their doors, which led ultimately 
to in-depth ethnography. Whilst this might appear a ‘skewing’ of sampling, there was 
enough range but also continuity within these six NGOs with which to explore the 
multifaceted, oscillating nature of legitimation as practice. Six NGOs, in addition, 
proved to be the logistical limit in the given timeframe. 
Figure 2.1: Six selected NGOs in Bagamoyo (pseudonyms) 
 HIV/Health Advocacy (good governance) 
Local (Bagamoyo only)  Community Health 
 Youth Health 
 Gender-Net (also micro-credit) 
 Eco-Coast (environment) 
International (HQ 
outside Tanzania) 
 Voluntary Partnership 
International 
 Advocates International 
 
With regard to the selection of the two villages, I settled on two contrasting 
environments. The first, Kiharaka, a village to which I had been signposted by several 
NGOs during my first trip in 2011, is a rapidly growing village located approximately 
half way between Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo town. It is under increasing 
urbanization pressures, particularly with regard to private land acquisitions, and its 
accessibility means it is more frequently served by both government and non-
government agencies. The second village, Kibindu, is at the outer boundary of the 
district, five to seven hours by public transport from Bagamoyo Town, remote and 
generally underserved. I had ‘entry points’ to both villages and provide detailed case 
profiles within the relevant chapters. Whilst these two environments were very different 
in a number of key respects, there was also surprising continuity between the sites and 
they provided ample opportunities with which to engage with people about their 
experiences on NGO and government activity. 
There are a couple of excursuses beyond the above selections. In some cases, I 




geographical or notional ‘field’ for the first time, or early in their legitimation trajectory. 
The first of these, incorporated in Chapter Four’s Kerege, is the shadowing of 
Advocates International as it entered remote and underserved Talawanda ward in the 
southwest of the district for the first time. The second of these is the inclusion of 
Community Development Innovation Professionals’ (CDIP) activities in Chapter Five’s 
Kibindu, early in their operational journey. A third speaks to the inclusion of 
Bagamoyo’s umbrella civil society organization, particularly within Chapter Three’s 
district case study. The last of these excursuses was by design, through the regular 
‘zooming out’ to the wider ward environment, including to adjacent villages, in which 
the two villages were situated. These aspects of fieldwork were generally more reactive 
and unplanned but nonetheless provided additional rich data in understanding: early 
legitimation work; the operations of younger players; and the localized ‘crowding’ and 
inter-organizational politics of particular geographical and notional fields. The data is 
incorporated at opportune moments in the relevant chapters. 
 (Participant) observation 
Participant observation has been considered the hallmark of ethnography since 
Malinowski decreed it so (1922). In the main block of fieldwork, I duly undertook an 
estimated 62 days’ observation, mainly of NGOs at work at village, ward and district 
levels, but with additional shadowing of governmental and private consultancy 
programmes. This included field visits, training workshops and inter-organizational and 
governmental meetings. I spent an additional six weeks living in two separate villages: 
Kiharaka (October/November 2012) and Kibindu (May 2013), unattached to any 
NGO. This generated data both in observing various programmes and initiatives (as 
part of the 62 days) and via interviews and informal discussions. 
Malinowskian-styled observation, however, rests on the assumption that it is possible to 
enter the lives of the people that you are studying and forge common interests or ‘ties’ 
(Wind 2008, p85). As such, the perennial ‘insider’/’outsider’ dichotomy is central to its 
dual activities of participation/observation (Spradley 1980). The reflexive ethnographer 
is well placed to straddle this divide, watching herself from the outside in. And yet, for 
anyone who as truly reflected on the status of ‘insidership’, even if apparently so by 
virtue of ‘traditional’ markers of race, gender or class, achieving such a state as a 




Narayan 1993; Zinn 1979). An ostensible insider status is refracted by divergent life 
trajectories, experiences, education and, ultimately, interests. Indeed, even for those who 
have been part of a community over an extensive period, the shifting layers and 
complexity of insidership means that even those deemed insiders by others can 
themselves feel frequent feelings of exclusion (Naples 1996). It is a conceit, therefore, to 
suggest that such divergent paths can be overcome through humour or ‘solidarity’ with 
the plight of others. 
The fragility of my insidership, and therefore my capacity to ‘participate’, was laid bare 
during my short time with my initial host organization. All overseas researchers are 
obliged to apply to the Commission of Science and Technology in order to obtain 
research clearance and are required to name a host organization. Given that I did not 
wish to be assigned to any particular NGO, and that I had existing relations with 
Bagamoyo’s umbrella Civil Society Association (CSA), I used their contact information 
to issue the permit. The CSA’s purported role was to build the capacity of, and 
coordination between, Bagamoyo’s civil society, a natural starting point for 
collaboration. Our prior discussions, dating from May 2011, had centred on shared 
goals regarding the need to coordinate and ‘map’ NGO activity more closely at a district 
level. I was interested to see how much mapping the CSA had achieved to date and was 
willing to step in to continue the exercise with those organizations who had failed to 
respond. We were seeming collaborators in our desire to document NGO activity and in 
our tacit disapproval of their shortcomings in this regard. As such, I positioned myself 
within CSA in order to access member organizations and collect information on their 
behalf; but was also outside in my attempt to understand how other NGOs viewed the 
CSA. 
I conducted the mapping exercise between May and August 2012, compiling a simple 
excel database, cross-checking available data from Bagamoyo District Council, the CSA 
and NGOs themselves of around 65 organizations. The data is not appended to this 
thesis for reasons of confidentiality and anonymity, but all interviews feature in 
Appendix B. I met representatives from 33 of these organizations, using the CSA’s own 
instrument. In doing so, I walked straight into a hotbed of issues regarding CSA, which, 
as explored in Chapter Three and elsewhere (Dodworth 2017), had fallen from grace. 




in the completion of questionnaires and other information requests. As my 
understanding of CSA grew, our temporary alliance began to disintegrate. Its secretary 
continually pressed me for informal information about organizations to which he had 
no access. I was petitioned to write funding proposals, both for CSA, which had some 
relevance, but also for staff’s other organizations, which did not. Reiterating my 
‘neutrality’, research aims or ethics fell on deaf ears. Clearly, my positioning within CSA 
should generate more benefits than to me alone. After three months, I made the 
unusual decision to change my host organization. I handed CSA the data I had collated 
and stepped away. 
Genuine participant observation, therefore, depends upon forging interests and ties, 
which, through the very act of conducting research, are diffused. Insidership presumes a 
contrivance of interests and life trajectories that ultimately diverge. Allegiance to any 
group is only ever partial; goals overlap temporarily. Wind critiques Malinowskian 
participant observation along similar lines (2008). In a UK hospital, the boundaries of 
where she could participate, even as a trained nurse, were clear and enforced. Whilst the 
boundaries for my participation were more permeable, the limits of how genuine 
participation could become remained the same. I was not solely an NGO worker, 
volunteer, villager, consultant, nor government associate, even though these facets were 
played on by myself and others. As such, Wind’s conception of ‘negotiated interactive 
observation’ is relevant beyond the medical sector. My access was also negotiated on a 
daily basis, interactive in that I was still a participant in my environment and the observation 
of others’ behaviour – their practices - how I spent the vast majority of my time. Such 
prolonged, negotiated observation circumvented the unhelpful binarism of 
oppressor/oppressed, embracing the complexity of legitimation practice. 
Village interviews: semi-structured, unstructured, informal 
Interviewing is a key part of ethnography. At the village level, however, this normally 
assumed the form of informal discussions, alongside observation. Out of the 84 formal 
interviews (Appendix B), only 27 took place in the village, given the intrusiveness of the 
engineered interview as compared to observation. When working with non-elites, a 
‘question and answer’ interview can reaffirm power imbalances between the researcher 
and the researched (Smith 1988) and is necessarily artificial in its construction (Douglas 




hesitated she was not an ‘expert’ when asked if I might ask her questions about her 
work.51 Leander, citing Bourdieu, goes so far as to suggest the interview as a form of 
‘symbolic violence’ (2002, p603), given the limits of informed consent and the uneven 
spoils of research. Formal interviewing was thus avoided where possible in the village 
setting. I opted for alternative modes of interviewing that sat alongside day to day life, 
rather than creating new spaces for research. This included the walking, or ‘go along’, 
interview (Carpiano 2009), but mainly informal discussions alongside sedentary work. 
This was interviewing as ‘a virtually invisible part of participant observation’ (Fife 2005, 
p101), recorded as part of fieldnotes. Indeed, much of the data generated during 
observation was derived from informal discussions and asides, highlighting a blurred 
division (Frey & Fontana 1994). 
Nevertheless, 27 more formalized interviews did take place without prior meeting at the 
village and ward levels within a conventional question/answer format. These interviews 
were lightly structured, typically starting with the interviewee’s role, tracing how it 
changed and developed over time. As noted under Reflexivity, these were occasions 
where I felt somewhat complicit in Bourdieusian ‘violence’, whereby informants 
possibly did not feel able to refuse to take part, regardless of the compact of informed 
oral consent. I tried, however, to mitigate such over the course of the interview through 
empathy, for example, with the difficult position that volunteers found themselves in. 
Whilst it would be a conceit to suggest I achieved such, the tone of the interview would 
change once it became clear my purpose was not to scrutinize, as other visitors might. 
There were many cases where apprehension gave way to cordial, indeed frank, 
exchanges with unsolicited offers to keep in touch. Follow-up interactions, whilst never 
unproblematic, bolstered the notion that the interview sparks a longer relationship and 
conversation. 
Elite interviewing 
In contrast to the village setting, formalized, semi-structured ‘elite’ interviewing at the 
district or national level (for example NGO or government managers) proved the 
dominant, and highly effective, research methodology for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
semi-structured interviews are a good balance between enabling comparison, the 
collation of responses around broad themes and ‘fact-finding’, whilst at the same time 
                                                             




allowing flexibility for the conversation to develop in new areas (Bryman 2001). I 
explored the complexities of relationship building, access and the legitimation of NGOs, 
with particular attention to the symbolic language of claim-making, as well as tensions 
between this and other, more official representations. This element is highly 
interpretative that would be difficult to explore using fixed interview scheduling. 
Secondly, the interview did not signify such a pronounced ‘break’ in the natural order of 
business. Face to face meetings and communication are key mechanisms for planning 
and information exchange. District offices, for example, often house large queues of 
plaintiffs seeking the time of office bearers. Whilst this does pose challenges of access, 
confidentiality and possibly anonymity (see below), it does not challenge the 
appropriateness of interviews per se. Most government office bearers, as well as senior 
NGO staff, educated to tertiary level, are obviously at home with frank verbal 
exchanges. Given the pressures on their time, the expediency of the typical one hour 
interview proved the most appropriate method. In contrast to the village setting, any 
further observation (such as accompanying on activities or district meetings) was 
subsequent to relationship-building during the interview process. 
Thirdly, somewhat related to the previous point, the ‘power’ balance differs in this 
setting. There is a danger here, however, as explicated by Smith (2006), of invoking 
over-simplified understandings of power, and elites as ‘possessors’ of that power. This is 
not, therefore, to disregard more sophisticated conceptions of power, nor to assume 
such power dynamics unique to studying up. Rather the point is that the act of 
interviewing in itself did not constitute the same spatio-temporal disruption. However, 
the exigencies of each interview played out, I needed to find strategies to engage these 
professional elites in at least some of the study objectives. There was therefore certain 
resemblance in my own behaviour to what I was studying in others: I had to ‘legitimate’ 
my presence and credibility with various institutions before moving forward. Both 
interviewer and interviewee, therefore, to paraphrase Gusterson, borrowed ‘complex 
repertoires’ to perform themselves (2008, p105): the very stuff of legitimation. 
Documents 
As discussed, there are different strategies of legitimation within different forums. There 
are ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ faces of development work. In this vein, therefore, it was 




summaries, strategies, policy and planning documents in order to understand the 
‘official’ face of a particular project, but also as a ‘bridge’ to the macro (Fife 2005, p129). 
In some cases, verbal descriptions, or representations, of a project, its contingencies, 
and exigencies, bore little resemblance to official documentation. In addition to 
fieldnotes and interview transcripts, I thus drew on ‘formal’ documentation as part of 
the competing representations that constitute the legitimation process, including wall 
charts; maps; volunteer lists; district and NGO profile information; NGO, district and 
village level budgets; existing NGO and district data sets and questionnaires; district and 
NGO planning and strategy documents; village visitor’s books, meeting minutes and 




Legitimation is the practice of accumulative claim-making. It infuses the exercise of 
power with symbolic capital: norms, institutions and material resource that render it 
ephemerally authoritative and rightful. Legitimation practice is deeply performative in 
crafting and sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through symbolic positioning vis-à-vis 
other actors. The thesis curates legitimation into sets of symbolic practices, with 
particular attention to its negotiation in the everyday. This demanded the toolkit of 
critical ethnography, its limitations noted. These principles, laid out in Chapter One, 
duly guided the data collection process as well as its inductive, iterative analysis.  
Different forms of ethnography, in turn, demand different kinds of analysis. Some in 
the interpretative tradition aim to build a unified account, as in the grounded school 
(Glaser & Straus 1967; also Clarke 2005; Charmaz 2006) whilst others have eschewed 
such in favour of ‘multivocality’ (Turner 1975) or ‘polyphony’ (Clifford 1986, p15). 
What is common to ethnography, however, is that interpretation and analysis is an 
iterative process, guided by the data rather than the imposition of theory. This is not, 
however, to say that the move from data collection to analysis is sequential, but rather 




tension between adopting an inductive, or even ‘abductive’,52 approach at the same time 
deriving concepts, in this case legitimation practices, which are not used as terms directly. 
As such, I conceive the analysis process as iteratively giving shape and content to 
concepts/sub-concepts against the wider thematic backdrop. 
With this in mind, I sought to move between the emergent six overarching practices: 
extensity, territoriality, state, representation, voluntarism and material resource, and the micro 
detail, as captured primarily in field notes, interview transcripts and NGO and 
government documents. As Schatzman & Strauss explicate, field research is a constant 
movement between gathering and analysing data (1973; also Dunn 2008, p90). In this 
way, legitimation practices emerged through iterative fieldwork, which in turn shaped 
the direction of subsequent data collection. Eventually, hardcopy fieldnotes and 
transcripts were manually colour coded by legitimation practices. This primary analysis, 
‘flagging recurrent patterns, variations on themes’ (Gusterson 2008, p107) allowed 
legitimation practices to crystallize. Primary analysis in turn enabled ‘secondary analysis’, 
forming patterns and relationships between practices (Fife 2005, p123), as I return to in 
the concluding chapter. Given my interest in the exploration of the macro through the 
micro, I also attended to specific case analyses, centring on a person or event, as a 
‘vignette’ of rich qualitative description (Brewer 2000, pp112-113). 
In this way, Kvale’s ‘ad hoc’ approach to interview analysis, drawing on the interplay of 
different techniques (1996, p203), has broader relevance. This interplay of techniques 
involves elements of narration, interpretation and condensation. Narration, expounded more 
fully by Mishler (1986), demands close attention to the temporal and social meanings of 
interviews as narratives, pertinent to unstructured, informal interviews as an ‘invisible’ 
part of observation. This situating of the interview in its wider context overlaps with 
interpretation, and indeed interpretivist enquiry more widely, in locating symbolic meaning 
beyond what is immediately apparent or indeed vocalized. At the same time, the 
condensation of themes and patterns are an inevitable part of narrating, selecting and 
interweaving material within the analysis, of ‘bringing order to the data’ (Brewer 2000, 
p105). An interpretivist, critical approach to analysing the ‘how’ is not, therefore, 
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foreordained to relativism, if supported by both the weight of empirical data - Geertz’s 





Reflexivity, and the claims it gives rise to, has become a site of contention within 
ethnography, in its ‘home’ discipline of anthropology and beyond. It is primarily a 
methodological term associated with critical research, but for some the debate goes 
much further. Archer, most eminently, has argued that reflexivity is a condition, or 
rather ‘imperative’, of late modernity itself (1995; 2012). She defines reflexivity as ‘the 
regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider 
themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa’ (2012, p1). Such an ability 
is heightened in the late modern era as the ‘lack of fit’ (McNay 1999) between habitus 
and field, between identity and the categories that once defined us, become ever-more 
pronounced (see also Alexander 1996; Beck et al. 1994; Lash 1999). In a sense, therefore, 
we are all both participants in and critics of the ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck et al. 1994) 
and its structures that once defined us with decidedly less complication.53 
The notion that we might potentially be liberated from such structures in pursuit of a 
new, more transcendental viewpoint(s), indeed potentially bolstering the work of the 
social researcher, can be forcefully taken to task. Bourdieusian analysis, as noted in 
Chapter One, at times struggles to escape the agential impasses of structural 
determinism at all. And yet ‘reflexivity’, both epistemic and sociological/methodological, 
is associated with Bourdieu’s philosophy of research almost to the point of synonymy 
(Gingras 2010). Rather than becoming something of an inevitable marker of modern 
life, however, reflexivity is, for Bourdieu, something that takes persistent, and indeed 
laborious, effort on the part of the researcher. It demands painstaking and empirically 
grounded self-reflection: on one’s own role as a researcher, the forms of ‘capital’ that 
enacts that privilege, and the position within and impact on the ‘field’ in which one 
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works (e.g. Bourdieu 1984). Bourdieu’s increasingly explicit exploration of the 
conditions of reflexivity grew apace in the 1990s, spawning a vast secondary literature 
(see Gingras 2010 for a review; also Lynch 2000). 
There has been, therefore, dynamic debate as to whether Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of 
sociology’ is possible. For some, including Archer, Bourdieu cannot ultimately capture 
or provide the means for agential self-reflection in contemporary social life (1995; 2012). 
Bourdieusian theorists, in response, have highlighted the more ‘generative and creative 
aspects of habitus and action’ (Akram & Hogan 2015, p610, drawing on Bourdieu 1977; 
also Adams 2006; Adkins 2003; Farrugia & Woodman 2015; McNay 1999; Sweetnam 
2003). Even with these addendums in place, however, it remains vulnerable to stronger 
post-structuralist challenges. For Geldof and Martin, for example, Bourdieusian analysis 
is doomed to fail in its proclaimed reflexivity in its persistent ‘thetical’ style, divulging its 
‘desire to speak the truth and to be the only one to speak the truth’ (1997, p41). The 
very act of invoking Bourdieu feigns textual ‘authority’ (ibid.) where there is none. 
Whilst insights from poststructuralist ethnography are well-taken, embracing more 
dialogical and polyvocal forms of research, the charge of ‘theticalism’ is nigh impossible 
to overcome. This thesis’ presentation provides an account of legitimation practice. Its 
thetical ‘truth’ is that legitimation itself is a necessary condition of contemporary 
authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates. Its actual content, 
however, remains contingent, shaped by the peculiarities of the field and as such, as 
argued under methodology, I fully embrace that contingency and partiality. 
Furthermore, this account has been shaped by my insertion into the field and the 
peculiarities that both gave rise to and resulted from the research encounter. The 
question, therefore, is how to embrace reflexivity without oneself becoming the sole 
referent of research: to find an ‘informed’ or ‘reformist’ reflexivity (Davies 2012; 
Leander 2002; 2008). With regard to the current project, this falls under two main areas: 
methodological and substantive. 
With regard to methodology, conventionally defined, this demands the critical reflection 
not just on one’s tools but also on the wider context of power within which the research 
encounter takes place. Bourdieu, as noted, drew attention to the potential ‘symbolic 
violence of interviews’ (cited in Leander 2002, p603), a concern taken up extensively 




in this violence, I tried to mitigate such over the course of the interview itself, making 
reference to such in the relevant empirical chapters. Whilst this does not absolve my 
complicity in invoking privilege, it at least highlights the complexity and protracted 
nature of negotiating access, circumventing simplistic binarisms of 
oppressor/oppressed. Moderating the mode of interviewing itself, as noted, rather than 
creating new spaces specifically for research, led to a less ‘violent’ encounter: indeed, my 
presence prima facie welcomed by certain groups. 
Lastly, under this methodological component, critical/feminist/post-structuralist 
ethnographers make the case for more dialogical, rather than unilaterally extractive, 
forms of research. Rather, therefore, than rendering one’s own account as permanent 
and authoritative, research findings form part of an extended conversation with your 
informants. ‘Social analysis’, as Davies puts it, ‘must now grapple with the realization 
that its objects of analysis are also analysing subjects who critically interrogate 
ethnographers – their writings, their ethics, and their politics’ (2012, p21). This proved 
the most difficult element of ‘working reflexively’ (Leander 2008). Occasionally, such a 
conversation was established productively. In one instance, when a key informant asked 
for my findings at the end of my time in the field, I presented the legitimation practices 
that now run through this written account. ‘Yes!’, he exclaimed, ‘we do do that!’, in a 
succinct yet multifaceted exchange that at once validated my research but also held it to 
account.54 In addition, it highlighted the potential of practice as a point of meaningful, 
self-conscious reflection, rather than that of pre-reflexivity. 
More commonly, however, informants, particularly those under ‘elite’ interviews, would 
interrogate in an assertive, if not admonishing, manner, irrespective of my 
documentation or informed consent. In one, particularly frank exchange, the 
interviewee asked me the point of volunteering any final comments: 
I: If I give comments, what will they become? […] Now comments, then later - 
what will be in the impact on our side? If I give comments...? 
K: I haven’t yet… 
                                                             




I: Because I mean research, academic research, most of the time its impact for the 
target person [beneficiary] is really low. You get your PhD, then you’re off again.55 
Elite informants would additionally interrogate my right to question, seen as a broader 
challenging of the validity of their work. ‘Who are you?’ to ask questions, asked one, 
ultimately refusing to share their organization’s constitution (theoretically a public 
document) until they ‘check who you are’.56 This element of ‘working reflexively’ often 
came up short, as I lacked adequate responses to rightful questions regarding the 
division of research spoils. I often shifted to other means of self-legitimation in an 
attempt to mitigate such differentials. 
The second, therefore, more substantive area lies in this curious case of self-legitimation 
within a study of legitimation more broadly. Whilst I endeavoured to curate the 
legitimation practices of others, there were certain themes in my own behaviour as I 
sought to construct my own authority to act in the name of research. By way of 
biography, after my Edinburgh undergraduate degree, I travelled extensively in Asia 
before completing a Masters in International Politics at Glasgow. I then moved into the 
international development sector, assuming several desk-based roles in London before 
moving in to the ‘field’. I had extended stints in Malawi and South Africa, with shorter 
visits to other African countries. This biography indeed formed part of how I inserted 
myself into my research field. 
As I argue under Ethics, as well as elsewhere (Dodworth 2017), I thus legitimated myself 
in multiple ways; experienced NGO fieldworker or ignorant foreigner; high level 
doctoral researcher or lowly ‘student’; streetwise traveller or vulnerable female; object of 
lust, animosity or both; friend and confidante or steely professional. I drew on different 
facets of my biographical identity to negotiate a more open conversation. Negotiated 
access is thus the story of both invoking and revoking privilege: both entreating and 
inverting power relations. Legitimation is also reciprocal, demanding the affirmation of 
others. In this way, there is much to Gusterson’s observation that interviews themselves 
are ‘dynamic events through which the identity of the subject [is] performed and even 
co-constructed by the interviewer and interviewee’ (2008, p105). Such dynamism 
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resonates throughout ethnography’s constitutive methods more broadly and, indeed, 
runs to the heart of legitimation itself. 
That I am able to reflect critically on the construction, maintenance and invocation of 
multiple roles is not an attempt to undo the partiality of this account. What it does 
allow, however, is the generation of data regarding the legitimation of myself and of 
others. The thethical truth, as argued, is that legitimation is a necessary condition of 
contemporary authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates, which 
includes the academy. Legitimation, as a relational process, demands the insertion of the 
social self into the field, and with it the now familiar use of a range of capital. It is 
precisely this process, the ‘interaction between ethnographer-as-self and ethnographer-
as-other that social knowledge of general interest and significance’ (Davies 2012, p189) 
is produced. 
 
Ethics, Access & Identity 
 
Ethics & Access 
This thesis underwent conventional processes of ethical review with regard to potential 
risks, confidentiality, informed consent and conflict of interests, in line with university 
and funder requirements. Informed consent was obtained orally, with the script 
appended in Appendix D. Organizations and individuals are anonymized, given 
pseudonyms as per Figure 2.1 Anonymity is always limited in that certain staff members 
may be able to recognize their peers given the presentation of certain opinions and facts, 
but these are ones often shared in public forums to such peers. Crucially, however, these 
organizations and their volunteers are not identifiable to outsiders and will not return 
search results online. I have argued, however, as others, that conducting research and 
the methodological decisions therein, are inherently political. In this vein, research ethics 
goes beyond the procedures associated with conventional review to include the politics, 
instrumentality and wider impact of research itself. In this vein, there are two distinct 
but interrelated areas. The first concerns the process of ethics review as a form of 
regulation and protection. The second addresses the wider politics of research, in this 




With regards to ethical review, it has been the object of much debate as to whether 
current processes contribute to ethical, or indeed quality, research (Crow et al 2006; 
Hoonaard 2001; Murphy & Dingwall 2007; Shannon 2007). The relevance of the 
‘biomedical’ consent model, particularly with regard to ethnographic fieldwork where 
the researcher cedes control of the environment, has rightfully been questioned (e.g. 
Bengry-Howell & Griffin 2011; Burgess 2007; Calvey 2008; Cassell 1980; Haggerty 
2004; Miller & Bell 2002; Spicker 2007; Thorne 1980; Wax 1980). It is difficult to set 
clear project parameters where the researcher’s exposure is prolonged; to explain 
objectives when they are unfolding; to predict findings and their use. Furthermore, 
scholars have highlighted the expanding attribution of terms such as ‘harm’ and 
‘vulnerable’ in the increasingly prohibitive process of review (Cassell 1980; Haggerty 
2004; Hoonaard 2001). 
With regards to the politics of research, for many living at the ‘margins’ in areas targeted 
by development agencies, a prolonged exposure to the industry has quite rightfully 
raised the question of ‘who benefits?’ This is no longer an academic debate but a highly 
visible experience of how spoils are distributed in the development hierarchy. Those 
who are consistently portrayed as poor or underserved are interacting with and resisting 
both this act of representation and the activities to which it gives rise. Feminist and 
post-structuralist thought seek to overcome the power asymmetries inherent in the 
research process by making their political goals more explicit (Gillies & Aldred 2002; 
Haraway 1988; Luff 1999; Opie 1992; Stanley & Wise 1990), but which is nevertheless 
still challenging when immersed into an environment laden with competing interests. 
Indeed, whilst circumventing some readings of harm, ethnographic research generates 
its own set of ethical concerns. 
My experience with CSA typified the constant recalibration between ethics, interests, 
emotions and, of course, data collection that ethnography demands. My CSA affiliation 
immersed me very rapidly into a complex, politicized patchwork of inter-organizational, 
or interpersonal, alliances and rivalries. I got to grips with the politics of information 
sharing and its relationship to power and authority. Whilst, therefore, there were 
rewards from the perspective of quarrying data, however, my experience with CSA 
threw up new ethical and emotional demands. It was impossible to ascertain 




reconciling our interests. I continually repositioned myself as knowledgeable, savvy 
insider or neutral, professionalized outsider. My use of Swahili or English could bolster 
either position, depending on the audience and circumstance. ‘You’re a real African 
woman’ I was told on multiple occasions, an ‘mswahili’ (coastal person – also 
derogatory term) in wry exchanges that simultaneously highlighted both assimilation and 
difference. My positionality was thus constantly in flux, even over the course of a single 
interview, and in a dislocating twist began to echo the very phenomenon of which I was 
studying in others. 
Access & Identity 
Access, therefore, is continually re-negotiated and only ever partial. Whilst 
ethnographers concede this, the ‘access’ debate has nevertheless been characterized by 
the quest for ever-better data. Ethnographers navigate the insider/outsider divide, 
uniquely positioned to excavate insights not visible to other modes of research (e.g. 
Davies 2012; Mosse & Kruckenberg 2017). Insiders, by virtue of membership of a 
particular group, have privileged access, insight and empathy. Outsiders, by virtue of 
their distance, are not overly familiarized with the setting and as such are able to offer 
new insights (see e.g. Hammersley & Atkinson 2010). Subsequent debate on the 
insider/outsider position has continued in this vein of methodological pros and cons, 
preserving social science’s ultimate aim of furthering knowledge of the world we live in 
(e.g. Aberese-Ako 2017; Brayboy & Deyhle 2000; Mercer 2007; Perryman 2011). As 
Merton expounds, we are able to transcend our placement of insider or outsider 
through academic training, ‘technical competence’ (1972, p41) and professional rigour. 
What unites this diverse body of work, however, is both that insidership and 
outsidership exist and such membership is not problematized. Thus we are members of 
multiple groups, resembling others in terms of race, age, sexuality and so on, but the 
membership status itself is absolute, its criteria bounded. 
Clearly post-structuralists are obliged to take the framing of this debate to task on both 
counts. On the first, they would deconstruct the façade of an objective social reality that 
we are able to describe, to analyse and ultimately to know at arm’s length. Social realism 
is a delusion that is epistemologically arrogant at best and duplicitous at worst. It is a 
convenient fabrication that serves the interests of the most powerful, who seek answers 




‘realist, interactionist, social (problems) text reproduces a romantic overidentification 
with society’s undesirables…It is a romantic ideology woven through liberal and 
conservative political agendas that make individuals responsible for their problems’ 
(1992, p130). Social realists like Merton are unable to reflect fully on how our 
methodological toolbox, our ‘technical competence’, constitutes and reconstitutes the 
world: the Foucauldian nexus between power and knowledge.57 The very act of 
conducting research in accordance with these competencies, as Griffith describes 
(1998), is a particular positioning that reconstitutes the world in accordance with 
externally ascribed categories. 
The second count, linked to this ontological scepticism, is that identity can be ascribed 
or bounded by our membership or participation in particular social groups. It is not 
simply, therefore, as Merton implies, that social life is complicated by our simultaneous 
membership of multiple groups (which researchers can and must transcend). It is rather 
that such groupings are inherently relational and in flux, and therefore cannot form the 
building blocks of a stable ‘identity’ at all. Rather identity is a continual process that 
draws symbolically from discursive frameworks, which indeed include traditional 
markers such as race, but also from temporal and spatial markers such as shared 
experience. Ethnographers who assumed they may be an insider by virtue of particular 
markers found that they were so only in some regards and at certain times (Griffith 
1998; Kondo 1986; Narayan 1993; Naples 1996; Webster & John 2010). Insidership, 
therefore, is only ever ‘partial’ (Narayan 1993, p676) and ephemeral. As such, if we 
reject the ‘social realism’ (Denzin 1992, p124) that underpins the insider/outsider 
dichotomy, we reject the possibility of insidership altogether. We are left with an ever-
shifting aspect as we interact with a multitude of ‘Others’ (Griffiths 1998; also Kondo 
1986) in a multitude of situations. 
If, therefore, the critical turn in ethnograpy is to be fully embraced, with its ontological 
pluralism and ‘multiplex subjectivity’ (Narayan 1993, p676 [citing Rosaldo 1989]) there 
are implications, clearly, for the academic’s production of knowledge. There are also 
implications, however, for the researcher herself and her experience in the field, now 
more central to the production of the text. If identity collapses into a collection of 
                                                             
57 It is a case in point that Merton tenaciously holds onto the term ‘Negro scholar’ into the 1970s, 
when it had already been forcefully rejected by Afro-American writers themselves, itself an act of 




temporary ‘positionalities’, what then anchors the researcher as they navigate through 
new and challenging territory? How do you temper the heightened awareness of the role 
you play in a particular context and the impact you have on your informants’ lives as 
well as your own? For Kondo, the duplicity of her roles led eventually to the 
‘dissolution’ of her ‘self’: an existential unease with very real psychological effects 
(1986). Whilst I never resembled a ‘Tanzanian’ in the way that Kondo looked ‘Japanese’, 
our experiences resonate regarding the constant tension in maintaining different 
personas: its ‘emotional labour’ (Hoschild 1983). Whilst writers like Narayan and Kondo 
seem celebratory at their liberation from the boundaries of identity and the millstone of 
‘insider’, there is inevitably a cost to the researcher of fluidity of markers that once 
anchored with decidedly less complication. 
Identity & Emotions 
As such, my positionality was constantly, and deliberately, ambivalent to others and 
therefore to myself. It could change over the course of an interview. Expectations of 
both researcher and participant also fluxed, reducing the likelihood that they might be 
fulfilled. I felt mercenary in my pursuit of ‘data’ at the expense of my respect for people, 
even when people were sometimes as mercenary in their exercise of power over me. 
Relationships felt partial and friendship ‘faked’ (Duncombe & Jessop 2002), and I 
inevitably failed at maintaining sufficient contact with those who had offered me 
camaraderie. Stacey suggests that ethnographic methods in fact risk greater feelings of 
betrayal and ‘abandonment’ (1988): indeed one informant I contacted relatively 
frequently one day texted me ‘how have you abandoned me? Can’t you even find time 
to greet me by message?’ Whilst this was also a manipulation on his part, it hit its mark. 
This element of fieldwork was difficult to deal with on a personal and emotional level. 
Part of this was due to the frustrations and limits of the relations I was able to enter and 
a feeling that I did not come close to meeting my and others’ expectations. Another part 
was accumulative, being isolated and having experienced animosity and circumvention 
over time. This was not, I felt, purely due to an insensitivity or obtrusiveness on my 
part, although I was at times persistent to the point of transgressing cultural norms. The 
primary reason was rather due to wider power relations given firstly my lack of any 
visible institutional backing, exacerbated by a deliberately nomadic role, not affiliated 




relations regarding my place to ask questions of others. Thirdly, was the rather grey area 
around corrupt practices or, more commonly, the role of interpersonal networks, power 
and exchange in securing access. 
By the time I finally left the field in June 2013, I was disoriented, having experienced a 
definite unravelling, or dissolution, of my ‘self’. I was exhausted, weak from weight loss 
and suffering insomnia. I felt disquiet at how I had managed and exited many of my 
field relationships. I had manipulated others but had been the object of manipulation. I 
had exploited others but been exploited. I had both wielded and ceded power. I had 
elicited and consumed feelings that were not genuine. On returning to the UK I was 
unable, for a period, to engage with my data nor listen to taped conversations that 
placed me back into the field. I tumbled down an ethical rabbit hole, chasing my tail on 
the same questions. I revisited literature on the ‘reality’, stresses and strains of fieldwork, 
which suddenly carried more meaning. I concluded that it is the management of 
relationships, whether or not they yield ‘data’, which comprises the bulk of fieldwork 
(Dodworth 2017). It is nevertheless rare to find accounts that capture the exertion of 
self-legitimation, with methodological textbooks airbrushing what can be a profoundly 
dislocating experience. As such, those who rightfully question the asymmetry of 
fieldwork spoils may do well also to audit the attendant costs. 
 
Conclusion: critically excavating legitimation 
 
This chapter sought to bring two, interlinked problematics to the fore. The first was that 
contemporary legitimation practice, as accumulative claim-making and its negotiation, 
has typically been rendered invisible to date. The second is a broader moral concern 
regarding the location of the research ‘subject’, also often in the shadow of theory-
making or of developmental problem-solving. This chapter has argued that interpretive 
praxeology, bolstered by the ‘practice turn’, informed this research to speak to both 
concerns. When practices are present, brought out ‘in the clear’ (Taylor 1985, p104), 
those who undertake, negotiate and contest them are also present. Interpretive 




representing the ‘native’s view’, but rather attending to practices as symbolic and 
performative, and therefore situational and interactive. 
Interpretive praxeology in turn paves the way for critical ethnography, as ‘deep hanging 
out’ (Gusterson 2008, p93 citing Rosaldo), in its approach to understanding the social 
world. It is ethnographic not only in its embracement of participant observation, or rather 
‘negotiated interactive observation’ (Wind 2008), but in drawing on a wide range of 
research methods infused with the ethnographic ‘sensibility’ (Schatz 2009, p5). 
Ethnography, as ever, is marked by its proximity, flexibility and indeed reflexivity in the 
act of entering and shaping the field of study. It is critical in its exploration of the macro 
via the micro, in linking the particular to wider ‘systems of power’ (Harvey 1990, p6). It 
is critical, moreover, bringing the ‘how’ question to the fore: ‘the techniques and 
practices, rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which 
governing operates’ (Dean 2010, p39). 
Whilst such ethnography can take place wherever notional field sites meet, the 
Tanzanian case provides a neat microcosm of the reconstituting public, with the global 
inserted into the local in new and interesting ways. Burgeoning numbers of NGOs 
reconfigure around ascendant district centres, interacting with, mirroring and indeed co-
producing the state in this forum. Bagamoyo in turn encapsulates recent development 
politics in Tanzania, housing ever-increasing numbers of prospectors, ‘for profit’ or 
otherwise. Its proximity to Dar in particular, alongside its autochthonous president has 
returned the ‘backwater’ of Bagamoyo to the spotlight, injecting considerable wealth but 
also inequalities and land pressures. Whilst a considerable amount of sifting was 
required through the district’s 124 registered NGOs, the study settled on primarily six 
active organizations as in-depth research subjects, each striving to legitimate their new 
or changing presence in innovative and adaptive ways.  
The research embraced the hallmarks of ethnographic research, with negotiated, 
interactive observation of legitimation practice at its heart. This was duly supplemented 
by informal discussions, formal interviews and documentary evidence, however 
observation remained the driving force in understanding legitimation in the everyday. 
Analysis was a strongly iterative affair, present from the first day of ‘entry’ into 
Bagamoyo, giving shape and content to emergent practices against the wider thematic 




reflexively or indeed consistently as new ethical, emotional and mental demands 
presented themselves on a daily basis. At times, I contended with remaining anchored, 
especially as I began to see in myself the process I strove to observe in others. These 
trials and tribulations are common, airbrushed out of textbooks on doing research, yet 
particularly pronounced in this case given the topic of research. Nonetheless, this 
struggle only reiterated the truth that contemporary legitimation is the stuff of critical 














Horizontal legitimation:  
Lateral thinking in Bagamoyo district 
 
Development politics in Bagamoyo 
 
Bagamoyo district is a microcosm of recent development politics in Tanzania. It is one 
of 127 administrative districts and of six in the coastal region Pwani. The district’s 
population has grown rapidly in the last decade, given its proximity to Dar es Salaam 
and its commuter belt sprawl (Dodworth 2014). This has brought a new wave of 
incomers, wealth and land pressures to an area characterized historically by migration, 
ethnic pluralism and aspiration as well as disparity (Allen 1981; Glassman 1995; 
Middleton 1992). Bagamoyo has recently proven popular for tourism, with sites relating 
to early Swahili culture, the ivory and infamous, if overstated, slave trades (Fabian 2013), 
as well as the missionary era. Last, but not least, Tanzania’s fourth president Jakaya 
Kikwete, who served two terms (2005-2015), hailed from the district. This returned 
Bagamoyo to the political limelight as state and non-state agencies mushroomed, 
building works sprang up and a new international port was steered into the region.58 
The continuing mix of local and transient populations, tourists, students and 
development agencies has exacerbated the complexity of development activity in 
Bagamoyo, most recently with respect to NGOs. The historical significance and 
aesthetic of the town, as well as its proximity to Dar es Salaam, attracted a steady flow 
of ‘development entrepreneurs’ from both within and outside Tanzania looking to 
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establish operations. There were by 2013 124, almost entirely ‘local’,59 NGOs registered 
with the district council, serving a population of approximately 290,000. The majority of 
these, however, were not undertaking regular activities at the time of research, with less 
than half able to claim to have been ‘active’ over the course of fieldwork.60 Levels of 
activity, in turn, varied greatly within this group, with around a dozen with permanent 
operations and staffing. 
This proliferation of very small NGOs competing for piecemeal pockets of funding, 
typically from the multilaterally funded Foundation for Civil Society, as well as the 
HIV/AIDS Rapid Funding Envelope,61 had thus contributed to this restructuring of the 
sector in Bagamoyo. There remained a sustained focus, therefore, on HIV/AIDS 
related activities as well as a movement towards the rubric of good governance, with its 
emphasis on accountability and community engagement, as in Tanzania more broadly 
(Mercer & Green 2013). The highest self-reported priority by Bagamoyo’s NGOs was 
thus in HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support (68%), followed by gender and thirdly 
group empowerment.62 Many organizations would combine their traditional focus, e.g. 
agriculture or savings cooperatives, with newly declared priorities in this regard, 
evidencing their multipositionality in this shifting environment. With the increase in 
registrations, institutional competition between active agencies in Bagamoyo was 
pronounced, with NGOs striving to craft superior claims to legitimate themselves to 
various audiences. The intensification of this work is rendered invisible by conventional 
project-based evaluative frameworks (Dodworth 2014; Mercer & Green 2013). This is 
particularly true of lateral legitimation practice, which cross-cuts the default verticalized 
logic of projects. 
 
Districtization and lateral legitimation in Bagamoyo 
 
                                                             
59 Local, according to Tanzania’s 2002 NGO Act, is defined as operational in one district. 
60 This drew on records from: the district council, civil society’s ‘umbrella’ association (CSA), donors 
and NGO self-reporting. 57 organizations were deemed active in having conducted activities in the 
previous year; a secretary and/or chairperson still undertaking administrative duties; a staffed, 
identifiable office. Interviews were conducted with senior representatives of 33 of these 
organizations. 
61Information available at <http://www.rapidfundingenvelope.org/about-rfe>  (18 August 2016). 




Legitimation, as expounded in the preceding chapters, is not simply about upwards 
‘incorporation’ (Li 2013) into a global governmentality architecture; it holds substantive 
lateral as well as downward aspects. It is, in addition, an intrinsically partial socio-
political process, ephemeral in its product of public authority. Such authority, via its 
legitimating claims of both entreaty and repudiation, is continually negotiated and 
contested by its intended audiences in the everyday. This obviously demands the 
insertion of the collective into its analysis, including contextualized social norms, thus 
yielding a broader encompassment. With this in mind, this chapter focuses on the 
lateral: the ‘district’ level in Bagamoyo. This is to embrace the full ethnographic impulse: 
looking laterally at the complex, overlapping multi-institutional environment in which 
NGOs negotiate and entrench their presence. 
The motivation to explore a district level case study, as laid out in Chapter Two, is two-
fold. The first is political in that Local Government Authorities, known as ‘the district’, 
are key administrative hubs, around which NGOs are increasingly centred. The second, 
as noted throughout the preceding chapters, is that empirical studies of NGOs tend to 
focus on their role within development hierarchies. This work focuses on the 
pronounced verticality of the development system. A recent case in point is Mercer and 
Green’s rigorous examination of the vertical ‘interstitial work’ that NGOs undertake 
between donors and those they work with (2013). There is, however, much in the way 
of lateral interstitial work as part of NGO legitimation practice. NGOs are as immersed 
laterally as they are vertically, which thus demands looking sideways as well as 
downwards at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and interactions that shape and 
constrain development activities. This 'noise' routinely filtered out through verticality is 
the very context within which NGOs negotiate and entrench their presence. 
This lateral work, in legitimating themselves to other NGOs and, crucially, to local 
government, forms the empirical backbone of this chapter. It focuses on the claims that 
NGOs make in presenting themselves to interested outsiders, including myself. It 
includes legitimation vis-à-vis peers, including representatives of other NGOs, 
Bagamoyo’s umbrella civil society organization (the CSA) and, critically, to the district. 
The district, as will be explored, is a crucial gatekeeper in recognizing, legitimating, and 
indeed resourcing, district-based NGOs. The district Community Development Officer 




securing district staff participation in project activities. All of these are crucial for 
smaller NGOs’ prestige and, therefore, future funding prospects, demanding continual 
lateral legitimation within the district, as well as vertical towards potential donors. This 
district domain admits of situational hierarchies but the predominant aspect is one of 
lateral engagement between similarly positioned entities; it is negotiation, affirmation 
and repudiation as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699). 
Data on lateral legitimation is derived from face to face meetings with representatives 
from over 30 organizations; observation in district inter-organizational meetings; 
training workshops; and the shadowing of NGO and local government visits. As laid 
out in the previous chapter, six key players emerged in the district as the most active 
from which the majority of interviews and observations are drawn, namely: Advocates 
International (AI); Voluntary Partnership International (VPI); Community Health; 
Youth Health (YH); Gender-Net; Eco-Coast (all pseudonyms, see Appendix C). Two of 
these organizations are formally international, but all six depend on international 
financing. Most of the organizations focus on health outcomes but also engage in ‘good 
governance’ and/or rights based work. Drawing from such, I curate these, mainly 
discursive, legitimation practices thematically in order to foreground the multiplicity of 
that process: its countervailing currents in the everyday. 
 
Extensity: ‘we go to the communities’ 
 
In June 2012, I attended the debut of ‘Youth Health’ within one of the district’s key 
lateral forums: the quarterly meeting civil society organizations working on HIV/AIDS. 
It was attended by over a dozen organizations and chaired by district representatives. 
Whilst the purported aim was to improve coordination between organizations, the meeting 
had developed into a competitive forum in which to iterate organizations’ presence and 
profile, primarily through claims of extensity. One participating NGO Youth Health, as 
will be explored, had undergone a meteoric rise in the district, driven by the efforts of a 
development entrepreneur from Dar es Salaam. This manager thus spoke at length in 
the meeting, far longer than any other representative, uniquely furnishing attendees with 




people designated most ‘at risk’; the preparatory training of their peer educators across 
all 22 wards; their distribution of T-shirts and information resources; and their claims of 
close collaboration, even partnership, with the district as well as key NGOs, including 
VPI and AI.63 
This vignette, which will be revisited in more depth, neatly encapsulates the first 
legitimating strategy of NGOs that emerged from fieldwork: extensity. Extensity is the 
projection of scale as constituted in space and/or time. This admits of two identifiable, 
interrelated forms, which were recurrent themes throughout fieldwork: spatial extensity as 
projection of geographical scale and depth and temporal extensity as projection of 
longevity of presence. 
The first form, regarding spatial extensity, resonates with long standing literature 
regarding the spatialized practices of (state) authority (e.g. Allen 2003; 2016; Engel & 
Nugent 2010; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Ruggie 1993; Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 
2009) and, in turn, NGOs as adopters of such ‘state-like’ technologies of rule (Allen 
2016; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Lund 2006a; 2011). NGO self-
representation and claim-making with regards to working at scale and depth, in this case 
across Bagamoyo district, indeed deliberately invokes the omnipresence of the 
Tanzanian state. The state, whilst on the ebb since its socialist heyday, remains a highly 
intrusive instrument into many areas of social and political life. NGOs mimic the 
organizational structure of local government at district, ward and ultimately village-
based levels. Their volunteers are drawn from these different levels, with trainings and 
seminars taking place at such and with organizations reporting regular monitoring and 
outreach activities within every ward. This projects an element of geographical ubiquity, 
or in Ferguson & Gupta’s words ‘encompassment’, (2002), working to align the NGO 
with the magnitude of existing state institutions. As Allen writes, regarding the 
construction of authority, ‘presence and proximity matter’ (2003, p3). Whilst there is a 
resonance, however, with ‘state-like’ spatial practices (see state), extensity is not reducible 
to the assumption of such characteristics. Indeed, it can also work in tension with the 
mechanics of the state itself. 
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The second, complementary form of extensity is temporal: the projection of an NGO’s 
continuity and presence over time. The interrelation of temporality with spatiality in 
legitimation is duly noted, as space itself provides the repository for the impression of 
the permanence of authority (Murariu 2012). Temporality thus interrelates with other 
forms of extensity, demonstrating viability and stability, reflecting and invoking that of 
the Tanzanian state given its endurance in, or indeed encompassment of, the post-
colonial era. Nevertheless, as I return to, there is certain symbolic capital in simply 
surviving over time, and which may serve to differentiate oneself from more recent 
competitors. It is to ethnographies of the particular practices that comprise these two 
forms of extensity in the everyday that I now turn. 
Spatial extensity: scale & depth 
With regard to the projection of geographical ubiquity, this practice was neatly 
exemplified by the meteoric transformation of Youth Health (YH) during my fieldwork. 
YH’s transformation was chiefly the sum of the efforts of one, masters educated 
entrepreneur from Dar es Salaam, who used a dormant Bagamoyo NGO as a 
springboard for a proposal to Tanzania’s multi-nationally funded HIV/AIDs body: the 
Rapid Funding Envelope (RFE).64 Suddenly this new, hybrid NGO, which merged the 
entrepreneur’s existing ‘consultancy’ with the pre-existing NGO, became extremely 
visible at a district level over a very short period of time. No such NGO was so 
prominent as YH, for example, on entry into Bagamoyo town, with signs welcoming, or 
indeed almost ‘vetting’, new visitors to the district visible from every entry point (see 
Figure 3.1). The name of the organization has been obscured, but it sits alongside RFE’s 
branding and the content is reminiscent of government-sanctioned public health 
campaigns. 
                                                             





Figure 3.1: Photograph of Youth Health signs, visible at all entry points into Bagamoyo. 
Translation: ‘Are you aware? Risky sex, multiple partners, drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution are 
ways of spreading HIV infection?! Love yourself, stop today. Welcome to Bagamoyo’ (Name of 
organization obscured.) 
 
In its office, Youth Health’s newly inscribed organizational structure was displayed as 
deeply interwoven with various district, ward and village level governmental institutions, 
with their voluntary ‘peer educators’ inserted at every level (see Figure 3.2). YH’s peer 
educators appeared under the district appointed ‘Ward Executive Officers’ (WEO). 
Community Change Agents (CCAs), rather confusingly, ‘belonged’ to another 
organization (Community Health) but featured in the chart under the district-appointed 
‘Village Executive Officer’ (VEO). These lines did not, in practice, represent a reporting 






Figure 3.2: Youth Health Organizational Chart, featuring their peer educators under the 
district appointed ‘Ward Executive Officers’ (WEO).65 
 
In addition, YH’s senior staff claimed to be fully operational in each and every one of 
the district’s 22 wards via a large number of stakeholders, volunteers and collaborators 
on the project, with the district council cited as its preeminent partner. The 
organization’s key protagonist, the MBA-qualified consultant from Dar, built 
interpersonal relations via the funding envelope, forging a rapid association with the 
national HIV/AIDS governing body, TACAIDS, at a regional level.66 By these means, 
he gained a foothold into TACAIDS’ district level monitoring team, meaning he paid 
monitoring visits to other HIV and health-related NGOs in Bagamoyo within months of 
his arrival. These developments were much to the consternation of other, longer 
established NGOs as to this entrepreneur’s credentials and authority to evaluate the 
work of others.67 
These interpersonal dynamics disclosed something of the undulating, situational 
hierarchies that form between ‘peers’. They form part of Lund’s ‘countervailing 
currents’ whereby NGOs, and indeed the district council, both entreat and repudiate 
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66 Information on the Tanzanian Commission for HIV and AIDS 
http://tacaids.go.tz/tacaids/en/historical/english/about/historical-background. Accessed 18.8.16. 












peers in an ongoing process of legitimation and contestation. This process, and 
extensity’s role in such, came so strongly to the fore within the district’s quarterly 
meeting on HIV/AIDS of the opening vignette. Whilst the aim was to improve 
coordination, the meeting had developed into a somewhat competitive forum in which 
organizations iterated their presence and profile. Despite being quarterly, members 
invariably reintroduced themselves in detail, as if for the first time, emphasizing scale of 
operations, year of registration and so on, in a show of spatio-temporal extensity. This 
ritual far outweighed that of reviewing action points from previous meetings or 
preparing new ones. Indeed, its cyclical nature had led higher profile NGOs to begin 
sending junior representatives as placeholders. Evidently, this forum afforded different 
opportunities to different players. 
Youth Health’s opening gambit, their first appearance, thus involved a laboured and 
detailed statistical component regarding recent activities. It detailed precise numbers, for 
example, of Commercial Sex Workers, bar and migrant workers. This conveyed scale 
and presence, in contrast to smaller players who struggled to give detailed accounts. 
Claims of partnership with the district and with larger NGOs aimed to embed Youth 
Health as part of the institutional furniture, but also having been vetted and affirmed as 
a ‘serious’ player. In contrast to this move to entreat key players, however, there came 
their inevitable repudiation. YH had, as noted, negotiated to monitor key players such as 
long-established INGO Voluntary Partnership International (VPI) as part of 
TACAIDS’ team. Its focus on mobilizing ‘youth’, as well as stigmatized populations, 
formed part of its self-differentiation, even though all HIV-related organizations 
attempted to work with these groups. Some of YH’s claims were thus taken to task in 
the meeting by more established, vocal members, particularly VPI and the Civil Society 
Association. Such claims were also disavowed in subsequent informal discussions.68 
Whilst YH’s upward vertical legitimation was strong, therefore, evidenced by its profile 
within and insertion into TACAIDS, its lateral legitimation floundered under the 
scrutiny of its guarded peers. 
In a similar vein, Youth Health’s projection of extensity did not bear scrutiny from the 
perspectives of those with whom it purported to work, as detailed in subsequent 
chapters. YH’s staff were starkly absent from the ward and village levels and, indeed, the 
                                                             




organization as a whole was seen to circumvent normal government protocols, in 
contrast to Figure 3.2’s representation. Nevertheless, the organization’s positioning 
between regional and district levels had enabled it to gain a seat at the district table, the 
ear of key staff and to garner a sense of scale considerably larger than its operational 
reality. This form of projection was not unique to this particular organization, but YH’s 
new manager was particularly skilled in this respect over a short period. The rapid, 
extensive injection of funds into this previously dormant organization had of course 
also served to amplify its influence in the district. The point, however, is that one is not 
reducible to the other; in addition, certain forms of legitimation, such as claims to 
extensity, may bolster funding bids in the future. 
Other NGOs in the district similarly projected extensity by representing themselves as 
ubiquitous both at scale across the district and in depth through their ability to ‘go to the 
communities’. It was, during introductory meetings with NGOs, very common to hear 
managers claim, as Youth Health, to be ‘active’ in every one of Bagamoyo’s 22 wards or, 
in some cases, its 97 villages (often used synonymously with community). This was also 
reflected in district council records, whereby roughly half of Bagamoyo’s established 
NGOs claimed to be operational in all wards.69 In addition to written records, scale and 
depth might be further represented, for example, by district-wide map displays in the 
NGO’s office, with pins representing a ward or village administrative centre or 
volunteer. Indeed, one NGO staff member, who was also the CSA chair, suggested that 
the scale and depth of NGOs at times surpassed the state’s armoury itself: 
NGOs can reach areas that government cannot reach…so the government needs to 
stop seeing NGOs as their competitors.70 
This depiction, as in the case of Youth Health, seldom bore scrutiny in that no NGO, 
even those well-resourced, sustained coverage on a scale that surpassed the district. 
When taken to task on the claim, given their lack of visible presence on the ground, 
NGOs would typically claim outreach facilitated by virtue of their membership 
structure, via local volunteers or via partnership with local government or other member 
organizations. In addition, in terms of the value NGOs themselves placed on the need 
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to ‘go to the communities’, there was a clearly perceived pecking order between NGOs 
who could realistically claim to be doing so regularly, even in part, and those without the 
capacity, strategy or intent to maintain a strong village-level presence. NGOs ranged 
from those deemed ‘serious’ by government staff to ‘seasonal’ or ‘briefcase’ NGOs, 
which remained the summation of one entrepreneur’s efforts, documents and indeed 
claim-making.71 
The ability to ‘go to the villages’ was thus a critical, and indeed closely guarded, 
legitimation device. The criticality of this depth was encapsulated by a recent 
phenomenon, common across major NGOs in Bagamoyo, whereby each NGO had at 
least one of ‘their own’ trained volunteer at the village level. The claim was that a locally 
based representative for that NGO, selected for their affinity with the NGO’s values or 
perceived capacity for the ‘work’, could advocate for change in their communities from 
‘within’. At the same time, this claim-making conveyed elements of consent and 
reciprocation from the community concerned, in that engagement is ‘voluntary’ but also 
institutionalized. In practice, as explored under voluntarism, village-level volunteers are 
inherently problematic, have a poor selection process and/or are hindered by the village 
leadership in their advocacy efforts. Nevertheless, the practice resounded clearly with an 
increasing depth of NGO presence and an emphasis on their community-facing aspect. 
Bagamoyo’s most established INGO, Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), was 
strongly legitimated by its scale and depth in going ‘to the community’ across the district 
over time. As its (outgoing) programme coordinator iterated: 
For the organization it has been started to work now many years, like since…in 
Bagamoyo I can say since 2004…And their strategy was to provide education to the 
community so the community, they understand the problem of HIV, the consequences and 
all things involved in HIV and AIDS because already the community was already 
vulnerable for HIV and AIDS and for them…maybe the lack of knowledge, the lack of 
education, knowledge and skills on understanding the problem.72 
The country director had similar comments on VPI’s ethos: 
We are looking always for the partnership from the community; yes of course the district 
but even at the grass-root level, so you know this process takes time.73 
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The extensity of VPI’s operations was implicit in its iterative narrative of ‘the 
community’ and ‘grassroots’. Part of this resonates with the idea of the grassroots as 
‘virtuous location’ (Mindry 2001), whereby the village or community is continually 
reconstructed as devoid of the corrupt and politicking processes which characterise the 
higher echelons of power. For VPI, however, it was as much the actual extensity of its 
operations as its location, outstripping all other organizations. As one of its programme 
officers iterated: 
Our old approach [training centrally] did not work. They [the beneficiaries] weren’t 
serious – they could just be three weeks staying at home. No one was going there, no one was 
monitoring. That is why we have decided to bring the training here: to the village.74 
Thus VPI’s programme officers spoke often, not without pride, of their resolve to visit 
each of Bagamoyo’s 97 villages at least once a year: its 22 wards at least once a quarter. 
One programme officer claimed of one particularly remote ward Talawanda, seen as an 
outpost in Bagamoyo due to poor access, that it’s ‘only us [VPI] and government’.75 This 
claim was not true as Advocates International, as outlined in the next section, had a 
growing, territorialized presence in Talawanda. The point in hand, however, is that 
VPI’s unparalleled geographical extensity in the district, and its supporting claims, 
allowed it to differentiate itself from the glut of newer NGOs clustered around 
Bagamoyo town and its peri-urban areas. 
VPI’s tenacity and depth of presence was clearly acknowledged and endorsed ‘laterally’ 
by district representatives, who reliably cited the organization as a bastion of good 
practice. As the district Community Development Officer remarked of the influx of 
Dar-based NGOs: 
Can we entail the development agenda reflecting to the people towards the grassroots? 
To me it’s a major focus. So the question is does this non-governmental organization 
work…direct to the community? 
He then responded to his own question, picking out VPI as a good example, as opposed 
to Advocates International (AI), the other international NGO in the district: 
…VPI, if you can see, it also tries to work with the community initiative…they are 
engaging with the community plans because we need… if you are organized you should 
focus to the community problems, community plan, so empower the community [to] 
come up with their plans, that is a good process. Also maybe AI, these international 
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organizations, they are trying to come up, to go through, but they have…also agenda, 
their own agenda, their own programmes.76 
Interestingly, VPI was as international in form as AI, but had managed to ‘localize’ itself 
more effectively in the eyes of the district, primarily through the extensity of its 
outreach. This was in spite of, in the eyes of the CDO, originally coming to Bagamoyo 
from Zanzibar in a similarly tactical bid to extend outreach. Clearly, the CDO had 
misgivings regarding the strategic moves of NGOs to bolster extensity artificially 
without the requisite depth. This was, for him, manifest in the more recent influx of 
development entrepreneurs from Dar, where he noted: 
It is a challenge. They are coming from the central [national level] to introduce 
themselves that, okay, they wish to work. They are requesting to work with the district. 
So we say “okay, we have about ninety seven villages. Not in this headquarter, there in 
the grassroots, so we wish you to go over there. That is our concern. And if you could 
even open an office there, maybe at ward level, because it is reflected with the 
community development, so it is better go there.” So when they introduce, sometimes 
they are saying they are just finding their resources, they never come. But we don’t have 
chances because they are in Dar es Salaam, most of them coming from Dar es Salaam, 
coming in Bagamoyo.77 
Nonetheless, whatever the perceived motives behind VPI’s extension to Bagamoyo in 
2004, the organization was now clearly acknowledged and accepted as a government 
ally, as explored under state. Its extensity, however, formed a key element of this, rather 
than its mantra of community empowerment, as it was far from clear that either local 
government or VPI had a genuinely ‘bottom up’ approach to developing strategic plans. 
Other, more junior, CDOs shared this perception of VPI’s laudable outreach: 
VPI I can see they work well because they get to that level of the community, right down 
at that level of the citizens.78 
Clearly, VPI had successfully legitimated itself in the eyes of the district and other key 
actors as a highly ‘localized’ NGO, with a scale and depth of presence that outstripped 
all others. This had helped to differentiate the organization at a district but also, as will 
be explored in Chapter Five, in remote areas like Kibindu. This is not, however, to argue 
its approach as therefore ‘bottom-up’: quite the contrary. Rather, that extensity through 
scale and depth across the district is itself a key legitimation device. 
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Temporal extensity: continuity in time 
There is additionally a substantial amount of capital garnered from longevity alone: the 
‘latent legitimation’ derived from institutional continuity (Packenham 1970). This in a 
sense presumes other forms of legitimation through a proven ability to endure and 
negotiate unpredictable environments over time. The timeframe of NGO activity is 
relatively short in Bagamoyo, as in Tanzania more broadly. Nevertheless, representatives 
from NGOs formed before 2006, which is approximately less than a quarter of NGOs 
formally registered in Bagamoyo, were quick to emphasise their year of establishment.79 
This was often accompanied by documentary evidence in the form of registration 
certificates framed on the wall and on file. 
2006 formed a watershed as the first full year of Kikwete’s presidency, marking a 
subsequent mushrooming of NGO registrations in his home district of Bagamoyo. 
Some informants claimed that indirect or covert presidential influence bolstered aid 
flow to the district,80 although it was difficult to trace this influence in practice. Either 
way, these select NGOs worked to distance themselves from the glut of ‘opportunistic’ 
development enterprises that entered the market under more favourable conditions. 
Claims to longevity harked to a time of more genuine developmental need and 
positioned these NGOs as pioneers: ‘we were one of the first’; ‘we started on benches’.81 
It were as if such NGOs were rooted in a more virtuous time, as well as space. These 
discursive practices were again further validated by ageing evidence of reports, 
photographs and strategic plans displayed on office walls. 
The manager of hybrid Youth Health also emphasized its continuity under the 
previously dormant organization registered in 2008, which was still relatively early in 
Bagamoyo’s registration curve. He emphasized this pedigree, stating ‘[the now] Youth 
Health has been working since 2008, working on many issues.’82 This claim served as a 
backstop to its concurrent claims of youthfulness and innovation. As noted, resurrecting 
a dormant organization was a useful strategy in securing funding by conveying 
institutional continuity and experience. Nevertheless, the organization was often derided 
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in the district as inexperienced, rejecting any claims of longevity. In response to the 
chaotic organization of YH’s first district-level awareness event, in addition to its 
questionable decision to hire erotic ‘kanga moja’ dancers in this conservative area,83 
brought in from Dar, most organizations mocked YH’s immaturity, laughing ‘they are 
still young – they don’t know! They will learn!’84 
Latent temporal legitimation was clear in how the more established AI distinguished 
themselves, in contrast with the less favourable characterizations coming from the 
district: 
But also it depends who you are engaging, what times, are you one of NGO, you are 
based in Dar you come to Bagamoyo and do a meeting for one day and you are never 
seen until next year? I think those are the ones who are facing a lot of problems. But for 
those like AI who have continued and we stay there and we know the people we engage 
with every day, we know how we started with them, we know how we work with them 
– I find it very simple! They know very well how much we pay and it is consistent, we 
will never say ‘no, this is not what we want’. So I think there are two different dynamics 
in Bagamoyo. There are a lot of NGOs that are ‘one off’ and there are very few NGOs 
that are living and working in Bagamoyo consistently; those [who do live in Bagamoyo] 
I don’t think face a lot of problems.85 
AI therefore, as one of the largest district players, likewise presented themselves as 
consistent and rooted in Bagamoyo, with longevity bolstering claims of representation. 
As the national policy officer commented, interweaving representation with longevity: 
Because we are a national organization…we are just a member to the international 
federation - that makes a difference. But also we have been working for some time, it’s 
not a new area that we’re just coming in.86 
Similarly, in response to a question as to whether having so few employees from the 
Bagamoyo district raised any challenges in its work, a senior manager of the long-
established Eco-Coast replied: 
But we’ve been working here for fifteen years! They say ‘Ah! You are Eco-Coast! You 
are one of us!’87 
This presentation of Eco-Coast, however, as will be explored, was not reflected in the 
coastal communities where the organization worked, given that it waxed and waned in 
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its project implementation. Formal longevity, therefore, is insufficient to backstop 
claims of continuity, scale or depth in practice. Depending on funding fortunes, an 
NGO may experience periods of expansion, remission or indeed complete dormancy, 
leading to one senior district administrator to pronounce most of Bagamoyo NGOs as 
‘seasonal workers’.88 Indeed, formalization as an NGO per se is a relatively new form of 
legitimation for development entrepreneurship. It was previously more common for 
organizations to register as a Community Based Organization (CBO) through the 
Ministry of Home Affairs until the late 1990s, when the process became relatively 
cumbersome and expensive.89 
Development entrepreneurs, however, were of course aware of the dilution effect on 
the NGO ‘brand’ given the rapid influx of newcomers. One such manager, running an 
early learning centre in some form since 1998, eventually rejected registration as an 
NGO to distance himself from the district council. This was an unusual bucking of the 
trend through his attempt to remove his organization from the perceived politicking and 
grey, if not corrupt, practices of the recent NGO sector in Bagamoyo.90 It was a 
differentiation that this manager made clear to me, as well as to his existing and 
potential donors. He nevertheless keenly emphasized his initiative’s longevity outside of 
the NGO mainstream back to 1998. The vast majority of NGOs, however, in the 
absence of such pedigree, sought to ratify themselves as NGOs as quickly as possible in 
order to access other forms of symbolic capital. 
To summarise, the projection of extensity is one valuable form of symbolic capital, 
manifest in spatial and/or temporal forms. NGOs work hard to give the impression 
both that they are substantively greater than they are but also that they are embedded 
within the district’s institutional furniture. Clearly, extensity overlaps with other forms 
of legitimation: through its mimicry of the state’s machinery, through claims of 
representation and of course, material resource, which can conditionally buy a seat at 
the table. The point, however, is that none of these forms of legitimation is solely 
reducible to another. Well-resourced NGOs do not always successfully legitimate 
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themselves, whilst smaller NGOs may manage to purchase greater influence than their 
bottom line figure first suggests. 
 
Territoriality: ‘it is an AI village’ 
 
Territoriality, as the, often exclusionary, creation and control of boundaries, provided a 
recurring theme in how development entrepreneurs represented spatial relationships. 
This included claims to be comparatively active and institutionally embedded within 
particular districts, wards or villages over others. NGOs regularly made claims to such 
domains, playing on boundaries of inclusion and exclusion at different times to different 
audiences. This form of territoriality can either bolster or disrupt the flow of other 
legitimation. Territoriality and representation, for example, may bolster each other in 
that an NGO’s positioning as more closely aligned with the needs of one community, 
village or ward works to the exclusion of another. At the same time, therefore, the move 
to territorialize within a district, thus conceding the non-representation of others, can 
disrupt claims of extensity across it. These NGOs, therefore, as non-state actors, regularly 
enacted practices that invoked and maintained exclusionary ‘turfs’ (2009, p14), lending a 
strongly territorial dimension to their claim-making. 
This resonates with a growing body of work that challenges territoriality as exclusive 
purview of the state. Territory and territoriality are conventionally, if not 
quintessentially, considered state domains in its efforts to retain sovereignty in a 
globalizing world.91 Sack's ground-breaking sociology of territoriality, however, argued 
convincingly the traditional conceptual armoury around state sovereignty to be overly 
restrictive. Such practices are rather part of broader human strategies to affect, influence 
and control the behaviour of others (1986, p2; also Agnew 1994; 2005; Lund 2006a; 
Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 2009). The creation and control of boundaries is the 
'primary spatial form power takes' (Sack 1986, p26) and is therefore related to extensity 
in creating and maintaining geographical sub-spheres of influence. Whilst extensity is 
characterized by ubiquity and universality, however, territoriality is rather the enactment 
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of particularity and exclusivity: the creation of constituencies within the state 
architecture who bear further claim-making. As Sikor and Lund argue, ‘[b]y making and 
enforcing boundaries, by creating a turf…different socio-political institutions invoke a 
territorial dimension to their claims of authority’ (2009, p14). NGOs thus create such 
bounded constituencies, bolstered by claims of representation, then work to ‘fold them 
in’ (Allen 2016). 
NGOs thus regularly performed territorial claims at a district, ward, village and sub-
village level. In one case, the prestigious AI’s Programme Coordinator, narrating his 
organization’s relationship with Kiharaka village (the focus of Chapter Four), claimed 
his organization helped to found the very village itself the previous year: ‘you can say it 
is an AI village’. He explained that, with AI’s help, this village split from its parent 
village and had become a leading light of participatory democracy and a model for 
others.92 The village literally became AI’s poster child, providing case study material for 
glossy newsletters. The AI programme team continued to emphasise this ‘special 
relationship’ over my time in the field. It visited this village far more frequently than 
others. It was the selected site for key awareness events, meetings and, in one case, as 
part of its strategic review. As I explore in the next chapter, this relationship was 
validated to some extent by village residents, although not always perceived in the same 
terms. 
Whilst this dynamic was rather exceptional, and exaggerated to some degree by AI, it 
was common to see smaller organizations stake such claims to unique, often exclusive 
relationships with particular groups at particular levels. The Community Health 
manager, for example, whose organization was somewhat under threat due to lack of 
funding, exclaimed ‘sorry – but these are my people’, when highlighting the challenge of 
multiple organizations staking multiple claims within a particular village or ward.93 His 
claim also suggested something of a more established relationship over time, crafting an 
impression of authority and control but at the same time that this authority was 
authenticated by his subjects. The NGO’s presence had been successfully vetted by their 
desired constituency, infusing the idea of territoriality with that of consent. This was 
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strongly apparent in the comments of a similarly-sized agricultural NGO, with the 
programme officer emphasizing: 
I have been working with the same people for a long time…when I call them and say 
‘come’, they come!94 
This claim was made in a bid to illustrate what set his organization apart from more 
recent imitators. Whilst the comment is brief, the themes of longevity, but also 
territoriality and exclusivity with regard to a working, consenting constituency within a 
particular village were apparent. These themes were also discernible in a longer 
interview with the Community Health manager, whereby territoriality regarding a 
particular village constituency was taken to the point of exclusivity with regard to other 
NGOs: 
The selection of the CCAs [Community Change Agents] was given to the communities. 
When we started working with village health workers there were very few, so we added 
CCAs. But then other NGOs went to work with people in the villages they chose the same 
person! Village leaders say ‘why every day is it the same person? Why are you milking the 
same cow?’95 
The same manager, exacerbated by his organization’s lack of funding, grew angrier on 
this topic over my time in the field. In response to the organization Kidz entering CH’s 
domain of Most Vulnerable Children, he exclaimed: 
Kidz make me sick, because every district has their own community-based organization to 
perform these activities, so how can an organization come from another area where they 
don’t know the context and the culture?...Our volunteers were told to work with Kidz and 
must stop working with others so I asked them ‘why don’t you train your own people!’96 
This manager’s frustration at being usurped from his turf by an organization from 
another district was arguably valid. This unease over access to recruits more generally, 
however, with whom NGOs have invested time and resource, was common amongst 
smaller NGOs more broadly. Certainly, Kidz may have stood to benefit from using 
volunteers who had been previously trained multiple times in reporting the impact of its 
programme. What is interesting about these comments, however, was that they focused 
more on inter-organizational turf politics than the volunteers themselves. As I explore, 
volunteers had mixed feelings about working with multiple organizations, not always 
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negative, and certainly did not see themselves as exclusively aligned with, or ‘belonging’ 
to, one organization over another. 
Territoriality, in the sense of drawing boundaries, or delimiting turf, also existed 
between perceived administrative levels. The extensive ability, indeed the right, to ‘go to 
the communities’ has been explored as a closely guarded resource. Community Health’s 
manager was similarly aggrieved by the incursion of Bagamoyo’s umbrella organization 
CSA: 
You know, I suggest you advise the CSA to focus on their role, which is to access funds 
with which to build the capacity of NGOs, not to go to the communities.97 
CSA, in turn, voiced similar concerns at the encroachment of international players like 
AI: 
What are AI doing now? There is something wrong with how AI are working. They are 
skipping a level, going directly to the grassroots!98 
Yet international organizations like AI and VPI counter-claimed the local for 
themselves: 
Before [VPI’s project] there is no one at the grassroot who can support the people 
grassroot to reach their rights.99 
This VPI programme coordinator suggested that it is only VPI who ‘use the community 
as they are working at grassroots level’.100 ‘International’ and local organizations alike, 
therefore, sought to delimit their geopolitical purview of claim-making, retaining the 
critical domain of the local for themselves. Indeed, VPI replicated this differentiation at 
different scales, with the director commenting on their unequal participation in a 
supposed ‘national’ coalition: 
Sometimes, you know, they have a name…but for us we are a local NGO and I also 
feel this even in the national network, for example we are in the network for gender, 
CSO Gender Coalition is the name. Sometimes, and there are Concern, AI, Care, who 
else - all these big organization [that are] then also local but sometimes I feel just that 
                                                             
97 Interview 7, Community Health programme manager, 14 June 2012. This was in reference to CSA’s 
new initiative dating from May 2012 funded nationally to arrange midhahalo (debates) on good 
governance and accountability at ward level. 
98 Interview 18, CSA secretary, 1 August 2012. 
99 Interview 26, VPI programme officer, English verbatim, 4 October 2012. 




they are doing their jobs and then they try to fill in the gaps involving you. It’s not a real 
work as a coalition.101 
For enterprising new organizations, such as the revived Youth Health, territoriality over 
domains was less concerned with previous investments of resource as with staking 
territorialized claims indirectly, via exclusive knowledge and access of particular groups. 
The manager, as noted, emphasized the depth of the organization’s baseline study of 
those most at risk to HIV infection (MARPs) in Bagamoyo, such as bar workers, 
Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs), substance users and migrant workers. He stressed the 
‘ethnomethodology’ used in accessing these populations in ‘sitting at their tables’, 
identifying 50 CSWs, 70 bar workers, 80 migrant workers and 50 intravenous drug users 
across primarily urban or peri-urban areas in the district (Youth Health Baseline Study, 
June 2012). As such, this methodology and its resulting ‘knowledge’ constituted a unique 
claim to understanding these particular groups: 
I know these people! I understand their behaviour. 
This claim, highly authoritative in nature, underpinned further license to intervene 
extensively into others’ lives: 
If I want to change these people, I need to diversify their income.102 
This remark divulges something of the sense of power and control of this particular 
manager, in this case founded on a purported exclusive access to particular groups. This 
baseline study, however, as explored in representation, and the knowledge claims 
thereof, did not demonstrate the rigour and nuance implied, indeed recycling tropes of 
behaviour associated with Bagamoyo and the Swahili coast. What was clear, however, 
was that this entrepreneur staked a boundary around his association with these groups, 
to the exclusion of others. 
Similarly, territoriality manifested itself in a degree of jockeying over partner ‘grassroots’ 
membership and/or community-based organizations (CBOs). Whilst there had 
obviously been a glut of organizations positioning themselves in this way, there were 
really only two key, district-wide membership organizations that had become part of the 
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civil society architecture. The first was the HIV/AIDS organization UWAMABA;103 the 
second was Gender-Net - a women’s network. Both organizations were membership-
based, providing advocacy, micro-credit initiatives, training and other services. Whilst 
Gender-Net is dealt with in more detail under representation, it is to influence over 
UWAMABA I turn. 
UWAMABA was founded in 2006, claiming over 700 members,104 and was more 
recently endorsed and supported within the local government infrastructure (which 
awarded it a limited budget). Given this pedigree, there was a level of competition for 
organizations to embed partnership relations with UWAMABA, who arguably held a 
high degree of both perceived extensity and representation. UWAMABA was frequently 
cited by entrepreneurs soliciting incorporation, such as Youth Health and Community 
Health, as a key partner. Such claims could potentially generate symbolic capital from 
the representation of people living with HIV/AIDS, and as such were more prevalent 
in self-descriptions than could be realistically substantiated. 
Despite multiple players claiming partnerships with UWAMABA, however, the 
organization was going through a turbulent period with uncertain funding, meaning 
travel to the villages had been impossible. It had gone from being relatively in demand, 
at the height of both VPI and AI’s HIV/AIDS care and prevention work, to being 
quietly abandoned by AI in 2011, as well as facing growing hesitation from VPI as to its 
dependency. VPI was paramount in UWAMABA’s inception, as part of its crafting 
nascent ‘civil society’ after its arrival in 2004. UWAMABA had remained historically 
quite reactive in either awaiting solicitations for partnerships from external organizations 
with funding, or via its role as a popular placement for overseas volunteers. When I 
asked the director, for example, as to future plans for the organization, he gestured to 
two American volunteers, working with the new programme coordinator, shrugging ‘I 
don’t know – they are working on it’.105 
As UWAMABA had thus been formed as part of others’ objectives, it had struggled in 
upward incorporation (Li 2013) towards becoming an organization in its own right. The 
hierarchy between it and prospective funding organizations remained pronounced, with 
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the coordinator pleading ‘we are working down here’ in a bid of authenticity but also lack 
of resources, amid protracted and circular conversations as to who was responsible for 
the organization’s growth.106 VPI was voicing increasing frustrations that the 
organization still did not have the means to sustain itself. Advocates International’s 
quiet but sudden abandonment of UWAMABA from 2011 had left its once advertised 
partner in difficulty: ‘our work is now hard; we have only our office running costs’,107 
still underwritten by VPI with some irritation. 
Territoriality can thus also manifest itself indirectly in jockeying and politicking over 
local partners. In this particular case the interrelationship between extensity and such 
practices is laid bare. Organizations are in effect bidding for exclusive forms of extensity 
and indeed representation. In this vein, AI was moving, somewhat counterintuitively, 
from its own extensive strategy, in which UWAMABA played a part in bolstering scale, 
towards a more selective, territorialized approach. This mirrored, as explored under state, 
its movement away from welfare and service provision, primarily in the area of 
HIV/AIDS, towards a ‘governance’ and accountability focus. This entailed the 
assumption of a more antagonistic stance vis-à-vis local government. In the words of 
their national policy officer: 
As we changed our modelling into the new strategy…our main principle is to work 
within the human rights based approach. For it’s more empowering the communities 
and for the communities to take actions, rather than us being there and providing 
services.108 
In this vein, AI was becoming particularly involved in the issue of land, namely the dark 
underbelly of land appropriation in Tanzania by big business and rich individuals. This 
meant the organization had become focused around three or four ‘hotspots’ in 
Bagamoyo, including the village of Kiharaka, with which it claimed its ‘special 
relationship’, as well as the more remote ward of Talawanda. Interestingly, Talawanda 
was claimed by VPI and local government as not served by any other organization and 
yet AI consistently claimed a territorialized presence, as an exclusive champion of local 
residents’ land rights. AI began visiting the ward regularly, as well as successfully 
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advocating for villagers from the ward to be included in a parallel business 
entrepreneurial project, initially focused on more urban areas.109 
The territoriality of AI’s approach, demarcating exclusionary boundaries within which it 
made representative claims, supported its increasingly issue-based advocacy and vice 
versa. It worked to identify where its strategic campaign issues, at international and 
national levels, had most local resonance. This then generated the case study and ‘real 
life’ empirical material it required to further stoke campaigns and pressure nationally. Its 
disengagement from direct service delivery, and therefore its natural complementarity 
with some state functions, no longer demanded a projection of presence that mimicked 
the Tanzanian state architecture. It sought instead to establish smaller enclaves within 
which to intensify and personalize relations and from which to springboard particular 
issues. Indeed, its new, reactive ‘free radical’ approach drew fire from peers, with VPI’s 
director commenting drily of AI’s coordinator: ‘yes, I know, he is always busy on his 
laptop’.110 
To summarize, NGOs regularly exercise direct territorial claims over geographical, 
administrative or thematic domains. Territoriality manifests itself indirectly, as the 
visible incorporation of some groups as well as the attendant exclusion of others. The 
iterative demarcation of spheres of influence is thus a highly spatialized form of power 
(Sack 1986), although it is of course continually contested by peers and from below. 
Territoriality, therefore, as a recurrent but inherently partial practice, is not merely an 
inevitable outcome of smaller budgets, nor conversely extensity an intrinsic part of 
growing an organization’s portfolio and profile. Territoriality, therefore, is linked to 
representation, just as extensity links to the state, but neither is reducible to the other. 
Rather extensity and its counterpoint territoriality are particular legitimation devices that 
may be embraced or negated as the situation demands. 
 
Working state capital: ‘the government gives us identity’ 
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Working relations with the ‘template’ of the state, an institution that looms large in the 
Tanzania, formed one of the starkest and variable forms of non-state legitimation. 
Whilst the distinction between ‘state’ and ‘society has proven an enduring one in social 
science, these findings add to the growing corpus of work that blurs this divide, in 
Africa and beyond. Actors straddle this divide, garnering symbolic capital from both. 
This does not mark a continuing trend away from studying state institutions ‘at close 
quarters’, which Nugent noted as a concern (2009, p8). Rather, it is possible to study 
how institutions are constituted by foregrounding ‘state-like’ practices (Lund 2011, p75; 
also Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; echoing Abrams’ ‘state-idea’ 1988 
[1977], p79), undertaken by a broader range of actors. In this way, the study of self-
proclaimed ‘civil society’, most vociferously NGOs, is not at the expense of 
conventional state-focused scholarship but is indicative of how the two are intertwined: 
how both are ‘reproduced through time and space’ (Nugent 2009, p8). 
These changing dynamics will be explored by focusing on the two international NGOs: 
AI and VPI. To hypothesise, one might expect that when NGOs focus on public 
service delivery, welfare and civic engagement/responsibility, they are more likely to 
highlight a positive relationship (‘partner’) with local government and national policy: 
taking state-led development to the people.111 However, when the object of 
development intervention focuses on areas related to the good governance agenda (e.g. 
human rights, accountability and transparency), the focus is on representing/mediating 
local ‘demand’ to realise rights (‘advocate’): taking people-led development to the state. 
There was certainly evidence of such a division between VPI and AI practices whereby, 
true to form, VPI forcefully projected its partnership with the district council as AI 
increasingly distanced itself. 
The point, however, is that such practices are fluid and not ‘locked in’. This 
state/society division is not fixed in time and space, but rather their imagined distance 
reproduced in everyday practices (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). This geography forms a 
crucial and continuing part of the political imagination in Tanzania (Dill 2013; Green 
2010; 2014; Schneider 2006). The (re)production of distance, as explored in 
representation, forms part of how NGOs iteratively locate and position themselves, 
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although this positionality is always temporary. Indeed, NGOs may draw on both kinds 
of relations to legitimate themselves in different contexts, as these two case studies 
disclose.112 
Voluntary Partnership International: ‘50% government’ 
For Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), extensity, voluntarism and 
‘community’ rhetoric marked key legitimation claims. Such devices, however, were 
problematic and inconsistent in their application. Most relevant here was the tension 
between ‘voluntarism’, as conventionally associated with civil society in the West, and 
VPI’s positioning with the Tanzanian government and its ability to compel. The close 
alignment with the district council was highly apparent in how VPI presented itself both 
laterally and vertically downward to key stakeholders and audiences. Its partnership with 
local government was imprinted on the side of its 4x4 vehicles; they frequently travelled 
and conducted training with district staff; they had a joint planning mechanism; and, 
uniquely, its calls for meetings and seminars to villages were issued by letter from the 
district Community Development office. This close relationship formed a prominent 
part of the verbal discourse surrounding the VPI’s work, heavily emphasized by its 
project and managerial staff. When I commented on its close relationship with the 
district, the (prior) country director said ‘that is the only way’.113 The country director in 
post reiterated: 
The collaboration with the district [council] has been installed at the beginning of the 
project… the relationship with the district was from the beginning.114 
The outgoing VPI programme coordinator, a Tanzanian member of staff, and 
previous/future government employee, had a very keen awareness of the legitimation 
benefits of close positioning to local government, reflecting: 
[S]ince I started to be coordinator I was trying to strengthen this collaboration [with the 
district] after looking at the advantages…Because we are registered under the 
government, it’s under the Ministry but it’s the government…fine we are working with the 
community, but under the Local Government Authorities. So we are working together 
to facilitate this community …[but] government is…responsible. Government are 
responsible for their people, it’s a key for their people...So for my understanding it’s like 
NGOs is working to support government to achieve development for their people.115 
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This alignment with government went beyond an operational decision and related to 
how the organization defined and legitimated itself to its peers. The coordinator was 
explicit on VPI’s preeminent recognition, adding: 
The government is the one that give us identity, that we are the organization working 
here…even you when you come here to the district, if we are not working closely with 
them it means when you ask…to work with the organizations, an NGO, any NGO…if 
they don’t know us when you go there they can’t even mention us. 
VPI’s director similarly emphasized symbolic recognition from the district: ‘to see you 
moving in Bagamoyo district’, thus seen as a serious player.116 
The relationship was indeed keenly reciprocated and validated by government staff, as 
VPI was consistently mentioned as the largest player in the district (when in fact its 
budget was comparable to AI) and with the best, or ‘most serious’, approach to its work. 
Another district development officer, for example, in the context of endorsing VPI as 
part of civil society’s role to help government, surmised: 
They say it [civil society] is the second arm of the government as government can’t do 
everything, so organizations help government to implement on many issues.117 
The interweaving between lateral and vertical forms of interstitial work was laid bare in 
the following excerpt, whereby embedding relationships with the district bolstered 
claim-making both upward to potential clients and, as explored in subsequent chapters, 
downward along the development chain. One VPI officer, representing himself as ‘50% 
government’ in monitoring visits,118 emphasized later how closely VPI and government 
responsibilities are aligned, with a similar downward-facing aspect to the communities: 
We saw that, that is our work, the work of the district, the work of VPI, so we think that 
is good if the district, they can allocate us a kind of budget where we can share the 
monitoring together… We need…money coming from the district to…support the 
people of the government to go down.119 
Two points became apparent from this dynamic. The first is the continued blurring of 
the public and private, government and non-government, as VPI staff take up positions 
of authority within district committees, and government bureaucrats sanction VPI work 
plans. This echoes Green’s ‘legitimation as being part of government’ (2010, p19). The 
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second, noting the tension between voluntarism and (state) authoritarianism, is how 
legitimation via national policy and governmental structures begins to invoke a top 
down, authoritarian model: bringing state-led development to the people. This has been 
ubiquitous in the national development discourse since Nyerere’s post-independence 
project (Schneider 2006) and there remains residual symbolic capital in that regard. 
Current close alignment with government institutions is not remarkable in international 
development discourse, with some donors promoting partnership with government as a 
funding criterion. In practice, however, VPI began to mimic or borrow heavily from 
Tanzanian state authority and its machinery. In drawing on and replicating state 
hierarchy, or ‘verticality’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002), it inverted its stated bottom-up 
ethos. The ‘development encounter’, as explored in Chapter Four, became highly 
authoritarian in reprimanding failure to enact government policy. At the same time, such 
an organization risks becoming beholden to state authority, increasingly constrained in 
their ability to highlight government failure or advocate in that regard. 
[I]t is very difficult to relate with them [district staff] because it is not the same level; we 
are not on the same level. There is always the feeling that ‘I [speaking as the district] am 
the Local Authority and you are an NGO and you come here and tell me what I am 
going to do but who are you?’ So if you want to avoid this you have to be very careful. 
There is this risk that they can say ‘who are you?’ But you evolve ways to find a 
compromise, it means…it’s a long process but it’s not impossible.120 
This dynamic was borne out in VPI’s annual stakeholder meeting, which became 
dominated by senior district staff regarding their demands and requirements for carrying 
out HIV/AIDS work in the district. The organization was unable to hold government 
meaningfully to account regarding its failure to fulfil its own obligations as laid out in 
national policy. Senior district staff gained control of the meeting agenda, stifling out the 
voices of other stakeholders until it assumed the form of bilateral negotiations between 
the district and VPI. Whilst the director suggested that ‘inside-out’ advocacy puts VPI in 
a better position to challenge government over the longer term, it was clear that the 
process was slow at best, and one that certainly would not take place in a public forum. 
VPI’s embrace of the bureaucratic machine at times left it stifled, opening more avenues 
for state sanction and control.  
                                                             




Lateral legitimation is not, therefore, positioning between equal peers, but discloses 
shifting, situational hierarchies that are both contested and affirmed. From a 
developmental practice perspective, positioning, or ‘partnering’ close to government has 
a strong upward legitimation effect, drawing on current thinking around building 
institutional capacity and sustainability. This positioning, however, infuses NGO 
practices more broadly, in borrowing from, and therefore replicating, state authority. As 
such, it defers to, thus reaffirms, the existing institutional hierarchy and can never 
fundamentally alter the configuration of the political economy: of power and resource. 
This was again borne out clearly in the highly politicized issue of land. VPI, through its 
Women and Child Rights instrument, delivered training and other inputs designed to 
raise awareness of legal rights for women, including in relation to land. The idea was 
that this knowledge would empower women to assert their land rights claims, 
particularly with regard to inheritance in the event of their husbands’ death. This was in 
alignment with national laws and government policy, so there was nothing overtly 
‘political’ in that regard. VPI layered on microcredit initiatives to redress forms of 
economic inequality. The land initiative, whilst not an ostensible priority, had the 
district’s tacit approval. 
This relationship, however, was not solely one of state surrogacy (Jennings 2008) or co-
option, although those aspects featured. It was rather situational as the context 
demanded. Firstly, both elites benefit from an external positioning as partners at times, 
whilst highlighting difference at others. It was beneficial for the district council to 
‘outsource’ this kind of rights based work, which is thankless in terms of political capital 
and infamously difficult on which to gauge progress. Anger and frustration at the futility 
of the work on the part of village level volunteers, compounded by perceived 
insufficient allowances, could be neatly deflected by government towards VPI. There 
thus remained daylight between the two. 
In the second, related, instance, given this distance from the workings of localized 
politics, VPI were unable to address the wider politicized environment in which women 
were expected to advocate their rights. Local power relations, in the form for example 
of influence over courts or police, may leave individual women thwarted at best or more 
physically and psychologically vulnerable at worst. Even the body where instances of 




town.121 Furthermore, VPI was notably silent on much larger scale grey and/or corrupt 
processes of land acquisitions, for example, by speculators and investors. Advocacy at 
the micro-level has little transformative power if not matched by power and influence at 
the macro. 
To summarize, VPI capitalized strongly on the residual symbolic capital of the 
developmental state in Tanzania. It claimed to support ‘government to achieve 
development for its people’, echoing Nyerere’s socio-political project. It sought to 
embed its initiatives at village, ward and district levels, invoking its partnership with the 
district council to compel the relevant leaders to act. Its close alignment with the 
district, joint implementation and the resource it committed to visit every one of 
Bagamoyo’s 97 villages at least once a year contributed to a strong impression of 
outreach and presence that mimicked the state architecture: indeed enabling its ‘co-
production’ (Dodworth 2015). This afforded an ability to compel and reprimand village 
leaders and volunteers on the failure to deliver in accordance with government policy. 
VPI thus foregrounded practices of lateral interstitiality with the district, although such 
relationships were not necessarily ones of equality. Hierarchies were, as ever, situational 
as part of legitimation’s entreaty and repudiation. 
Advocates International: ‘between you and government’ 
Advocates International (AI) underwent a strategic shift in focus from service provision 
towards advocacy during my time in Bagamoyo. Despite its attendant trajectory away 
from government partnership, however, its positioning remained situational, using 
different legitimation in different contexts. It was interesting to witness AI position 
itself as mediator during a village-level land rights’ dialogue, ‘between you and 
government’ and set apart from government representatives. This contrasted with its 
fleeting advisory, partnership role, sat alongside government in another meeting, when 
examining the quality of and access to primary school education. When I pressed the 
Programme Coordinator further to clarify their position: 
We are the bridge, bridging the gap as government are very far. NGOs are coming in to 
make sure people are close to government and government to the people…But we’re 
also working with government…122 
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The claimed interstitiality is prominent in this metaphor, as is the ambivalence in the 
nature of such relations. This ambivalence was also reflected, as will be explored in 
more detail in subsequent chapters, in how AI legitimated itself at the community level. 
The organization drew on its government associations, yet stressing its independence as 
a ‘private’ charity. In another incident some months later, whilst in the AI vehicle, we 
took a short cut through the district bus terminal, normally out of bounds for private 
vehicles. When I asked the coordinator his reasoning he laughed, saying ‘[t]hey are 
government [licence] plates! We are working in the public interest!’123 
In practice, AI worked hard to reconcile this movement from government 
partner/advisor to watchdog/adversary and back. ‘Advocacy’ itself as a term seemed to 
delegitimate particular NGOs to key district personnel, with one key senior manager 
remarking ‘[a]dvocacy! What is advocacy? These advocacy NGOs – they are not 
serious!’124 AI, quite unlike VPI, was never named as a major player, partner or exemplar 
of good practice. The tension between AI and the district became more conspicuous 
over the course of a year, the coordinator commenting: 
You know it’s very tricky, when you work with them [local government]. They can be 
your friends now and next three months they’re not…and you find a way to get back 
close to them again, you get close to them again. That’s how it works; in and out, in and 
out, in and out. They are not consistently with you; one moment they are, one they are 
not.125 
The issue of land, however, previously out of bounds for NGO engagement, again 
made an interesting test case for AI’s increasingly abrasive relationship with 
government, at both district and national levels. Its focus on land governance issues, 
and in particularly the increase in ‘land grabs’ by national and multinational corporates, 
had come to a head in Bagamoyo, given the rapid development of its infrastructure 
during Kikwete’s tenure. As such, AI and government, at both district and national 
levels, had come to blows over highly politicized, often grey or corrupt practices 
regarding land acquisition by foreign and national investors. 
In this vein, a 24,000 hectare and mainly fertile area of land in northern Bagamoyo 
district had been identified by successive foreign investors for the development of a 
sugarcane plantation for biofuel production. Originally the area had been leased to the 
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Zanzibar government in 1974 as a cattle ranch, Ranchi ya Zanzibar (RAZABA). The 
ranch degraded, was infested by tsetse fly and so given up in 1994, at which time the 
land was adopted by the ranch workers, new residents, charcoal producers and 
continuing pastoralists. Earmarked by several investors in interim years, a proposal from 
a foreign company was finally formalized with government in 2008 to develop an initial 
7,800 hectares of land for large scale commercial and outgrower sugarcane agriculture, 
with an ethanol processing plant on site.  
Key decisions for this initiative had been made at a national level, and there had been no 
inclusion or consultation of either civil society or local government until the initiative 
was well underway. The mandatory Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(ESIA) had been undertaken by private consultants hired by the company and, whilst 
they consulted within the project site, did not consult larger NGOs based at Bagamoyo 
district centre. There were no other NGO or civil society representatives monitoring 
this process outside of AI, although there was a certain amount of NGO involvement 
to deliver particular socio-economic aims of the project, particularly around 
resettlement. In the early months of its involvement in 2012, AI focused its scrutiny on 
the accuracy of the ESIA, particularly around calculations for water usage, implications 
for food security given the transfer of land to sugar cane production and issues 
regarding migration and resettlement. A previous investor had been rightfully taken to 
task over the authenticity of its ESIA, which deliberately, if not fraudulently, 
downplayed the negative impact of the project, to the point where it failed to secure 
funding guarantees and withdrew (Havnevik & Haaland 2011). Given this context, the 
ability of large companies to maintain public and private copies of such reports and the 
lack of government scrutiny (or indeed interest) in the findings, the resulting public trust 
in the independence of the assessment process was low. 
Over the year, however, as AI’s knowledge of the project, players and the wider political 
issues deepened, attention moved to the appropriation of 2,000 highly fertile hectares of 
land into the project site, apparently against the wishes of many residents. Whether this 
area was part of the original RAZABA site is difficult to verify, given accurate maps of 
the original site were resident with the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and not 
forthcoming from the District Land Office. Indeed, the lack of available information on 




conveniently loose definitions of the ‘RAZABA area’ to include contiguous areas. The 
very ambiguity of the project site was noted as a project risk in a draft ESIA conducted 
by consultants for previous investors but the note was removed from the final 
publication (ibid., p118). What is clear, however, is that this area west of a railway 
boundary that was, rightly or wrongly, understood to be the boundary of the RAZABA 
ranch was suddenly incorporated into the project area under the ‘former RAZABA 
ranch’ nomenclature. The disputed area was included in the current company’s mapping 
from the outset, bringing the proposed site close to 10,000 hectares. 
In early 2013, the 2,000 hectares of land was reassigned as a sub-village from one village 
to another, seemingly without the full consultation of the leaders of the original village. 
In a highly irregular turn of events, the district commissioner (DC) attended this 
meeting and was minuted to declare the land’s reassignment agreed, despite this post 
having no mandate over local land issues. Even those employed under the Ministry of 
Land at a district level would have no remit over land allocations of this size and nature. 
It is not clear what the exact motivation was for the DC to attend this meeting. One 
informant, involved in resettlement planning, suggested that the leaders of the original 
village had been particularly vocal in their opposition to the project and so reallocation 
would remove them from the equation.126 Allegations of a sizeable payment made by the 
company to the DC were circulating both amongst civil society representatives but also 
more widely amongst Bagamoyo town residents. There was also awareness of 
presidential pressure on the DC to do whatever necessary to ensure the project’s 
progression.127 
Whatever the true sequence of events within this murkier side of ‘doing business’ in 
Tanzania, it was at least clear that due process with regard to land allocation had not 
been followed. The issue was not discussed openly with office bearers, nor did it feature 
in a meeting between the company and various civil society organizations that took 
place later in May 2013, at AI’s insistence. Whilst the meeting itself to take place was a 
hard won victory, it was steamrollered as a public relations opportunity for the 
company, with little time allocated for debate. In addition, national media was at that 
time distracting attention on to the resettlement issue within the project site, under the 
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rubric of ‘land grabbing’, giving airtime to villagers falsely claiming to have been resident 
within the ranch for generations. In fact, there had been a huge influx of claimants into 
the area since it became earmarked for development, by both land speculators and those 
falsely vying for resettlement compensation from the government. Very few had been 
resident before 2009 and the company had a perfectly legal agreement to lease this land. 
The emotive rhetoric in the national eye around land grabbing, including the sizeable 
concessions given to foreign companies, had served in this instance to smokescreen the 
illegitimate and coercive appropriation of land elsewhere (see also Hall 2011). 
In this case, the positionality of AI, particularly in relation to government, was again key 
in how it legitimated its presence and involvement. Civil society was claimed to reside in 
a particular ‘space’, counter-posed to abuses by big business and big government, and 
therefore automatically more closely affiliated with the interests of the citizen. This 
Tocquevillian conception of virtuous civil space was crucial to how AI legitimated itself 
in this instance: 
With this kind of project, you know, government is interested in the money, you know, 
the growth of the district, the infrastructure, the macro-physical things you know that’s 
what they are interested [in], so anything coming on that side is good. That’s how they 
look at impact also, they don’t go into social, economic, the life of the people, that’s not 
their concern. So…I don’t feel there could be any counter-argument from the 
government in any way [to object to the project], no way, it can’t. So that was my 
expectation. So it is only civil society who can stand and be different.128 
At the same time, AI moved to invert the vertical authoritarianism, positioning itself 
closer to the imagined ‘community’ realm: 
He [the district CDO] wanted the DED [District Executive Director] to be around, the 
DC to be around. He wanted people from National Environment Commission to be 
around, TIC [Tanzania Investment Centre] to be around...For me and the rest we were 
like ‘no, this is quite low level, because this is CBOs, we are talking about low level, civil 
society - we want our space’.129 
It was not clear, however, that AI genuinely operated at a ‘low level’ or indeed that AI, 
CBOs (Community Based Organizations) and civil society could be used so 
interchangeably. Given AI’s national and international advocacy charge on issues of land 
rights, accountability and indeed taking on corporate power, the case of this land was a 
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strong fit for the organization’s profile and evolving strategic focus. As the national 
policy officer described it: 
I think that is one of the opportunities of being international, but we’re also national 
now as I’ve said. So we have more interest with our people at the national level so that 
gives us mandate as well to actualise. Because we are a national organization but we are 
just a member to the international federation - that makes a difference. But also we have 
been working for some time, it’s not a new area that we’re just coming in.130 
Thus the interstitial work of AI between administrative levels, insofar as such geography 
holds, was keenly felt. The organization could draw on its considerable international 
profile and status, including its ability, ‘its people’, to generate national media attention 
on a particular issue, as a tacit threat to local office bearers. As a more junior AI staff 
member exclaimed, ‘they [government] are scared of us!’ It would be near impossible to 
shut AI down at a national level, in contrast perhaps to other national NGOs, such as 
BAWATA, who fell afoul of the state over the sensitive land issue in the 1990s.131 At the 
same time, AI could find itself temporarily crowded out laterally, through informal 
politicking at a district level. The political game it played in balancing prestige at these 
various levels in the system had become far more pronounced. 
It was by virtue of this process that it formed the ability to challenge both the micro- 
and macro-social and political environment in which it operated. When asked if 
government relations, especially at a district level, were now more difficult to manage, 
the national policy officer replied: 
It is tricky. It is tricky because you are dealing with power relations, you’re disturbing 
the status quo so it’s most likely you will be looked at as an enemy. Like you’re trying to 
change things and they would prefer if you are providing service delivery…so you 
would be complementing them.132 
Clearly, this ability to challenge was a strong exercise of power and prestige that 
originated in part higher up the development hierarchy. It would thus be indeed difficult 
to argue that AI constituted Mamdani’s ‘indigenous’ civil society (1996) and as such 
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there were, as AI staff themselves conceded, implications for whether they truly 
represented those on behalf of whom they claim to advocate. This was particularly true 
when issues were intermeshed with wider international discourse (e.g. ‘land grabs’ and 
‘food security’) when the very strong material incentives for people to sell their land 
could not be easily discounted. Furthermore, AI, given its heightened territoriality, had 
no prior existing relationship with either of the villages adjacent to the disputed 2,000 
hectares and nor did the vast majority of the organizations that participated in the 
meeting that AI pushed for with the company in 2013. The perspectives of the villagers 
themselves were strangely absent from deliberations. AI staff had little familiarity with 
the other organizations that it stood together with as ‘civil society’ over the issue. When 
I asked the programme coordinator about the work of the other organizations in the 
meeting, he replied: 
I don’t know what the others are doing, I don’t know. I have seen some of the 
organizations for the first time. And also it is not the matter of what you are doing, it is 
a matter of how powerful you are in the district and how you are respected, what is 
your reputation. Even if you had 20 NGOs with no reputation they’ll [government] 
never issue us anything. So I wish you had 5 strong ones – that could make a change. 
In this instance, politics and influence pulled against representation and unanimity with 
other players. It is fair to say that AI was more feared than ‘respected’ in this regard. 
This is not a critique of AI’s particular operational aims in and of themselves. Rather it 
is an examination of how it crafted its ability, often laudable, to take on highly 
politicized issues that are often beyond the scope of ‘local’ NGOs, including VPI. Its 
freedom and distance from the district council apparatus afforded it mobility and 
territoriality, but this in turn could prove at odds with extensity and even 
representation at a local and district level. It was also at the expense of recognition by 
the district council themselves, who maintained misgivings at AI’s propensity to work 
outside of ‘the system’ or, in other words, their control. 
To summarize, it is more fruitful when interrogating the legitimation of public authority 
to highlight ‘state-like’ practices rather than drawing institutional domains. The state in 
Tanzania provides an enduring, symbolic template of public action on which different 
organizations may draw. VPI’s replication of state-like practices conferred authority but 
inverted its proclaimed bottom-up ethos, whilst AI’s distance from the state afforded its 




situational and may shift depending on aspect and audience. Furthermore, the state, via 
local government, is not impotent in this constellation of practices, equally participating 
in the lateral legitimation, affirmation or contestation of development agencies’ 
authority to act. The district as field highlights the complexity of contemporary 
legitimation in this regard, as actors skilfully navigate its many facets. 
 
Representation: ‘these people, they just sit!’ 
 
Representation is a performance. It demands continual movement between claims to act 
or to stand for others: between distance and proximity. Nevertheless, both elements are 
intrinsic to representational practice in ambiguous contexts, with such continual 
movement proving pronounced during fieldwork. This oscillation, highly performative 
in nature, was starkly encapsulated by an encounter with Youth Health’s programme 
manager. As noted, he was educated to Masters level and, through fusing his Dar 
consultancy with a dormant Bagamoyo NGO, had secured a major grant focussing on 
‘at-risk’ populations. In my first meeting, when asked about approach, he explained the 
‘ethnomethodology’ of their baseline study. ‘We need to put on their shoes’, he 
explained, ‘we need to sit on their chairs and at their tables’ to understand the reality of 
their lives and experiences. He described how it had taken time to identify at-risk groups 
due to existing taboos but after empathetic perseverance he gained ‘insider’ status.133 His 
claim-making imparted a proximity to his constituents, thus an increased ability to stand 
for them. 
When we stepped outside of the office, however, the NGO ‘hat’ was firmly removed. 
The manager had become increasingly assertive during the course of our discussions 
through requests for external help for his organization in return for access, which was 
not uncommon. On leaving the office, however, the conversation turned to the 
prospects of finding him an mzungu (white, western) wife. The turn in topic was so rapid 
and, to my mind, inappropriate that I struggled to negotiate the conversation. I 
attempted to deflect with humour, asking why he would want an mzungu when they are 
so much trouble. He began a torrent of abuse about how coastal women were ‘lazy’, 
                                                             




‘without goals’ or ambition and he would be totally unable to meet a woman of the 
appropriate level in Bagamoyo. In this exchange, the manager iterated the difference in 
status between himself and the Other he worked with, its alterity fixed and immutable. 
The Other’s inability to act for their own self-development necessitated his organization 
to act for them. 
These representational practices, to act for or to stand for a definable constituency, have 
long been disaggregated in political theory, most notably in Pitkin’s seminal work (1967; 
see also Mansbridge 2003; 2011; Rehfeld 2005; Saward 2010; Vieira and Runciman 
2008). Contemporary representational practice, however, pronounced throughout 
fieldwork, visibly moves to encompass both of these, manifest in fleeting positionalities 
of both distance and proximity. Distance manifests itself in claims of the need to act for a 
constituency, due to barriers to self-development, which is long embedded in colonial 
discourse around Tanganyikan trusteeship (Green 2014; Hunter 2015). Proximity, 
particularly prominent in NGO claims and in civil society more broadly, conveys ideas 
of resemblance: shared norms, traits or interests, which (uniquely) allow civil society to 
stand for those excluded by the chauvinist mainstream. The oscillation between these two 
positionalities mirrors legitimation’s repudiation and entreaty, as part of its 
countervailing currents.134 
Representational practice comprises some of the most fiercely guarded claims by NGOs 
regarding their placement and ability to intervene on behalf of particular under-served 
populations.135 Such claims fall into two stages: NGOs, through their intimate, more 
egalitarian relationship with their constituents at a village level, are able to directly access 
and understand their ‘developmental’ needs. Secondly, NGOs have at least a formalized 
relationship with government, in this case the district council, and so claim to be in a 
position to aggregate, amplify and advocate for their constituents’ claims. The rhetorical 
emphasis in such claims is the ability to stand for a collective. This representation 
‘performance’ (Holzscheiter 2016) resonated strongly within the previous words of AI’s 
programmes coordinator: 
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NGOs are coming in to make sure people are close to government and government to 
the people…We are the voice of the people to government.136 
The coordinator emphasized how government fails to represent the interests of the 
masses, leaving civil society more proximate to stand for the people.137 Such claims far 
outweighed the role of resource transfer in legitimating AI, even though materiality was, 
as will be explored in Chapter Four, critical to underpinning downward representational 
claims. 
The issue of representation, therefore, interweaves closely with the preceding themes of 
extensity, territoriality and state relations, as well as that of materiality. Indeed, 
Nyerere’s authoritarian populism instituted the ten-house cell system to manufacture the 
‘consent of the governed’ (Aminzade 2013, p139). These relationships, however, have 
proven complex and often work in contradictory ways, given no development elite 
socially resembles the groups they work with: Pitkin’s ‘descriptive representation’ (1967). 
NGO and government workers alike ritually bemoaned the trials of working with 
Bagamoyo’s ‘coastal people’. Given that the vast majority of professionals came from 
outside of the region, this had profound implications for claims that NGOs were indeed 
well-placed to represent the interests and attitudes of their constituents, towards whom 
they assumed a colonial-like aspect. 
Whilst tropes regarding coastal, indeed Islamic, ‘backwardness’ have become embedded 
in the contemporary Tanzanian political landscape, perceptions associated with coastal 
people have waxed and waned according to the region’s politico-economic prominence. 
The term Waswahili (Swahili, coastal people) oscillated in and out of fashion as signifier 
and of self-identification, depending on the area’s associated power and influence. Its 
association with Ustaarabu (civilization: derived from ‘Arab’), the height of coastal 
civilization and aspirational migration quickly faded during the German then British 
colonial periods, wherein Waswahili were stripped of their land rights (Fabian 2007b). 
Negative associations, including that of criminal and thuggish behaviour, crept in in the 
1930s (Eastman 1971; Fabian 2007b). Fabian cites from archives a saying from the 
1930s that ‘hapa Bagamoyo, sisi tuhuibiana’: ‘here in Bagamoyo we steal from each other’ 
(2007b, p225). During the 1940s, nationalist African pride displaced Ustaarabu and Arab 
                                                             





paternalism, which had taken on connotations of bondage and racial victimization 
(Glassman 2011, p58). 
As such, the rise to predominance of the up-country nationalist leaders began to eclipse 
the once coastal powerhouses. By the 1950s, the coast was viewed to have degenerated 
to a backward, ‘boorish’ way of life (Eastman 1971). Under Nyerere’s leadership, Swahili 
was decoupled from its coastal associations, appropriated as the language of unity and 
nationalism (ibid). The socio-economic decline of the coastal settlements accelerated in 
this political climate that focused on the industrial development of the north and the 
agricultural boom of the south west. By the 1960s, Bagamoyo was seen to be a 
backwater, ‘by-passed by modern communications’ (Iliffe 1979, p382), isolated from 
and impermeable to outsider influence. Posted government officials in the 1960s 
complained that locals were failing to participate in ‘nation-building’, lamenting that 
‘Bagamoyo people have a belief that they know…the desire for them to learn or to adopt 
to new changes is very little’ (Fabian 2007b, p319 citing local government archives). For 
Fabian, this resistance was ‘no different from the resistance that all other outsiders to 
Bagamoyo Town had experienced throughout its history’ (ibid.). 
This palpable ‘inside/outside’ sensibility has endured to the present day. The state 
bureaucrats of the 1960s have been complemented by the non-government 
developmentalists of the last decade. These NGO elites, as their government and 
colonial predecessors, have received a formal, generally Christian, education. An 
overwhelming majority of NGO (and government) staff in Bagamoyo came from 
outside of the coastal region.138 This is often true of any development context and has 
been thoroughly critiqued elsewhere (e.g. Ferguson 1994; Tvedt 2006). More uniquely to 
Bagamoyo, however, is the continuing palpable divide between inland and coastal 
culture that infuses every development encounter. NGO practitioners regularly 
articulated their frustrations with working with coastal people, suggesting that 
backwardness, culture, religion and lack of education were all barriers to their 
participation. ‘They just sit/remain’ (wanakaa tu), ‘they don’t understand’, ‘they are a bit 
behind’, ‘they are still in the box’ staff lamented as industrious trainings and workshops 
                                                             





crumbled into inactivity as participants return to coastal life. Cooper’s ‘modernizing 
bureaucrat’ persists in combatting the perennial laziness of the people (2002). 
There is a clear tension, therefore, between claims of proximity, via an equal footing with 
constituents in order to stand for them, and claims of distance with perceived 
developmental failure of coastal people to adapt and to act by themselves. Nevertheless, 
both elements are intrinsic to representational practice in such ambiguous contexts, 
even over the course of a single encounter. Thus the opening vignette, detailing the 
encounter with Youth Health’s manager, encapsulates to the extreme the continued 
oscillation within the representational ‘performance’ (Holzscheiter 2016). The 
juxtaposition in this case was laid bare, between the NGO forging a common 
understanding with those it claims to represent and the individual entrepreneurial 
pioneer who, by definition, seeks no peers at all. This extreme example of 
representational practice and its instability spotlighted a persistent tension within 
legitimation more broadly: to both entreat and repudiate those they work with. 
It was interesting to explore these issues of representation with Julia, an expat volunteer 
with Voluntary Partnership International who was, prima facie, a clear ‘outsider’. VPI, 
despite its successful ‘localization’, was an international organization, for which Julia was 
a volunteer for one year. In addition, she had not studied development studies as her 
colleagues, but had a background in anthropology. In her words: 
I didn’t study, you know, international this, development that…I don’t have that 
framework, so I don’t fit in there [gestures to VPI office]. They all believe a lot…me, I 
don’t know.139 
Julia had spent a year in coastal Tanzania prior to joining VPI. She not only had a strong 
command of Swahili but an exceptional ability amongst expats to read and decipher 
coastal ‘culture’. She was able to read the different layers of metaphor and irony, or at 
least was aware when she did not understand, which was challenging also for Tanzanian 
inlanders. Through this ability, she garnered a capacity to draw people to her from all 
walks of life. In addition, given her detachment from the development discourse, or in 
her words ‘framework’, she was freer from the compulsion to project developmental 
‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ onto social interactions. 
                                                             




Julia reflected often on the issues and paradoxes VPI experienced in their approach, 
explored already in part. She was particularly conscious of the tension between 
‘mobilizing’ people to advocate for their ‘rights’ and whether this was really standing for 
their everyday needs, picturing in such circumstances: 
Even if I’m aware of my rights, in my daily life I have many other problems to solve, 
basic needs to solve. It happens that even if I know my rights, sometimes I forget. 
Not forget, I don’t have time to think about them. 
Her contemplation on her own position, and VPI’s insertion into people’s lives more 
generally, was highly reflexive: 
So there are many things between them that make it very difficult to deal with, the 
issue of human rights. And me, I can’t understand it because I wake up, I eat, I have 
everything, so even when I stay in the workshop sometimes I feel very, very bad. I 
can’t believe sometimes what they are telling [regarding stories of domestic abuse]. But 
at the end of the day I can’t understand because I didn’t live their life; I don’t know 
which kind of problems they have every day. 
She also reflected on the disruptive effect of pushing to act in the name of human 
rights, particularly regarding gender, and the contradictions of having locally placed 
volunteer ‘advocates’ to undertake such work: 
Julia: So we can do a lot of philosophy, but at the end of the day… 
Kathy: The reality… 
Julia: Yeah, the reality. So it’s very difficult, very difficult. Because we have also…cases 
of rape of children and parents, they agree to not enforce, to not report, 
having…wanakubiliana na mbakaji [they come to an agreement with the rapist]…and 
stop. And also there is the shame to denounce some cases. And then I think in the 
village it’s very difficult because everyone knows each other. I think in the village the 
structure of the village is also made of a sort of cooperation that sometimes doesn’t 
allow you to break some relationship, even if they are in a bad relationship. They need 
each other. It’s very difficult.140 
Julia was alluding to the often futility of dismantling community structures through what 
is essentially an individualistic perspective on training volunteers, couched in the 
liberalism of the rights-based approach. There is a contradiction in at once setting apart 
such volunteers as pioneers, whilst simultaneously reaffirming the importance of 
‘community’ based change, as explored under voluntarism. Other staff, of course, were 
also aware of such challenges, but the willingness to challenge the established VPI script 
was limited. Furthermore, Julia’s self-critique was not necessarily shared by the 
                                                             




Tanzanian staff, who often defaulted to pre-existing stereotypes. When I asked, for 
instance, the VPI programme officer if he found the area challenging to work in: 
It depends on the kind of people you are working with. When you work with women 
and girls there is no big problem or challenge. But when we work with directly the 
fishermen it’s a bit challenged because these people are always thinking about fishing. 
They’re not aware about other social problems like HIV and AIDS, they are not 
aware. They are aware, but they don’t care. They don’t care. That’s why going to an 
area like Saadani, you can get it in the story of gang raping, you see? So these 
fishermen, I don’t know, maybe because of the nature of their work, they’re a bit…I 
could say cruel, or what, I don’t know, I’m missing what to say. But they’re not 
frightened about social welfare, about social issues. There are really strict with their 
activities of fishing. They don’t care even about the families.141 
Even for the (expat) Country Director, the failure of people to engage meaningfully on 
the issue of HIV/AIDS represented an inability in local people to see the scale of the 
problem. ‘It’s not my mother or brother who’s dying’ she lamented, in an aside that 
disclosed distance between her organization and those it claimed to represent. She later 
reflected, towards the end of her tenure, that there was a particular barrier to operating 
in Bagamoyo district, not least to do with ‘per diem’ saturation, meaning that no 
organization could successfully work there and that VPI would be better to leave.142 
What set Julia’s reflections apart from other VPI staff was the attempt to empty out 
moralizing from these challenges, as well as the compulsion to consign causes of failure 
to outside the organization. What underlies many of the stereotypes of coastal people is 
a familiar form of moralizing around a particular work ethic, reminiscent of Weber’s 
writings on the subject (2001 [1930]). It focuses on the presumed reliance on fishing, as 
well as the purported rejection of kazi (work). Kazi translates in this instance more fully 
as manual labour, as associated with agriculture, rather than business or 
entrepreneurship. This came out explicitly in the words of a government employee, who 
was working on a World Bank funded welfare project: 
It’s true! Coastal people are lazy you know, they don’t work like people of Iringa, I 
think you saw eh? The coastal women wake up, they put on their clothes and just 
want their men to bring them food… [Why is that the case?] This area is dominated 
by Arabs; they don’t like work, they like business.143 
There is no perceived contradiction within such a view with the contemporary 
valorization of neoliberal development discourse, which includes micro-finance, 
                                                             
141 Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, English verbatim, 11 December 2012. 
142 Fieldnotes, discussion with VPI Country Director, September 2013. 




whereby business and entrepreneurship are actively promoted. Nor is there a 
contradiction perceived with the simultaneous emphasis on fishing. Bagamoyo is not, 
nor ever has been, reliant on mariculture, with fishermen forced to diversify throughout 
the ages (Fabian 2007b). Furthermore, the number of fishing villages on the coast is 
very small compared to the scale of Bagamoyo district. Nevertheless, this fixation on 
Bagamoyo fishermen and their perceived distaste for hard graft, alongside the supposed 
Islamic indifference towards the ‘right’ forms of education, were consistent themes 
within reflections of cultural barriers to development: 
Well, Bagamoyo, if you look in Tanzania, the trend of development in many, many 
areas has been actually stimulated by influx of new people in the area. Bagamoyo has 
remained as a conservative area, you will find the majority of people are native. So 
intrusion from other areas is very, very minimal. This is one. But secondly, according 
to tradition and culture from people around the coast, they normally don’t send kids 
to schools, so this has also been one of the areas which made them to remain or lag 
behind. Thirdly is the notion of a fisherman area. There is a tendency of spending 
most of their time around the sea looking for fish and they become quite lazy so this 
is one. The other which is very, very sensitive but I think has also contributed is also 
most of the Islamic communities you find is also lagging behind. This, normally, we 
don’t put in writing because it is also very politically sensitive.144 
But what is culture? It is something that is created. And you cannot separate it from 
people’s work and their livelihoods. Fishing is not like farming, where you get up early 
in the morning and go to the shamba (farm). There are no set times – there are tides. 
And so when the tides are not right the only thing to do is to come back and sit, play 
bao (draughts), sip coffee. And so people arrive and see them just sitting and say ‘Ah, 
these people are lazy!’145 
The first set of reflections was made by an operations officer from a UN agency at the 
national level, reaffirming a number of coastal, colonial-like stereotypes. The tropes of 
laziness and Islamic backwardness are prominent, as part of a timeless, immutable 
cultural disposition.146 Bagamoyo must continue to depend on incomers to re-educate 
and indeed emancipate coastal people from their cultural shackles. 
The latter set was made by an older, highly experienced and devout Muslim programme 
director for Eco-Coast. Although he himself was not from the coast, these reflections 
were clearly more empathetic in nature. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed the belief that those 
who partake in mariculture have more leisure time without labour, but also that they are 
not involved in other economically productive activities. It thus supported the 
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assumption, despite the initial claim otherwise, that culture is fixed and demarcated. He 
added, ‘[c]ulture is who he is, he is a fisherman and that is his culture and he will 
continue to be so’. The fiction of the isolated, self-sufficient fishing community, 
impermeable to outside influence, is thus still regularly invoked as a significant 
impediment to working in the region. 
Due to the nature of Eco-Coast’s work on coastal eco-systems, focusing on particular 
environmental ‘hotspots’ and the surrounding villages, its target areas were typically 
more remote and difficult to access. As such, its representative claims in acting/standing 
for the inhabitants of these villages, as explored, were more territorialized and 
contrasted with the extensity and uniformity of government. Indeed, Eco-Coast’s claims 
of proximity were also contrasted with those of newer NGOs, due to its comparative 
longevity in the region. As noted, when asked as to whether having so few employees 
from the Bagamoyo district served raised any challenges in its work, he replied: 
But we’ve been working here for fifteen years! They say ‘Ah! You are Eco-Coast! You 
are one of us!’147 
The territorial form of representational practice, however, disclosed predictable 
countervailing currents. The Eco-Coast director was obviously cognizant that whilst 
claiming to stand for these constituents, overlooked by government designs, his 
organization was simultaneously bound to act for them. This was particularly true given 
the intangible, deferred benefits of ecological conservation. When pushed again if 
having no Eco-Coast staff from the region made a difference, he replied: 
It makes a big difference. Even a new person in the village is viewed with suspicion. It 
depends on how you present yourselves. If you say you are there to bring 
development you are viewed with suspicion. If you say you are there to learn you can 
join them, be part of them. But this you build up slowly. For example if you want to 
bring toilets you don’t say ‘where is the toilet?’ You start by saying ‘where can I help 
myself using your facilities?’ And then you can start slowly putting your own 
agenda.148 
As such, these two kinds of representational claim, standing for and acting for, are often 
fleeting, with one collapsing and another taking its place. The tension between insider 
and outsider, proximity and distance, was keenly felt in this exchange. It is often, 






however, the development expert and outsider, acting for the Other, that wins outright in 
forging the authority to act. 
It was typically in such brief, informal moments where the performative element of 
proximity and standing for a constituency collapsed back into the need to act for the 
aberrant Other. An older, highly respected matriarch of civil society in Bagamoyo 
impressed on me the unique ability of herself and her NGO to access and relate to 
neglected areas and groups, particularly women.149 This script slipped in her anger, as 
workmen due to undertake work on a building she owned failed to arrive on time: 
‘These people!’ she cried, referring to the Bagamoyo unwillingness to work, ‘it’s like a 
slave mentality!’ Similarly, after the tape had stopped running, an international NGO 
representative exclaimed: 
You know these coastal people, they don’t want to do anything you tell them and do 
you know why? It is the legacy from slavery. They don’t want to do what you tell them 
to because they think you are enslaving them.150 
In fact, the role of the slave trade in Bagamoyo’s pre-colonial history has been recently 
reconstituted and overstated for political and economic reasons (Fabian 2013). 
Nevertheless, it provided a convenient, if rarely spoken, trope on which to hang 
castigation. The frustration in governing the postcolony thus continues, whereby local 
people are portrayed as marred, unable to identify that which is in their own interests, 
leaving elites struggling to bridge divides. 
The tension between territorial representation and those whose interests are in fact 
represented remains problematic. For AI, it was true that relations between it and its 
beneficiaries became more personalized and, at times, more strongly reciprocated as 
people began to view it as their NGO (see Chapter Four). At the same time, given that 
these territories or turfs are sites where pre-identified advocacy issues play out, there is 
an ambiguity as to whose issues they are representing. As the AI national policy officer 
continued, in response to my question on the topic: 
It’s a big challenge. For now it’s not their issue, they don’t see it that way. Apart from 
providing the right information, providing the capacity, and building. We have not 
been able to provide an alternative to community. Yes there’s ‘don’t sell your land for 
food security!’ but what next? I think we still need to work with the government to 
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bring the government on board. Because the alternative will also come from the 
government, because if it’s really committed to transforming its community to see 
agriculture as a real way of life.151 
This echoed the programme coordinator’s comments in the Bagamoyo context, when 
asked about whether this issue of food security has resonance: 
You are right. It depends on how you mobilize people to understand, they will be on 
your side that this is wrong, this is wrong. And maybe you also start with the angle of 
money, it’s undervalued, you are cheated. Because that’s where they will understand 
better than food security, but you know very well your intention is food security but 
will start that as the first and then the second one as food security and then mobilize 
them in that way, they resist! They say ‘we don’t like that’, they want the money, that’s 
the biggest thing. It’s very hard to mobilize people when things for them is very 
difficult, short term reasons for them.152 
Clearly, the perennial development dilemma between ‘enlightening’ others on their true 
interests and purer forms of ‘advocacy’ remains at play, particularly when working to 
translate global development discourse. Staff were of course aware of the dilution effect 
it has on representation, but were unable to stray too far from an internationally 
mandated script. The ambiguity of the representativeness of advocacy work was laid 
bare in the coordinator’s later comment, that it is ‘AI speaking through others’, whereby 
local champions are identified, brought in to voice words that originated elsewhere. This 
subtle, shifting positionality epitomizes the multifaceted, situational performance of 
representational claims. 
The issue of representation was contested much more visibly through various NGOs’ 
explicit rejection of Bagamoyo’s umbrella organization’s efforts, the Civil Society 
Association (CSA), to position itself as mouthpiece of the district. The CSA registered in 
2009 as part of a surge in the number of district network organizations. This was in part 
due to recognition of the need for improved NGO coordination in rural districts like 
Bagamoyo, but also of networks as a new opportunity for development entrepreneurs, 
via small amounts of funding from the multilaterally funded Civil Society Foundation 
(also Mercer & Green 2013). Indeed, its increasing activity and presence was spurred on 
by the increasing influence of a rival, longer established network in a neighbouring 
district at a regional level who had funding to build other district networks, much to the 
CSA’s consternation.153 CSA’s more formalized claim of representing civil society was 
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thus existentially critical, to a level surpassing that of individual NGOs. Its claims of 
extensity and representation across the district, however, were belied by its negligible 
paid up subscription list, which was only 25: a fifth of its claimed membership base.154 
The CSA nonetheless described itself to others as directly improving the services of 
CBOs and NGOs, as well as building their capacity, placing itself ‘above’ and distant 
from civil society in a bid to act for it.155 In a funding application to the UNDP, for 
example, the CSA claimed: 
Civil society organizations, NGO, CBO and FBO leader showed no existing link 
whether horizontal or vertical between their organizations and the local government at 
various levels. And at grassroot level between communities to their leaders.156 
This challenging of existing CSOs’ representativeness and interstitiality would have been 
highly contentious if circulated, given such claims are likewise existentially critical for 
such organizations. In this way, the CSA was carving out sensitive space in which its 
unique interstitial work, laterally and vertically, was crucial to better governance. 
The CSA’s precarious funding situation, however, had meant it had become highly 
reactive and moved into areas not expected by its founding members, causing confusion 
as to its overly proximate role. This had prevented it from conducting any serious 
capacity-building of member organizations, including in the area of fundraising, which 
was a key, if unrealistic, expectation. This had left members asking questions as to what 
they received for their dues. As explored under territoriality, NGO leaders like that of 
Community Health were pushing back against perceived encroachment by the CSA: 
You know, I suggest you advise the CSA to focus on their role, which is to access 
funds with which to build the capacity of NGOs, not to go to the communities.157 
Thus, representational practice at this district level was directly underwritten by access 
to potential funding. As a programme officer of an agricultural organization retorted: 
CSA…want to speak for me where in fact it is easier for me to speak for myself and it 
is easier for me to get money myself. For now they only get money from us and for 
what? And it’s hard for us to get that money.158 
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Similarly, in response to the CSA’s assumed interstitial, ‘coordination’ role, an (African) 
expat quipped, ‘what skills and experience do they have to coordinate me?’159 
In this way, organizations were actively rebuffing the CSA’s representational claims of 
distance and the need to act authoritatively for Others. They were rather viewed as 
overly proximate, not in a representational sense, but as a competitor similar in aspect. 
Once again, the intrinsic spatiality of representational claims, shifting, replicated and 
contested at different scales, was laid bare. 
To conclude, development agencies, colonial and post-colonial, have performed 
proximity as well as distance to those they claim to represent. This is particularly true of 
NGOs in the absence of meaningful consent or formal authorization to act for others. 
The need to compensate is manifest in such claims to be ‘one of the people’, to be close 
to the people and ultimately to stand for the people. These claims, however, are fleeting 
and give way to the conclusive need to act for the people when situations of uncertainty 
and of perceived failure solicit a more authoritative stance. In this way, well-worn tropes 
such as laziness and backwardness continued to be recycled as barriers to Bagamoyo’s 
own development. NGOs, therefore, as their colonial and missionary forerunners, cast 
themselves as custodians of the people’s interests, past and future. This is not, however, 
a representational practice restricted to NGOs, however, as it is revealed to be an 
integral part of constructing one’s authority to act, from the global to the local. 
 
Voluntarism and virtue: ‘I don’t eat’ 
 
The language of voluntarism was predominant throughout fieldwork, manifest in 
different forms and different forums. At the district level, managers reiterated how ‘I 
have volunteered’ (lit. ‘I have offered myself’), ‘I don’t get anything’, ‘I don’t eat’, in 
contrast to the perceived excesses of government elites and indeed larger NGOs. They 
emphasized the necessity of their work, driven by community needs irrespective of 
salary. This resonates with what Green discerned as deliberate placement at the bottom 
of the development hierarchy, in a bid to prospect partnerships with larger agencies 
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(2012, p309) or Prince’s upward ‘incorporation’ (2015, drawing on Li 2013). Whilst 
these practices do indeed resonate with the internationalized, indeed verticalized 
neoliberal regime of good governance and its demands of an active citizenry, however, 
there are multiple registers at play.160 
‘Voluntarism’, and its associated virtue, is a core legitimation device that has permeated 
‘civil society’ since its inception in Western political philosophy. Civil society, as noted 
in Chapter One, has long been conceived as a distinct realm of public activity. The 
influence of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, building on the writings of Locke, 
compounded this division, whereby society comes together as ‘one body politic’ (Locke 
1948 [1689], p44) to institute, but also counterweight, government intervention into the 
lives of its citizens. This in turn, via Tocqueville (2000 [1865]), instilled civil society with 
the language of virtue and of community voluntarism in the face of state predation and 
amorality (see also Dorman 2005, p41; Lewis 2002; Weintraub 1997). 
This template has been revived since the 1990s through the return of civil society as a 
concept again ‘useful to act’ with (Lewis 2002, p570). Civil society, predominantly via 
NGOs, has thus been aggressively promoted by international organizations to hold 
African governments to account (Mercer & Green 2013; also Abrahamsen 2000; Mosse 
& Lewis 2005; Williams & Young 1994). Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving unsalaried 
time and effort towards a perceived, or claimed, common good, has proven a resurgent 
legitimation device in this domain. In its most recent articulation, formalized voluntary 
work has become integral to a range of development interventions throughout Africa, 
promoted by donors, NGOs and government (Boesten et al. 2011). This recent wave of 
voluntarism has rightly renewed academic inquiry into such practices, scrutinizing for 
elements of continuity and change (e.g. Brown & Prince’s collection 2015). Such work, 
however, overemphasizes the verticality of neoliberal governmentality and foreshortens 
the importance of various lateral forums. 
Mercer and Green, for example, emphasize voluntarism as part of the verticality of the 
development ‘contracting chain’, and the careful self-positioning by NGO elites within 
that complex (2013, p107). They argue that the language of voluntarism and of virtue 
serves to differentiate local civil society from ‘the perceived failures of government’ 
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(p111), whereby government elites are set aloft in contrast to the virtuous ‘grassroots’ of 
civil society (citing Mindry 2001). This dynamic was indeed, as noted, borne out to some 
extent by discussions with NGO leaders in Bagamoyo district, where numbers are high 
and resources scarce. These managers reiterated how ‘I have volunteered’ (lit. ‘I have 
offered myself’), ‘I don’t get anything’, in contrast to the perceived excesses of 
government elites and indeed larger NGOs. They emphasized the necessity of their 
work, driven by community needs irrespective of salary. This indeed resonates with 
Green’s deliberate placement at the bottom of the development hierarchy, in a bid to 
form partnerships with larger agencies (2012, p309). 
Whilst this is of value in some circumstances, however, continual lack of funding and 
discernible activity may also prove a source of embarrassment for NGOs, delegitimating 
them from their peers and, crucially, from local government. Organizations without an 
office, regular operations or a permanent staff member were derided by district staff as 
‘not serious’ or as ‘seasonal workers’.161 The district Community Development Officer 
(CDO) was sceptical, as explored, of NGOs entering on a speculative basis. With the 
CDO placed as the most significant gatekeeper for NGOs in the day-to-day, he 
controlled access to the right meetings, consultation and planning and, crucially, 
securing district staff participation in project activities. An NGO which consistently 
emphasises its low funding and inevitably voluntary nature, therefore, brings the District 
Council little to the table, preventing it from sitting alongside more ‘serious’ 
competitors. 
Despite this growing ambivalence of voluntarism vs professionalization, it remained a 
pronounced legitimation device for the larger Voluntary Partnership International (VPI). 
VPI was voluntary in ethos in that, historically, it placed overseas volunteers alongside 
salaried Tanzanian staff on a programmatic basis to work on issues of ‘community 
development’, primarily HIV/AIDS care and prevention. In addition, it drew on their 
network of trained volunteers at village level, invoking voluntarism and its virtue to 
differentiate their organization and to promote, even instil, altruism over material 
interest in their recruits.162 
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The expatriate country director, when asked why staff stressed the voluntarist ethic 
whilst introducing VPI in workshops, responded: 
Yes, they [the programme officers] are also an example. Of course they have salaries 
but…they are not big salaries, not like other NGOs but [they don’t] complain if they 
have to work during weekends or after working hours. Also they are an example…to 
understand people that besides their daily lives, to go to the shop or whatever they do, 
there is something more that they can do. And no one is paying you to do this…As an 
organization we have a philosophy and VPI philosophy we want also to share with the 
community. Also because we are training people to do something…it’s not a work so 
that’s why they put an accent on this aspect that VPI is…voluntary, starting from the 
name and all people working with the organization. It’s one of the baseline for 
VPI…to be voluntary.163 
Whilst it was true that VPI staff received lower salaries than their INGO counterparts, it 
was a surprising claim that this would forge affinity with their volunteers, given the 
obvious disparity in situations. The programme officer who ran the workshop was 
much more empathetic in her reflections, but ultimately voiced the same ethos: 
It’s important [to stress voluntarism] because many people who called to the training 
or workshop, they expect a lot. Sometimes they think that they’re coming from home, 
they left their business or their activities there and they came to sit in the class without 
any…any income, so they expect more from many organizations. So even us they are 
not happy with 5,000 [Tanzanian shillings] as allowance, they are not happy, because 
other organizations when they call them sometimes they can give them 15 […] they 
can give them 10, so VPI we can’t. So when we give them the task, maybe to sensitize, 
like TOA to go and collect datas, we didn’t facilitate them in anything, we ask them to 
volunteer. That’s why from the beginning sometimes I prefer, even all the facilitators 
they need to clear this things.164 
Indeed, as will be explored in Chapter Four, this claim that voluntarism and payment 
were mutually exclusive served predictably as a persistent point of antagonism in 
workshops. More pertinent to the discussion in hand, however, is that VPI and its 
voluntarism were strongly sanctioned by the district council with whom, as noted, it 
conducted joint activities. VPI’s unique placement laterally within the arms of the state, 
via the district, conferred vertical authority to its work, at times to the point of 
compulsion (Dodworth 2014). This was also true of their co-produced, virtuous 
discourse of community voluntarism as a recruitment vetting device. It was a constant 
endeavour in VPI workshops that the ‘right people’ were selected to do the requisite 
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work within their communities, supporting this core legitimation device in other 
forums.165 
There were several challenges, of course, with this idealized form of civic voluntarism 
packaged upwards to donors, co-produced laterally with the district and lastly 
downwards, to village recruits. Firstly, voluntarism, particularly in this context, played 
once again into negative stereotypes of coastal people within Tanzania, whereby people 
were viewed to have few other demands on their time. This was borne out by endless 
debates regarding allowances for conducting voluntary work within and between 
villages. VPI portrayed demands for allowances as dissonant with their voluntarist ethos, 
whereas their volunteers viewed allowances as an acknowledgement of their time and 
resource in working on what were perceived as external initiatives. 
Secondly, it was based on a flawed conception of the village as a coherent, unitary 
community. NGO workers of course acknowledged the fractious nature of village level 
politics and had an intimate knowledge of local power dynamics. Nevertheless, the 
notion of a community volunteer is built on the assumption that the community both 
pre-exists and can be moved in a particular direction on a set of issues.166 This further 
assumes that volunteers can endlessly detach themselves from and relocate themselves 
into that context. As such, the individualistic liberalism of the human rights framework 
clashes with the simultaneous invocation of the community collective and its imputed 
conservative fabric. The training of individuals as a means to both cohere and rupture 
the fabric of their presumed community was beset with contradiction. NGO workers 
informally acknowledged such tensions, even if formally they were compelled to 
continue to reaffirm the aims of the project.167  
Lastly, there is an inconsistency in the invocation of voluntarism that is specific to the 
Tanzanian context, its symbolism entwined with post-independence socialism. President 
Nyerere’s Ujamaa, or community socialism, was portrayed as a return to pre-colonial 
values of respect, communal property and communal work (1973 [1968]) pp334-340). 
‘In traditional African society everybody was a worker’, Nyerere claimed early in his 
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state-building project (1968 [1962], p4), adding later that ‘we can work together 
voluntarily for our own benefit’ (1973 [1968], p347) at a time of material scarcity. 
Ujamaa, as laid out most explicitly in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, claimed a virtuous 
break from an exploitative past (Brennan 2006a, p398) and was a key instrument in the 
construction of public authority (Hunter 2008). Although Ujamaa failed in many 
respects, it did institute a regular, often weekly, graft of msaragambo, or public works. 
Village ‘voluntarism’ was thus state-sanctioned for almost three decades, outliving 
Nyerere’s time in office. It was on this basis that Advocates International (AI), quietly 
abandoned voluntarism. The incoming Programme Coordinator ended volunteering 
initiatives on assuming his post in 2012, reflecting later: 
It is like this, in Ujamaa days, socialism in Tanzania is the period 1967 to 1977…it 
went on further to 1980s, during this period communities were one big family and 
that is how it was preached by our late Mwalimu, all very well united by our language. 
There was an official day called harambee where every villager will go out to do 
community work, being road construction, cleaning et cetera. I remember in 1980s in 
our village was always every Friday. This behaviour built up in people’s behaviour and 
eventually became community practice. Was no longer official but willingly people 
every Friday would go out and do voluntary work. For me, this is volunteering in 
Tanzania which by then we didn’t call it that name, was harambee or msaragambo. Later 
this practice died after communities started to lose trust from leaders they elected. In 
the 1980s and 90s a lot of public parastatals were dying, cooperative societies in 
villages and districts were pocketed by educated individuals through corruption or 
abuse of power. Since then the spirit of community, willingness to go out and 
voluntarily help in development work died. What I am saying here, the term doesn’t 
work, volunteer for who? Why volunteering while we know public money is not spent 
rationally? 
For this staff member, therefore, if NGOs are serious about distancing themselves from 
the failed government of Tanzania’s past, they must also reject this flawed conception of 
voluntarism. In justifying his decision to abandon voluntarism, he submitted it was 
wrong of any ‘public’ actor to sanction such work onto the shoulders of those who 
could afford it least: 
[T]hose who devotedly offer their time to volunteer are either those required to do so 
by virtue of their faith, religion, values or those who feel they are better off, they are 
wealthier than community they serve. You can’t volunteer from nothing, you studied 
primary by single meal per day, you got to secondary by paying your own fees through 
long hours of labour…[H]ow do you expect…most Tanzanian who have come from 
this tough road to eventually volunteer for others? This all makes volunteer idea so 
tough here. People will volunteer with pay and not without pay, and that is how 
volunteerism should be considered here.168 
                                                             




AI, however, was alone in abandoning voluntarism in Bagamoyo and thus crafting 
distance from the District Council. For AI, it was no longer a legitimation device given 
its revised advocacy focus at various levels. It needed to be highly reactive to political 
events at all levels, seeking to convert such into leverage over government actors. As 
such, the extensity and endorsement proffered by large scale networks were no longer 
productive, superseded by a ‘free radical’ approach, forging fleeting alliances as 
necessary. Whilst AI’s abrupt shedding of its volunteers caused some consternation 
amongst existing recruits, as will be explored in the next chapter, it offered improved 
manoeuvrability and a cutting-edge brand of development advocacy, thus ahead of its 
peers. 
Other organizations, however, with considerably less economic, social and symbolic 
capital than AI, drew consistently on the presence of voluntary networks as a 
legitimating device. This was not reducible to the ‘virtuous location’ (Mindry 2001) of 
the (fictional) community over centralized government, although this was invoked. It 
was, rather, that the existence of a voluntary network allowed development managers to 
convey further lateral legitimation to their district peers, as well as vertically to donors 
and the communities in which they work. The relationships between volunteers 
themselves and extensity, territoriality and forms of representational practice have 
already been explored. The institutionalization of voluntary networks duly conferred a 
scale and depth of presence; temporal continuity; boundaries of influence; and forms of 
consent. When Community Health’s funding had come to a close, for example, the 
manager continued to draw heavily on the presence and activity of its network to 
maintain an impression of temporal and spatial extensity. When asked if their volunteers 
were still working beyond the end of the project, he replied: 
They are not tired, by the way. The way we are working with these people we say ‘you 
are working for your own people, who have honoured you!’169 
Building a voluntary network, therefore, is part of such contemporary projects’ 
infrastructure and yet unavoidably garners uncertainty and ambiguity within such 
boundaries and beyond. 
It is evident, therefore, that voluntarism as a legitimation device is multifaceted and 
changing. AI rejected voluntarism as a break with the failed state-led development of 
                                                             




Tanzania’s past, in favour of a new development template. VPI, in contrast, continued 
to embrace voluntarism and its virtue as an indispensable part of the ‘community-led’ 
discourse, which, contrary to Westernized accounts of civil society, it co-produced with 
the district council. This drew on residual symbolic capital from Nyerere’s era, in turn 
appropriated from colonialism, thus representing more continuity than change. Smaller 
organizations clung to their volunteering networks in the face of increasingly sparse 
funding, as a tidemark of their previous extensity and actuality. Voluntarism in Tanzania 
is thus not confined to civil society but forms a template for public action around which 
different actors coalesce. Furthermore, it is not merely ‘virtue’ but the social 
infrastructure of voluntary networks themselves that proffers institutional presence. 
These claims, however, are not unidirectional in their application but negotiated in the 




This chapter sought to explore legitimation practices at a district level, looking laterally 
across a distinct hub of activity around which local development elites are increasingly 
centred. In the words of a local government employee ‘the district level is really where 
you find all kinds of people; it is really the grassroots.’170 The location of the elusive 
grassroots aside, the district provides a clear forum for the construction of public 
authority. The increasing number of players active at a district level accentuates this 
process of claim-making, as actors seek to legitimate themselves to interested parties, 
including peers and local government. With the district council and, to a lesser extent 
other NGOs, acting as gatekeepers to further legitimation, situational hierarchies 
accentuate the continual process of entreaty and repudiation of such players. This is part 
of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699), which became apparent 
across each practice. 
Extensity, in both its spatial and temporal forms, draws on the ‘latent legitimation’ 
(Packenham 1970) derived from institutional continuity. It is about forging and 
maintaining a presence, enabling symbolic representations of an organization’s actuality 
                                                             




in other forums. This process may take place in conjunction with other players, typically 
through the mirroring of the state architecture, or in competition, as players look to 
dwarf others, thus forming situational hierarchies. Territoriality is the counterpoint to 
extensity, whereby ubiquity of presence is replaced with exclusivity and the formation 
and maintenance of bounded spheres of influence. Extensity and territoriality are thus 
linked as primary spatial forms of power, but what is evident, as per Sack’s work (1986), 
is that such forms are no longer the purview of the state, nor of ‘high politics’. Non-
government organizations equally seek the space within which to govern and such 
claims to govern are forged and experienced in the everyday. 
The fluidity and ambivalence of legitimation practice is highlighted through the use of 
state relations. Domains between state and non-state are not fixed, meaning non-
government organizations may also engage in ‘state-like practices’ (Lund 2011, p75; also 
Gupta & Sharma 2006) in legitimating their right to govern. Positionality vis-à-vis the 
district council was thus fluid amongst NGOs. If ‘government is the one who gives us 
identity’, this may be realized either through its entreaty, as in the case of Voluntary 
Partnership International, or its repudiation, as in the case of Advocates International. 
As noted, however, such relations are not entrenched and organizations may assume 
different aspects at different times. Extensity, territoriality and state relations interrelate 
with symbolic claims of representation and of voluntarism, which assume particular 
forms in the Tanzanian context. 
The dynamics of entreaty and repudiation, of proximity and distance, are indeed most 
stark in relation to claims of representation. This discloses an intrinsic ambivalence in 
representational practice between claims to stand for and to act for a particular 
constituency. For development actors, whether NGOs, the CSA or the Tanzanian state, 
the logic of acting for the Other ultimately wins out, foregrounding distance from, and 
repudiation of, the groups which they mean to represent. Representational performance 
is thus particularly spatialized, which in turn enable claims of interstitiality. Voluntarism 
also has a spatialized component, conventionally portrayed in Western-centric thought 
as part of a civic sphere separate to and distant from that of the state. In the Tanzanian 
context, however, voluntarism in fact discloses an overlap with state-like practices. 
Voluntarism, in turn, affords other legitimation in the form of extensity as well as 




In summary, creating the space to govern demands a multi-faceted positionality, and 
which in turn necessarily involves a lateral component. Looking laterally, however, does 
not imply equality amongst peers, even though actors can be similarly positioned. 
Situational hierarchies form as result of the continual construction of public authority 
‘as an active and contested process of assertion, legitimization and exercise’ (Lund 
2006a, p679). The countervailing currents of such legitimation are borne out in the twin 
processes of entreaty and of repudiation of other players within a field, which run 
through each legitimation practice. Legitimation practices, therefore, are not 
symbolically or substantively distinct, but in fact strongly interrelate and overlap within a 















‘To the communities’ and back 
 
All the NGOs are at the district level – where are they working now? They are not 
working here! We have a lot of different issues here, but the organizations don’t 
come…What are the district doing now for us? 
These are the words of the chairperson of Kiharaka village, Kerege. Kiharaka is a 
rapidly changing, highly politicized environment between Bagamoyo and Dar es 
Salaam’s centres. In these comments, the chairperson strongly and succinctly repudiated 
the claims of NGOs resident at a district level, whether that of extensity, state, 
representation or material resource. Several organizations, as will be explored, cited 
Kiharaka as the exemplar of its work, whilst another as its most defective. The 
chairperson, however, discloses a keen awareness of the multipositionality of such 
organizations. Downward legitimation and its negotiation have been rendered invisible 
by the elite-driven accounts of legitimation to date. Rather than downward legitimation 
as unidirectional, put out ‘to the communities’ for consumption, it is negotiated by 
constituents in the everyday. Individuals affirm, contest and indeed reject, the authority 
of both state and non-state to intervene into their lives. Indeed, this has very real 
implications for the ability of organizations to effect the actions of others. 
Whilst the previous chapter, therefore, centred on lateral legitimation practice at a 
district level, downward legitimation forms the empirical nub of both this chapter and 
the next. Lateral legitimation, between peers, collaborators and competitors, provides an 
additional forum for the entreaty and repudiation of other actors, as part of 
legitimation’s countervailing currents. Such claims are then projected vertically, both 
upwards to donors and the international sphere but also downwards to the intended 
subjects of governance. Whilst there is sufficient critique of how NGOs legitimate 
themselves upwards (e.g. Anders 2005; Gould 2005; Lister 2003; Mercer & Green 2013; 




Walle 1999), there is little on how discursive practices are negotiated at the ‘interface’ 
(Long 1989) between district and village. 
In this chapter, I briefly revisit how NGOs legitimate themselves to their constituents 
but then, crucially, how these discursive claims are appraised and contested at the ‘local’ 
village and ward levels. This is in one sense a bid to ‘study up’ (Nader 1972), but also to 
counter the verticality bias of extracting data along a singular plane. The chapter thus 
continues, methodologically, to embrace the ethnographic ‘sensibility’ (Schatz 2009), 
looking laterally at the broader context of people’s lives. After providing an overview of 
Kiharaka’s rapidly changing socio-political environment, the chapter proceeds to 
explore how claims (re)produced at the district level are appraised and negotiated within 
each legitimation practice. 
 
Bagamoyo in miniature: legitimation in Kiharaka 
 
This chapter draws on four weeks’ fieldwork, primarily in November 2012, centred 
predominantly on Kiharaka village in Kerege ward. Kerege ward is situated 
approximately midway between Bagamoyo town and Dar es Salaam (see Figure 4.1). 
Bagamoyo’s influx of investment and population, alongside increasing inequalities, are 
encapsulated in the ward’s changing fortunes. It is at the furthest southeast corner of the 
district and directly borders Kinondoni, which is one of Dar’s three administrative 
districts. Kerege is nominally rural, but second only to Bagamoyo’s urban ward in 
population density, registering at 205 per km2 (Tanzanian Census, 2012) (see Figure 4.2). 
It is one of the newest of Bagamoyo’s 22 wards, carved out of its parent ward Zinga in 
2009. It houses some of the most rapidly changing peri-urban environments along the 
mushrooming Dar-Bagamoyo corridor, as well as remote and underserved communities 
along the coast (Dodworth 2014). As such, there is uneven distribution of development 







Figure 4.1: Map showing location of Kerege Ward 
 
Figure 4.2: Map showing Kiharaka in relation to Kerege village and the tar road 
to its southeast, Dar suburbs to its west (Changwahela is northeast on the coast). 
Kiharaka village is almost five kilometres from the tar road at Kerege but is rapidly 
becoming a construction hotspot. Land pressures and urban sprawl from Dar es Salaam 




and flat plots of land within commuting distance to town. Indeed, Kiharaka was due to 
be declared a ‘new town’, whereby land usage would no longer be under village 
governance.171 A strange juxtaposition had developed between the ‘village-like’ centre, 
with traditionally constructed stalls and eateries, and the enormous, multi-storey, gated 
villas dotted around the periphery in various stages of completion (see Figure 4.3). The 
land issue had thus become a highly charged one. Ongoing ownership disputes, and the 
broader contest regarding who should benefit from the land dividend, ran to the heart 
of Kiharaka village governance and politics. Disputed and fraudulent land claims were 
heard twice weekly by the Land Disputes Committee. At the time of research in 2012, 
the village chairperson was in a legal dispute regarding a Tanzanian investment 
company’s claim to a sizeable area of land, having passed a by-law to block it, which had 
escalated to the district court. The village office saw an almost daily stream of private 
cars and 4x4 vehicles with rich professionals coming to finalise land sales, building 
permission or to register as residents. 
 
Figure 4.4: Picture of large gated villa behind the school near Kiharaka’s centre 
 
The land issue thus forged a highly sensitive climate in which increasing numbers of 
NGOs sought to intervene. Indeed, land had a role to play in Kiharaka’s very inception 
as a village in 2009, breaking away from its previous status as a sub-village of 
                                                             




Mapinga.172 Advocates International (AI) claimed a pivotal role in this process, whereby 
Kiharaka villagers were successfully ‘mobilized’ to exercise their rights and to advocate 
for improved local service provision. This underpinned the AI coordinator’s claims: 
‘You can say [Kiharaka] is an AI village’. The land issue drew AI to Kiharaka in the first 
instance, with their land governance component focusing on communities near 
Bagamoyo’s two tar roads.173 AI claimed that Kiharaka continued to serve as a leading 
light of participatory democracy and a model for others.174 The village chairperson had 
formerly been an AI Community Development Facilitator, receiving rights-based 
training on various legal and governance issues. AI emphasized its continuing ‘special 
relationship’ with Kiharaka, positioning itself as the mouthpiece for villagers’ interests 
and their efforts to secure rights to land in the face of big investors. 
This is not, however, to conject that Kiharaka’s leadership was representative of a 
homogenous ‘community’, holding uniform interests regarding its land boom. Some 
villagers, especially those nearer access tracks, had benefitted greatly from the hike in 
land values, generating liquid assets through the sub-division of their small plots of land 
for sale. Village income was healthy, given the village is eligible for ten percent of land 
sales. It had a well-maintained and resourced village office with quality fittings, chairs 
and stationery as compared to the other 30 odd villages I visited and a budget in relative 
healthy surplus. It was also likely, however, that village leaders had benefitted 
individually from the grey area of land valuations, officially recording sales at less than 
the market price and extracting the surplus. The chairperson, for example, until an 
accident in 2012, was driving a large Cherokee Jeep, to the bemusement of visitors who 
associated this fortune with the land windfall. The headteacher, himself an ‘outsider’ as 
is often the case with teachers posted in Tanzania, rued how Kiharaka had squandered 
its land dividend until there was nothing left for sale: 
To say honestly, there is a problem of leadership in this village. They have put the issue of 
land sales over the development of the village.175 
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He supported this with the fact that various village development committees, of which 
he was a member, had not met for a year. 
It was impossible that AI staff would have been oblivious to this grey area of land sales 
in Kiharaka. At the same time, the village proved a useful and fertile testing ground for 
AI’s evolving strategic approach. Key relationships had been embedded, providing a 
conducive environment for innovative or high profile events. Any illegitimate income 
had not diminished the chairperson’s prestige as an advocate against larger scale land 
appropriation by big business, which had the perceived complicity of district level staff. 
His remarkable resilience in the face of higher authorities, using the district court case 
against the investment company as a soapbox, meant he was a continual thorn in the 
side of district executives. AI sought to position itself within, or rather ‘between’ such 
politics. 
Whilst AI trumpeted its special relationship, strongly legitimated within the leadership, 
other NGOs experienced rather different outcomes. Kiharaka’s congested land 
development arena was mirrored by a high number of NGOs vying for influence. In 
Kerege ward as a whole, government staff reported the presence of 6 international 
NGOs at different times (Voluntary Partnership International, UNICEF, Red Cross, 
CAMFED, Pathfinder, AI and Population Services International) headquartered, with 
the exception of VPI, in Dar es Salaam. This meant that several large organizations were 
not registered with the district council (and so did not feature on the list of 124 NGOs). 
Pathfinder, for example, worked via an agreement with the district hospital. Others, like 
CAMFED, were registered at a national level but recognized and mandated via ‘working 
groups’ within Bagamoyo District Council. The majority of these international 
organizations focused on health, except CAMFED, which focuses on girls’ education. 
Ward staff named four other national/district level NGOs (GenderNet, UWAMABA, 
Kerege Development Organization and Youth Health) operating within the ward.176 The 
organizations reported to be operational in Kiharaka village differed again from that of 
the ward. The village chairperson named firstly and foremost AI and, when prompted, 
acknowledged the presence of Care International, Eco-Coast and Community Health, 
outright denying the presence of VPI. The difficulty in ascertaining which NGOs were 
operating at which levels was endemic in Kerege, as in Bagamoyo as a whole, reflecting 
                                                             




reporting biases as well as the intermittent circumvention of local government by larger 
INGOs. 
The predominant analytical emphasis on upward, and indeed formalized, legitimation 
renders other forms of legitimation, as explored, less visible. In particular, downward 
legitimation and its everyday negotiation have been starkly absent. Over my time in 
Kiharaka, I sought to explore the resonance of downward legitimation claims, produced 
primarily at the district level, for those that NGOs worked with. The different fortunes 
of VPI and AI in particular epitomized divergent vertical legitimation strategies in 
Kiharaka. In this way, the Kiharaka case provided a highly congested, politicized and 
polarizing environment, but one that encapsulated broader contemporary changes in 
Bagamoyo more widely. Such an environment brought such divergent legitimation 
practice and effect markedly to the fore. 
 
Extensity: ‘All the NGOs are at the district!’ 
 
My first visit to Kiharaka had taken place as part of my Masters dissertation in June 
2011. My curiosity had been sparked when both AI and Community Health had 
independently suggested I visited to gain a better understanding of their work. Having a 
volunteer at the heart of every ‘community’ was a key legacy claim of Community 
Health, with each one represented by a blue pin in every village on their map of the 
district. The manager pointed to Kiharaka’s pin, urging me to ‘ask for the health 
attendant; everyone will know him’. I arrived at Kiharaka village office, met the 
chairperson and spent the rest of the day in the company of a ‘Community Change 
Agent’ (CCA) named Akili, recruited and trained by Community Health. Akili suggested 
that I accompany him on home-based care visits to new or expectant mothers. We 
visited four households and I watched as Akili spoke with small groups of women about 
their health and their baby, discussing symptoms, hygiene, breast-feeding and so on, 
using a small flip-chart of images as prompts. 
Despite his skill and knowledge, Akili appeared ill at ease in those localities and the 
relationships with the women laboured and uncomfortable. It was not until I visited him 




sub-village of their parent village Mapinga. As such, Changwahela and Kiharaka were 
formerly part of one enormous village, which spanned over 6,000 hectares (60km2) 
(Bagamoyo District Profile 2011). Since Kiharaka’s ‘graduation’ to full village in 2009, 
however, it had become a completely separate jurisdiction. Changwahela was over five 
kilometres away from Kiharaka (nine from Mapinga) across challenging, swampy and 
flood-prone terrain. Changwahela’s remoteness meant that it had markedly inferior 
quality of services, even compared to Kiharaka, with no clinic, school or potable water 
supply; water was biked in from six kilometres away. Akili seemed alien to Kiharaka 
because he was, coming to undertake health work with people who did not know or 
accept him. Akili’s aptitude for the work was negated by such competing formal 
jurisdictional authority. 
This vignette encapsulates how district level claims of extensity, i.e. the projection of 
scale both spatially and temporally, faltered at the village level. In this case, 
understandings of formalized territoriality confounded Community Health’s projection 
of extensity, having repeatedly impressed that their agents worked at the heart of every 
community. As it transpired over time, only the village chairperson had heard of the 
CCA’s role, his name or Community Health and this lack of familiarity had hindered 
him on home visits in Kiharaka. The CCA’s ability to legitimate himself was 
undermined, compounded by his rejection by the village leadership: ‘that health 
volunteer?’ the village chairperson retorted when I subsequently asked after him, ‘He 
can’t work here anymore!’177 
Remarkably, given the remote location of Akili’s sub-village, he had worked tirelessly 
across the parent village as a health volunteer for five organizations, at times 
concurrently. Whilst there were some material benefits for this work, depending on the 
organization, Akili was emphatic of his motivation to help ‘the community’ as well as 
the satisfaction he derived from learning and utilising new skills (see voluntarism). As 
far as his work as Kiharaka CCA, however, Community Health’s optimistic claims were 
misplaced. Akili had long ceased working in the village, given the formal boundaries as 
well as the informal delegitimation of the project by its constituents and the village 
leadership. The blue pin in Kiharaka in the map displayed on the wall of the Community 
Health office supposedly represented Akili but in effect meant very little, even before 
                                                             




the villages’ boundaries were redrawn. The programme manager was not and could not 
be familiar with the political geography of individual wards, given the scale of the 
district. The broader point, rather, is that this claim of extensity had been explicitly 
rejected by many in Kiharaka for some time. This was unbeknownst to the organization 
who had recommended I visit there to understand the quality, scale and depth of its 
work. 
Community Health was not the only instance whereby a claim of extensity had been 
strongly scrutinized and contested by the vocal Kiharaka leadership. The leadership 
strongly denied that VPI had any presence in their village at all, via their association with 
the Community Justice Facilitators (CJFs). When I asked the chairperson who was 
Kiharaka’s CJF he cried: 
No! There is no CJF here! There was one in Mapinga. I was a CDF [Community 
Development Facilitator] for Mapinga and now, since I am the chairperson, there are 
two more CDFs in this village. Because CDFs are a product of AI; CJFs are a product 
of VPI.178 
This was a clear repudiation of VPI. The Village Executive Officer and headteacher also 
said they were unaware of the presence of VPI or any CJF. When VPI finally came to 
the village to summon their ‘stakeholders’ in a monitoring visit some months later, the 
chairperson did not attend despite the letter issued by the district council. The Village 
Executive Officer reported at the meeting that the CJF had been informed but had not 
been able, or had forgotten, to attend. In his absence, the VEO accused him, like others, 
of returning ‘silently’ from training, without feedback.179 The delegitimation of VPI’s 
presence in Kiharaka despite, or indeed because of, its association with the district (see 
state) indeed precipitated informal strategies of silence and withdrawal. This flew in the 
face of one of VPI’s key legitimation practices, whereby it reached all areas of the 
district and was coextensive with the government machinery itself. As ‘proximity and 
presence matter’ in the construction of authority (Allen 2003, p3), it duly falters in their 
absence. 
Prior to the VPI monitoring visit, I had found the name of Kiharaka’s CJF, Zawadi, 
listed on the wall of the Kerege ward office. When I eventually located him, he was 
returning home from a full day’s labour on a construction site in the village. He 
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approached me with much caution and some animosity, founded on a concern that I 
had come to demand why he was not fulfilling his duties as CJF. The interview that 
followed left the greatest impression of my fieldwork. Once he understood I wished to 
empathise with his situation, he explained at length the futility of his task. He had been 
trained at the same time as the other CJFs in 2008. Although the new village boundaries 
had caused some confusion, it was the local leadership’s rejection of VPI’s work that 
had prevented him from assuming his duties. This rejection had had a prohibitive effect 
on Zawadi’s ability to undertake the work, as he lamented: 
After Mapinga split about two or three years ago I was sent to a refresher training [for 
CJFs]. I reported back to the village leaders but I have not yet been presented to the 
village…So often these days I no longer follow up [on this work] when the time 
comes to get my information…I feel bad that perhaps I have not followed up. But 
then I have still not been introduced to the community. I have asked ‘why have you 
not introduced me?’ but I still have not had a response.180 
Whilst not Zawadi’s key priority, the burden of this role had nonetheless proven the 
source of much frustration. It had evidently been demoralizing for this man, whom his 
VPI-associated peers in the ward had known to be a highly motivated volunteer. His 
absence during VPI’s monitoring trip to Kiharaka later that year was seen by their staff 
to be symptomatic of both the CJF and the wider village’s failings to engage with the 
appropriate work and, indeed, their own ‘development’. In fact, it was almost entirely 
symptomatic of the rejection of VPI’s presence in the village on the part of its 
leadership. 
VPI’s spatial extensity, therefore, a key legitimation device in more remote areas, had 
faltered in congested Kiharaka. AI’s successful legitimation, in contrast, especially 
amongst the leadership, had worked to the exclusion of others (see territoriality). This 
was neatly captured by AI and VPI’s responses as to why their projects had so clearly 
succeeded or failed respectively; both replied ‘leadership!’ without hesitation. The village 
leaders were happy to service one NGO but not both. Indeed, given the chairperson’s 
acrimonious relations with the district, particularly in their criticism of unlawful land 
‘grabs’, VPI’s close association with the district bureaucracy did not play in their favour. 
Kiharaka was, in return, seen as a renegade village, which consistently failed in the 
district’s development efforts (see state). 
                                                             




Members of the Kiharaka leadership were, in turn, highly sceptical of the perceived 
development ‘racket’ at a district level and the retention of resource at that level: 
All the NGOs are at the district level – where are they working now? They are not 
working here! We have a lot of different issues here, but the organizations don’t 
come…What are the district doing now for us? We are the stakeholders. In fact, the 
district [council] contributes [to the issue] too. They don’t ask organizations what they 
are doing and where. It is an issue of district leadership. Every organization comes 
with their own plan, for example, ‘we are working on health – we have this plan’ or 
‘HIV/AIDS – we have this plan’ but they don’t implement. Organizations are not 
doing the work; they write the reports, they get money and they eat. Eco-Coast came 
with their plan and we cooperated, in that mangrove project, but now they are 
missing. GenderNet said they would come but until now they are not here. They said 
to our mothers [women] to join and to organize and you will get a loan but until now 
[gestures empty hands].181 
Other organizations also failed this continuity test of temporal extensity, unpredictably 
coming in and out of focus over time. As Akili rued of Community Health, whose 
project had disintegrated by 2013: 
The Community Health project just died without notice. When we went to submit our 
information we just gave them to the guard. We still needed the project – we’d started 
to see changes. I was angry, I lost motivation. The training had given us a new way of 
educating the community…I don’t know why Community Health don’t communicate 
with their stakeholders inside [wadau wa ndani] – they only care about their external 
stakeholders [wadau wa nje] [Would you work with them again?] Community Health 
helped my kin. If they came again I would work with them again, but I would see the 
way in which they returned.182 
Akili was obviously aware of the claims communicated externally by Community 
Health, but the extensity and reciprocity projected by its manager had little resonance 
given the manner of their departure. Whilst this had served to delegitimate Community 
Health to some extent, however, Akili was open to a new negotiation, highlighting his 
agency to do so. 
Another experienced health volunteer Afia, who had been trained by several 
organizations since 2008, most recently by VPI in 2011, was also not present at the VPI 
November monitoring meeting due to the leadership thwarting communications. Afia 
had earlier remarked how difficult it was to know which organizations were still current 
at any one time: 
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[Do you still work with VPI?] Yes, but it’s hard to know as they are very far away and 
there is little communication. But until now I am still working with VPI. 
Afia added that, when speaking of another health organization Pathfinder, long periods 
of time passed between contact, whereby challenges arose and circumstances changed: 
I haven’t sat with them. I haven’t sat with them and we have challenges. It’s better 
that we sit with them; it’s been a long time since we received the training on reporting 
and recording, a long time, and I haven’t received any follow-up training.183 
She noted at length how these issues of continuity were exacerbated by problems of 
coordination, as organizations etched small project ‘enclaves’ of influence where they 
were recognized and relationships embedded.  
To summarize, the picture of spatio-temporal extensity, constructed by many NGO 
actors laterally at a district level as well as upwards to national government and donors, 
contrasted strongly with one of flux and discontinuity at the village level. NGOs’ claims 
of extensity, therefore, both geographical and temporal, were strongly contested by the 
Kiharaka leadership, as well as scrutinized by the volunteers these NGOs work with. 
Such contestation highlights a process of delegitimation of many organizations claiming 
Kiharaka operations, hindering their authority to effect behaviour in others. It also 
foregrounds the relationship between extensity as ubiquity and territoriality as exclusivity, as 
the competing spatial forms that power takes. 
 
Territoriality: ‘AI are very close to us’ 
 
Territoriality and extensity are (inversely) linked as spatial forms of power. Whilst 
extensity is characterized by ubiquity, at district, national or international scales, 
territoriality is the bounding of sub-spheres of influence within a system. As explored, 
the district-wide extensity claimed by VPI and Community Health had been negated by 
key post-holders in Kiharaka. This had been in favour of a much stronger alliance with 
AI, to the exclusion of other players. Some of this, as I will explore, was underwritten by 
the levels of investment by AI, both in terms of material investment but also in its 
successful perception of continuity in time, which in turn bolstered claims of 
                                                             




representation. The strong territorial claim made by the AI Programme Coordinator, 
that ‘you can say that Kiharaka is an AI village’, was clearly acknowledged by village 
leaders. As such, a mutual covenant was evident between AI staff and Kiharaka’s 
leadership. ‘AI are very close to us’, remarked Femida, a prominent leader and member 
of the village government when asked by a government-sanctioned researcher to name 
active organizations. ‘So AI is a major [big] institution?’ ‘Yes’, she replied, ‘they are in 
this village.’184 
The basis of the contract, however, was expressed somewhat differently. Clearly, AI 
viewed their relationship with the village as intertwined with the personal leadership and 
qualities of the village chairperson, who graduated to the post with AI support and 
‘mobilization’. They emphasized his prior role as a Community Development Facilitator 
(CDF), implying that AI provided him with the skills and knowledge he required to 
assume the role as chairperson and in turn to mobilize the community using a rights-
based agenda. Whilst the chairperson did not deny his longstanding relationship with 
AI, and was candid about his previous role as CDF, the legitimation of AI’s presence in 
Kiharaka village was grounded firmly in resource transfer: 
AI are mainly at the school. They have, for example, built over 70% of the school. But 
they have also had successes in the community, in enabling [people] to give their ideas 
and speak their minds.185 
Other leaders, such as Femida and the Village Executive Officer, had a similar view: 
We complained as mothers that we had no basic services and we’re so grateful they 
built us a school and there’s a pump. They’ve helped us a lot. So AI are very close to 
us.186 
We thank AI! They’ve built classrooms, they’ve given us water, they’ve built teachers’ 
houses.187 
AI regularly evaded in its lateral and upward representations the role that material 
resource transfer played in legitimating their local presence. It preferred to focus on its 
proximity to, and representation of, ‘the people’ and their interests, building enclaves 
in the face of government or corporate interests. AI, given its rhetoric of community 
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mobilization and bottom-up development, increasingly downplayed the child 
sponsorship component of its programme, as top-down resource transfer did not fit 
with its evolving discourse. 
It was evident, however, that the regular transfer of resource to the school, via its child 
sponsorship programme, purchased the initial space, or territory, in which to deepen 
relations with key collaborators in the village. AI’s economic capital over time indeed 
converted to something more symbolic. It is not sufficient, therefore, as Bourdieu 
would emphasize, to argue that only ‘money talks’; AI volunteers, as those of other 
NGOs, were indeed clear that there are many motivations to work with a particular 
organization or initiative beyond material interest (see voluntarism). It is rather that the 
terms of Kiharaka’s contract with AI were different in emphasis from those projected 
laterally and upwards from a district level. AI’s legitimation comprised territoriality and 
representation, but which were tacitly underwritten by historically investing material 
resource. 
Indeed, AI’s special relationship with Kiharaka and especially its school community 
could be unpicked further. The child sponsorship component of AI’s work demanded a 
large amount of data collection on each child every quarter. This process was affirmed 
and contested in different ways. The liaison for this was called the Community Resource 
Person, whom AI predictably emphasized to extend to the heart of the community to 
understand intimately the immediate environment. It was not until late in my fieldwork 
when I accompanied AI to Kiharaka for data collection that I discovered that their 
community resource came from the adjacent Mapinga village.188 The woman aided AI 
with several schools in Kerege and was adept at the work. The idea that the Community 
Resource Person was from Kiharaka’s community, however, providing tacit 
endorsement and legitimation of AI’s work, was not accurate. 
The early process of crafting territory by AI, by then well established in Kiharaka, was 
brought into sharp relief through nascent relations within Talawanda, in the south west 
of the district. AI had recently identified Talawanda and its new neighbour ward Pera as 
‘marginalized’ communities, with respect to political voice, government and NGO 
presence. The area was a strong fit for AI’s shifting strategic focus away from service 
                                                             




provision towards good governance and land rights. There was a large private firm 
prospecting and acquisitioning land at a rapid rate in the area, with the aim to build a 
cement factory. By May 2013, it had acquired 6,000 hectares and yet its original approval 
was for only 200.189 The acquisitions were at best below market value and at worst 
corrupt, as planning protocols and avowed hectare rates were not adhered to, seemingly 
without sanction from the district. AI was becoming intricately involved in championing 
their own construction of villagers’ rights. 
I accompanied AI as they introduced themselves to a new village in Pera late into 
fieldwork in May 2013. It was a full village meeting, organized by the leadership at AI’s 
direct request. There were around 70 men, women and children present and the meeting 
lasted just over 90 minutes. Whilst the AI programme coordinator emphasized AI to be 
a ‘private’, charitable organization free of ‘politics’, he also emphasized close 
relationships with local government, particularly ward-level administrators and 
counsellors. The coordinator drew first on the Talawanda Ward Executive Officer and 
then an adjacent village’s chairperson, to introduce AI and its work to the Pera villagers. 
He further emphasized AI’s established relationship with Talawanda, Pera’s close 
neighbour and parent ward, in justifying its expansion into that particular village. In 
response to a comment of the WEO that AI works to help all children, the coordinator 
modified: 
It’s true – it’s all children, all children of Tanzania, we’re in all areas. But for now, for 
these two or three years, we want particularly to focus on [lit. to hold on to] Pera and 
Talawanda.190 
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Figure 4.5: Photograph of AI introductory meeting, Pera (no staff visible) 
AI’s practice of deepening territoriality, therefore, placing boundaries around the 
immediate political locality, played a part in building trust with villagers, the majority of 
whom had not heard of the organization, its activities or volunteers. Locating itself at 
the ward level, to the exclusion of other wards, was an attempt by AI to craft 
operational space whilst also distancing itself from district-level politik. Once again, the 
terms of the ‘special relationship’ with other villages in Talawanda projected at such 
meetings were affirmed, contested and indeed rejected within Talawanda itself. In one 
incident, for example, a family refused to allow photographs to be taken of their 
children or home in service of the child sponsorship programme, despite their children 
being part of the intervention. The AI officer commented, exasperated, ‘ah, they don’t 
know the benefits of the project’, with a local resident responding wryly, ‘oh, they 
know’.191 
It is important to note, therefore, that despite the comparative success of AI over VPI 
in Kiharaka, legitimation did not hinge entirely on the views of the leadership. The 
legitimacy of Care International, for example, was explicitly rejected by the Kiharaka 
chairperson, saying: 
                                                             




No one [from Care] has come to our office, which is a big problem. If they don’t 
come to the office they do not have the authority to work with the communities.192 
‘Formal’ legitimacy, however, as argued in Chapter One, plays only a contributory role 
and is not decisive in contemporary legitimation. Non-state actors, for instance, are able 
to go around the organs of the state when expedient to do so, even if they borrow 
intermittently from state authority. Despite Care’s lack of protocol in accessing the 
village, delegitimising it to leaders, there remained a strong affiliation among a group of 
Kiharaka women to the legacy of a particular Care savings project, to which they 
continued to refer to as ‘Care’. The chairperson, having served as head of Kiharaka only, 
was likely unaware of the original project genesis, when Care operated under the 
jurisdiction of the parent village Mapinga. 
This project was thus an anomalous fragment of an earlier Care programme, centred 
primarily on Dar municipalities but having forayed into adjacent districts. The project, 
however, had exited rapidly over the misuse of project funds, with several staff 
dismissed.193 As such, existing staff at Care’s headquarters in Dar were unaware of the 
previous project’s coverage in Bagamoyo district, and therefore the continuing 
identification with the organization of a group of women in Kiharaka. Some of the 
group’s members also mentioned that no one from Care had come for a long time, 
wondering what had happened. This identification with Care still served to exclude new 
NGOs seeking to implement savings projects with women. An endorsed territoriality, 
therefore, was reflected in the affiliation with Care and the scepticism of new 
prospectors. One leader Rahema, the chair of the group, told me, in response whether 
GenderNet had a presence among women in the village, ‘No - we are Care; they are 
GenderNet [gestures outside village]’.194 
GenderNet, it transpired, had similarly attempted to organize groups but had failed to 
fulfil its promise of the timely distribution of funds, at the time of research. The 
network therefore, as explored in representation, failed to legitimate itself in Kiharaka. 
Whilst there were many reasons for this, a key factor was that many of the women were 
already part of the Care savings and revolving loan group. I attended several of the 
group’s meetings, which administered a savings and loans system seemingly flawlessly. 
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The group had a strong internal coherence and a high level of affiliation if not with Care 
staff, who had long ceased to monitor the programme, then the ‘Care system’ (mfumo wa 
Care) and retained a Care identity more broadly. The formal, if fluid, boundaries of the 
Care initiative, therefore, were still informally enacted by women in their everyday lives, 
unpredicted and, indeed, unnoticed by the organization. The endorsement of Care 
worked to the exclusion of other women’s groups, meaning a form of territorialized 
identity impeded others’ claims of extensity.  
Whilst the use of volunteers has been examined as primarily a form of extensity, there is 
also an element of its counterpoint territoriality, as NGOs move indirectly to craft their 
own enclaves of influence: ‘these are my people!’ From volunteers’ perspectives, 
however, the overall impact of multiple NGOs building multiple spheres of influence, at 
times pulling in different directions, can be counterproductive: 
You need to work together as a team...Starting from the members, yourself until you 
get a solution to the problem. Now you find you have lost each other, before you 
reach anywhere you have lost each other and then work becomes a burden to me; 
volunteering to report becomes difficult, and you have your own needs you 
see...advocacy is good but it requires hard work and for people to really work 
together.195 
The proliferation of these village volunteers, as each organization sought to craft and 
embed their own operational space, not only led to the dilution of such roles and 
responsibilities, it diluted the influence of these organizations. Indeed, it deflected 
responsibility away from the village government. 
To conclude, territoriality provides a counterpoint to extensity through its exclusionary 
practices. Boundaries, at times formalized in juridico-legal practices and at others 
informally enacted, provide a primary form of power relations. This is not, however, 
purely material but admits of a strong ideational component; boundaries are social, not 
just physical, phenomena (Ruggie 1993). Whilst the AI example illustrated the 
importance of underwriting territorial claims with the investment of time and resource, 
therefore, the Care women foregrounded the importance of identity in the enactment of 
territorial claims. These women endorse and reciprocate particular boundaries in the 
everyday, irrespective of state and indeed non-state intervention. Such findings 
                                                             




contribute to the unbundling of state from territory, as per Sack’s work (1986), but also 
meld the formal with the informal, state with the non-state, ideational with the material. 
 
Working state capital: ‘We are between you and the government’ 
 
Whilst the state continues to command a considerable amount of symbolic capital in 
Tanzania, relations with the state are increasingly ambivalent in their direction downwards. 
Thus NGOs, in turn, play with legitimation ‘as being part of government’ (Green 2010, 
p19), but also as being part of its negation. These strategies and claims formed a crucial 
role in how organizations sought to legitimate themselves in the Kiharaka context, but 
to varying degrees of success. For VPI, working state relations was very much the 
former: being part of government. The most visible act of affirmation downward was 
through conducting ‘joint’ activities. Letters announcing trainings and monitoring visits 
were issued through the District Council. The senior Community Development Officer 
(CDO) for Bagamoyo district issued the letters on government letterhead, explaining the 
purpose of the activity and who was obliged to attend. VPI, from 2012, conducted 
monitoring with normal rank and file CDOs, arriving in one vehicle ‘from the district’. 
As such, VPI had increasingly mimicked or borrowed from state authority: its 
‘verticality’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) and its (conditional) ability to compel others. 
The discernible blurring of the line between the district and VPI was thus evident in 
how VPI staff introduced their presence at its monitoring meeting, with a project officer 
stating at the village-level monitoring meeting: ‘I am not just VPI. I am 50% VPI, 50% 
government’.196 The officer later emphasized how closely VPI and government 
responsibilities aligned, but also their similar downward-facing aspect to ‘the people’: 
We saw that, that is our work, the work of the district, the work of VPI, so we think 
that is good if the district, they can allocate us a kind of budget where we can share 
the monitoring together…We need a certain percent of money coming from the 
district to support their people, not to support the people of VPI, just to support the 
people of the government to go down.197 
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Thus the ‘development encounter’, focusing on the monitoring of state-sanctioned 
initiatives at the village level, such as HIV/AIDs management committees, became 
highly authoritarian in reprimanding continual failure to enact government policy.198 
This one [monitoring activity] is a bit good because we go there with the team from 
the district level, and when the people in the community, I mean the stakeholders that 
we are monitoring, when they saw the people from the district level they saw that 
okay, this is a bit stronger than as we go ourselves. When you go there ourselves, it 
seems that this is our VPI work, it’s not the work of the district. So it’s a bit stronger 
when we go with the district people, and people consider it monitoring.199 
Indeed, the invoked hierarchy of VPI and local government’s condescension ‘down’ to 
the village was clear in the monitoring meeting dynamic. The villagers assembled were 
not familiar with the project officer and the atmosphere was uncomfortable, at times 
antagonistic, which contrasted with VPI’s warmer relations in other parts of Bagamoyo. 
The hierarchy, therefore, was most pronounced in cases of perceived failure to 
implement state-led development. The residual symbolic capital of Tanzanian 
developmentalism loomed large in the encounter; whilst the human rights discourse was 
different to that of Nyerere’s day, the mechanics were similar. 
This is not, of course, to argue that the villagers were unvarying in their interests and 
perspectives, which were also manifest in the meeting. The additional authority, clout 
and scrutiny afforded by the presence of district staff led to discord as to who was to 
blame. The Village Executive Officer (VEO), for example, was eventually forced to 
concede that there was indeed a Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) in Kiharaka, 
despite being a ‘product’ of VPI. He suggested that the CJF had offered no feedback, in 
contradiction to the CJF’s own account that he had been repeatedly blocked (see 
voluntarism). Three women who had received training by VPI on the issue of child and 
women’s rights similarly challenged the executive officer’s claim that people ‘return 
silently’ from training, responding: 
No! We reported to the VEO and the chairperson. We told them what we learnt and 
that we want put into contact with the rest of the village to share our training, but 
until today we have not been introduced. 
                                                             
198 Practices of ‘admonishment’, as part of spatializing vertical states, are also explored in Ferguson & 
Gupta (2002). 




The VPI officer, increasingly frustrated, chided the executive officer in the meeting, 
albeit indirectly by the use of the term ‘government’ to refer to the executive officer and 
indeed the absent chairperson: 
So, you see, there is an issue. They do come and give feedback but they don’t get 
cooperation on the side of the government…If you get training you need on your 
return to announce what you have learnt. If you have difficulties, if there is an issue 
with cooperation then that is an issue for village government.200 
The thinly veiled derision of the executive officer in such a public forum by the VPI 
officer produced some uncomfortable silences and snickers. The officer may well have 
been at fault, complicit with the chairperson in thwarting volunteers from assuming 
their activities, particularly those associated with VPI. What is relevant to the issue in 
hand, however, is that the VPI officer was able to assume a position of authority, 
legitimated and sanctioned by the state, in order to reprimand publically an employee on 
the governmental payroll. 
Other volunteers in Kiharaka associated with VPI experienced similar barriers to their 
work within the village leadership. The health volunteer Afia, also trained by VPI on 
gender and child rights, declared in response to the question whether she worked with 
the CJF: 
We participate together but his issue is the same as mine. We’ve been prevented [lit. 
defeated] from uniting as a team at every turn. If I may join with others here, to make 
this link, that link…I am not answerable for that. It’s not my job! So you become 
weaker without that [link]. This is everyone’s work. The plague of ignorance belongs 
to all; the plague of ill health belongs to all.201 
Whilst therefore Kiharaka manifestly did not form a monolithic ‘community’ in their 
view of VPI, the village leadership was nonetheless flexing as gatekeeper in order to 
thwart VPI’s interventions. This was part of the wider malaise regarding both NGO and 
governmental projects being announced but resulting in few perceptible material 
benefits. Key benefits, as noted, were perceived to remain at the district level. In 
contrast, the strong relationships forged with AI were underwritten by a firm basis of 
resource transfer at the school. This had evidently deprived other organizations of 
operational space, or turf, including VPI, which operated, at least within the confines of 
this monitoring meeting, with the full force of the state. 
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The failure of VPI to legitimate itself in Kiharaka, despite its association with the 
district, was symptomatic of the fact that the village was somewhat out of step with 
normal hierarchies. The chairperson was, as noted, involved in a legal dispute regarding 
a Tanzanian investment company’s claim to a sizeable area of land, which had escalated 
to the district court. The district authorities were perceived by villagers to be oblivious 
to, if not complicit in, the appropriation of village land by big business. The chairperson, 
with the support of AI, had become extremely vocal in that regard. Furthermore, given 
Kiharaka’s location near Dar, the village was less beholden to district patronage. Land 
sales had given a consistent level of income in absolute terms, despite seepage during 
transactions. Small business owners benefitted from the proximity to town to access 
goods and services. Kiharaka was increasingly integrated into Dar’s outreach, set to 
become a ‘new town’ in its own right and so increasingly dubious of Bagamoyo’s ruling 
elites. 
This disconnect was quite neatly encapsulated in an exchange initiated by a district 
Community Development Officer (CDO) for an adjacent ward who had also happened 
to purchase land to develop in Kiharaka. I was party to her discussions with Femida, 
who had an administrative role in the village government, as they spoke of the failure of 
various NGOs to fulfil their promises. ‘But’, the CDO added, ‘people here also have the 
tendency to invent stories’, suggesting that failure may lie with the villagers and their 
ability to circumvent the district, to which Femida laughed heartily. The CDO 
emphasized that ‘government designs projects’ for Kiharaka, to which Femida retorted 
‘yes, they design projects!’ playing on the Swahili kubuni for design, which can also mean 
invent or create. Her implication, on my interpretation, was the litany of projects 
announced but never fulfilled, on the part of government or otherwise. Later, on the 
bus returning to Bagamoyo, the CDO disputed this, suggesting the Kiharaka villagers 
did not wish to implement the programmes brought to them.202 
In such a context, the close association of VPI with the district was not a productive 
asset. The village chairperson did not even attend the monitoring meeting, nor were all 
the requisite people informed. Towards the end of the meeting Femida declared, ‘we’ve 
been reprimanded! (lit. beaten) We understand!’ When the village executive officer 
closed the meeting, he said ‘we’ve listened and discussed important issues. After this, we 
                                                             




have work!’ After VPI had departed, Femida decried the state of Kiharaka’s various 
committees to the village executive officer and others but not without considerable 
irony. This generated more laughter and wry exchanges. The gathering dispersed, 
without any further discussion of what the ‘work’ might entail nor agreement as to next 
steps. The unwelcomed intrusion on the part of the district was something to be 
endured rather than acceded. 
By contrast, the disconnect between village and district leadership was leveraged by AI. 
AI had an increasing propensity to skip district council engagement in favour of national 
actors, media and publicity. The programme coordinator, for example, helped to 
facilitate a national TV film crew to descend on a particularly destitute primary school in 
Talawanda ward, without a single permanent classroom. The news piece was enough to 
prompt an incandescent telephone call from President Kikwete to the District 
Commissioner as to how such a school could still exist within his home constituency. 
New classrooms were erected within a year. AI also remarkably facilitated the trip of the 
UK’s Labour shadow MP for International Development to Kiharaka in a bid to 
highlight the ‘land grab’ issue. This again put pressure on district bodies to monitor the 
case. The threat of AI’s ‘media button’ explained its officer’s comment: ‘they are scared 
of us!’ 
This circumvention of district authority was at the root of how Kiharaka’s leadership 
could be deemed ‘failing’ by VPI and district level representatives but ‘strong’ and 
exemplary by AI. Kiharaka’s leaders had an increasingly abrasive relationship with the 
district, as did AI. AI enactment of bureaucratic protocols was increasingly, by their own 
omission, for show. This was echoed by a façade of deference and protocol towards ‘the 
district’ on the part of the attending village leaders during the monitoring meeting. The 
increasing disconnect between Kiharaka’s perceived interests and that of Bagamoyo 
district, and its leadership’s dissent signalled, in AI’s words, a ‘model’ of participatory 
democracy. Kiharaka literally became AI’s poster child, providing case study material for 
glossy newsletters as well as playing host to several high profile land rights events, 
covered by national media. 
There was, of course, both facets within the Kiharaka leadership: strength and weakness; 
subversion and compliance; mobilization and stonewalling; public interest and private. 




and presented externally by NGOs. For VPI, Kiharaka epitomized developmental 
failure, whilst for AI it represented monumental success. AI staff did not know the 
issues faced by the VPI-associated volunteers, nor indeed were aware of CJFs in the first 
instance, despite the CJFs’ endorsement by the district council. VPI in turn had some 
idea of AI’s work but kept a critical distance, viewing it as lofty and removed from the 
hard graft of community-based work. These divergent representations are an enduring 
symptom whereby development narratives are constructed and transmitted vertically 
along the logic of projects, rather than laterally across the village as a whole. As such, 
these two narratives of Kiharaka existed in different forums and for different purposes. 
There was no instance whereby the two might meet and reconcile. 
To summarize, the state continues to afford symbolic capital in Tanzania but such 
capital is conditional and situational. Proximity to the Tanzanian state can indeed 
legitimate authority in many contexts and NGOs can in turn replicate, or indeed ‘co-
produce’, the state (Dodworth 2015). This may work via extensity, as explored in the 
subsequent chapter, or the discourse of community development (see voluntarism). In 
the Kiharaka context, however, the claims projected downwards by development actors 
such as VPI were strongly repudiated by villagers themselves, in particular the 
leadership. It was distance from government, therefore, as in the case of AI, bolstered 
by a record of resource transfer that engendered additional space within which to 
govern. The divergent fortunes of AI and VPI, reflected in their irreconcilable 
representations of the village, highlighted legitimation’s affirmations and contestations 
as part of its countervailing currents. 
 
Representation: ‘people still cling to their issues of the past’ 
 
Representational practice, as explored in Chapter Four, is a performance and one 
predicated on ambivalence. It oscillates between claims of proximity to stand for the 
people and that of distance and the constructed need to act for aberrant Others. Growing 
formal space for opposition in Tanzania has served to undermine the state’s historical 
monopoly on claims to stand for all Tanzanians. It is within this space that most NGOs, 




innovated representational claims of superior proximity to the people. Eco-Coast’s 
senior manager spoke of NGOs at the ‘micro-level’, echoing the AI coordinator’s 
comments of ‘low level’ space for NGOs and civil society more generally.203 Some 
communities, as AI’s programme officer mused of Maasai constituents, ‘feel like 
government hates them’.204 NGOs are thus better placed to stand for marginalized 
Others: to aggregate and amplify the concerns and grievances of villagers far removed 
from rich urban centres and the spoils of Tanzania’s new found economic growth. As 
the senior manager of Eco-Coast challenged, ‘who is the national interest, and where?’205 
Representational claims of NGOs, as they craft rhetorical ‘space’, are their most 
existentially critical and thus fiercely defended. NGOs’ claims of proximity to ‘the 
communities’ manifest themselves in two contrasting modes of interaction with local 
government. The first, uniquely Tanzanian mode - nominally the ‘VPI model’ - is that 
the breadth and depth of NGOs’ extensity, especially in hard-to-reach areas, 
complements and indeed co-produces government-led efforts to bring development 
initiatives to communities. The more neoliberal ‘AI model’, by contrast, is founded on 
the assertion that government, including district government, can no longer be assumed 
to represent the interests of vulnerable communities. Civil society’s NGOs, however, 
free from ‘politics’ and the pressures of patronage, can align with the interests of 
marginalized people. These models are deliberate abstractions, given no NGO engages 
exclusively in one or the other. No NGO staff member would assume government 
either wholly benevolent or malevolent, nor claim that personal interests do not 
intervene within every kind of institution. Nevertheless, elements of these two ‘ideal 
types’ were evident in how VPI and AI presented themselves to Kiharaka village and, 
critically, in how they were appraised and contested by villagers. 
VPI, in its highly formalized engagement in conjunction with the state, aimed to redress 
anomalies and deficiencies within Kiharaha’s governance structures: the need to act for 
deficient Others. The distance between itself and Others was visible in how its visits and 
monitoring meetings were announced, as well as the hierarchical dynamic of such 
meetings in holding Others to account. In contrast, AI was highly informal in its 
interactions, exemplified by frequent texts, calls and the ability to ‘drop in’ 
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unannounced. The headteacher called the programme coordinator on a Sunday for an 
amicable chat that lasted ten minutes. ‘Don’t worry about my surname’, the coordinator 
informed new constituents: ‘just ask for John and you’ll get me’.206 Through consistent 
informality and inversion of hierarchy, AI successfully positioned itself inside Kiharaka’s 
politics, as aggregator, instigator and catalyst. 
AI’s agitation thus found more traction than that of VPI’s shadowing of the 
developmental state in the Kiharaka context. Many in Kiharaka, in particular the 
leadership, were aware of the increasing distance and disconnect with the district level 
machinery. With regard to goods and services, such as specialist HIV/AIDS health 
services, Kiharaka was increasingly angled towards Dar es Salaam over Bagamoyo, with 
Dar’s Mbweni considerably closer. With regard to politicized issues such as land 
appropriation, Bagamoyo bureaucrats were perceived to be aligned with big business via 
‘the national interest’ rather than with villagers in Kiharaka. Kiharaka, in return, was 
seen by the district as something of a renegade village, operating increasingly at the 
margins of Bagamoyo administrative control. AI thus successfully forged strong 
territorialized relationships within Kiharaka, via the leadership, to the point of 
exclusivity. 
AI’s positionality as insider, however, standing for Kiharaka’s interests, was ever only 
relative and partial. AI, for instance, struggled to gain traction beyond the school and 
the village leaders. Whenever I asked people in the village centre if they knew of AI, 
they would generally hesitate before gesturing ‘they are at the school’. AI’s partial 
constituency within Kiharaka was neatly illustrated during a high profile land rights 
event hosted there with support from their national office to mark World Food Day in 
October 2012. Over one hundred guests and visitors from outside the village were 
present, including national media, a host of national NGOs, the district guest of honour 
and his entourage as well as villagers from other coastal districts. The theme was ‘land-
grabbing’ and its relation to food security. A drama performed by Kiharaka villagers 
depicted the appropriation of land by outside investors, before a series of speeches and 
songs. The drama showed villagers gaining jobs with the investment company, 
becoming security guards of the land that their family once owned for generations. 
                                                             




The guest of honour was the district Community Development Officer (CDO), having 
stepped in at the last minute as the district commissioner dropped out. The CDO was 
poorly prepared and opened his speech with the wrong village name. ‘Never mind’ he 
joked ‘it’s all Bagamoyo’, further cooling his reception. The CDO then talked in general 
terms about the need to improve coordination around land issues between different 
parties and at different levels. His final task was to launch an online ‘portal’, 
spearheaded by AI, whereby villagers like those in Kiharaka would be able to register 
cases of land-grabbing, including by SMS text message, broadcasting such cases to a 
wider audience. The response as the CDO keyed the laptop was muted at best, in the 
midst of some confusion as to what the portal was or how it might relate to the event in 
Kiharaka. The whole task disrupted the event’s initial momentum. 
AI’s programme coordinator, in contrast, communicated skilfully with the crowd and 
received an enthused response. This was in part due to his strengths as an orator, 
through his ability to speak authoritatively and dramatically but maintain humour. It was 
also due to established relationships with some of the villagers. He drew out and 
repeated a catchphrase from the drama: ‘do we protect [i.e. guard] or do we own [this 
land]?’, which roused guests and villagers alike. He addressed villagers and their specific 
concerns using the first person ‘we’, in contrast to the CDO. He set the scene for a 
village elder to stand to speak out about losing land to rich Dar residents, the ensuing 
disputes, spiralling prices and the incongruous villas. The elder finished by addressing 
the guest of honour as representative of government authority, shouting ‘tell the district 
commissioner that there is no benefit from investors in this village!’ He received the 
loudest applause of the day. 
AI, to some extent, had successfully positioned itself inside this advocacy drive. Its role 
was part antagonist, part arbitrator and so duly performed its proclaimed interstitial 
positionality ‘between you and government’. It gave examples, with first-hand testimony 
from villagers from other districts, of its record of successful arbitration in land 
disputes: identifying, escalating and finally resolving such conflicts. It drew on this 
history, and impression of institutional continuity, in its efforts to embed itself into a 
similar domain in Bagamoyo. AI’s extensity with respect to presence in other districts, 




some symbolic distance between AI and the district authorities, as well as bolstering 
their representational claim with those people, on that issue, at that moment. 
This display of unity, which had been gathering momentum, unravelled quickly when an 
unexpected event divided the audience. Just as I was scanning the crowd to ascertain 
who was from Kiharaka, a band of men from the village who had apprehended another 
villager burst through the performance area en route to the village office. The Kiharaka 
villagers watching the event were quickly caught up in the affair, whilst the hundred or 
so guests remained seated, uncertain if the fracas was part of the performance. The 
choir, with young people from several African countries coached by a young Dutch 
woman, pushed on hesitantly. It became clear, as the sea of people divided, that the 
main attendees comprising the dozen or so rows of seating were from outside of 
Kiharaka. The vast majority of villagers present had been ‘participating’, or rather 
observing, from the margins. The arrest of this villager, for a terrible assault on a child, 
made it highly visible as to who was a constituent of Kiharaka and who was not. It was 
only after the seriousness of the crime came to light, and it became clear that Kiharaka 
residents would not be returning, that the programme coordinator abandoned the event.  
It would be a truism to note that different parties had different priorities on the day of 
the event. The point is rather that representation is ephemeral and partial. AI was 
effective in forging accord and therefore representational assent regarding some aspects 
of land conflict, with some Kiharaka villagers at certain times. Interests, of course, are 
nebulous and diffuse and there are challenges to shoehorning complex issues into the 
rubric of ‘land-grabbing’ or ‘food security’. AI’s programme coordinator was keenly 
aware of this difficulty in balancing claims of representation with the pressures to fit an 
external advocacy strategy. When I asked him if villagers were furious at a prospective 
cement factory’s tactics he replied: 
That’s another side of it. They are not very furious, they want the money. And some 
of those villagers who are not within the GPS marked area [of the proposed factory] 
complained - they want to be in! That’s why I wrote to AI HQ, food security – whose 
concern? Forgetting other issues around security, like poverty. I want to sell my land, I 
don’t care where I will get food from. But AI is like ‘you can’t sell because at the end 
of the day you have to cultivate, farm, you have to have food’. Food security – whose 
issue? That’s where we come…different dynamics are coming. It’s not something 
people own, their agenda.207 
                                                             




As such, the AI coordinator, as his manager, described the delicate process of ‘making 
people understand’ their rights and interests over the long term. This indicated a subtle 
movement from the need to stand for others to the need to act for them. In this way, 
AI positioned itself as custodian of these villagers’ interests, present and future. Once 
again, the development outsider and the logic of acting for Others won out in forging 
authority, even for AI and its avowed progressive form of politics. 
This oscillation, from standing to acting for Others, was prone eventually to collapse 
into well-worn tropes of coastal people, their inappropriate values and their inability to 
‘develop’ themselves. Whilst senior AI staff spoke more judiciously of helping people to 
understand issues such as land rights and food security, a junior staff member was more 
vocal on the disjuncture between coastal people and inlanders’ values. He explained to 
me, in a car journey back from Kiharaka, how culture and land ownership are 
interrelated, adding: 
You know these people, Pwani [coastal region] is not really their place. Many people 
were brought here by slavery and so people are not having the same attachment or 
history with the land. So, people do not necessarily value the land in the same way. 
The officer added by way of illustration the story of one villager who sold his small plot 
of land for ‘nothing but a second hand motorbike’.208 His comments strongly implicated 
right and wrong values, as well as frustrations with coastal inhabitants perceived to be 
on the wrong side of the divide.  
As explored in Chapter Three, these perceptions of coastal life are still consumed and 
reproduced by Tanzanian mainlanders in political discourse and the media, despite being 
only partially grounded in truth. Bagamoyo, as noted, was historically as dependent on 
agriculture and its (valorized) graft as mariculture with regard to food production 
(Fabian 2007b). The role of the slave trade has been exaggerated in the making of 
Bagamoyo (Fabian 2013), dwarfed by the value of the ivory trade for which much 
labour immigration was voluntary. Nevertheless, this image of a slave town, inhabited 
by slavery’s wretched and hapless descendants, still looms large in the public 
imagination (ibid.). This augments the view of Bagamoyo as an historical anachronism, 
out of step with contemporary Tanzania. The continuity with British colonial and early 
post-colonial discourses regarding coastal backwardness, and even barbarity, is striking. 
                                                             




There is also an obvious inconsistency between the values lauded in some quarters by 
NGOs such as AI versus those denounced of coastal people. The majority of NGOs 
have absorbed elements of neoliberal discourse, particularly with regard to income 
generation, entrepreneurialism and access to credit for marginalized groups. The ability 
to engage in the production of commercial goods and services is deemed preferable, 
indeed more developmental, than a reliance on subsistence agriculture. At the same 
time, coastal people are disparaged for being too interested in ‘money’ and ‘business’ 
dealings, rather than a hard day’s graft in the fields. ‘Coastal people do not like work’ a 
Zanzibari friend laughed, ‘they like business’ rubbing his finger and thumb together to 
indicate money. This kind of business is not honest or virtuous, unlike working the land. 
As such, the values of commerce and business, at the apex of current neoliberal 
development thinking, are extolled in certain forums but decried within this moralizing 
domain. Business is less virtue than vice amongst the workshy coastal inhabitants. 
It was instructive to watch how these particular discourses were interpreted and 
appropriated by people in Kiharaka and the surrounding Kerege ward. Visitors would 
often joke about coastal people being only interested in money and financial benefits, to 
the great amusement of villagers. In one example, a university researcher was visiting a 
group of prominent women in Kiharaka to gather data about the environmental 
challenges they were facing, arriving with district government staff. The group was 
debating whether the increase in pikipiki (motorcycle taxis) in the village presented an 
opportunity or challenge, with one mentioning that earnings have increased as a result. 
The researcher responded, ‘yes, coastal people like kisentisenti’, using a slang term for 
money, to which the women laughed heartily. Bagamoyo people’s love of money, of a 
quick financial win, of wheeling and dealing, was a trope regularly recycled and 
appropriated by local people themselves, with a heavy dose of irony and humour. 
It was, however, not only incoming staff who navigated various stereotypes, continually 
repositioning themselves as insider or outsider. NGOs, striving to project an impression 
of extensity and mimicking the state before them, were increasingly recruiting their 
‘own’ volunteers at the village level. This interweaves with representation through 
volunteers’ permanent presence as advocate and/or reformer in their own communities. 
These volunteers stood for the people, but also selected, in theory, for their affinity with 




volunteers continually had to reconcile their position as village ‘insider’ and 
representative with that of ‘outsider’ expert, party to more progressive knowledge and 
ideals. Volunteers frequently pointed to low levels of education, understanding and 
motivation amongst their peers to work for the good of their own communities. 
One such volunteer for VPI for Kerege ward, Dr Alima, who was a full time medical 
practitioner in addition to undertaking VPI’s human rights work, remarked: 
Bagamoyo, don’t you see, is divisible into different parts: there is here, the coast, and 
inland, on the way to Kibindu is Chalinze…we might call that mainland. Coast is here, 
our Bagamoyo and here, people they leave that issue of volunteering as too hard, 
different to inland…The villages there [inland], if you go there, they really respond to 
voluntary work, but here they are…we say that they don’t care, do you see? Even this 
issue of groups, if you look at here our place, these groups haven’t formed but there 
[inland] they are working. A lot of education has been given here, more, but people 
still like to cling to their same old issues of the past.209 
In this discussion, Dr Alima played with such stereotypes, focusing on the intractable 
coastal backwardness and lack of education, but also flipping between the first person 
(‘our Bagamoyo’) and third (‘people cling to their…issues of the past’). Other volunteers 
also continually negotiated the insider/outsider divide, carefully replicating the language 
of NGOs themselves regarding the prevailing lack of understanding and motivation in 
the areas where they work. 
Stella, a Community Development Facilitator (CDF) for AI within Kiharaka, was a 
strong replicator of AI’s own language. When I asked why she volunteered, she said: 
As a CDF I look at the particular environment within the village, for example issues 
or challenges that were within the village and then to try and resolve them through the 
‘circles’ [groups], circles of between 10 and 30 people, we sit together, we discuss and 
see what we can do; for example in our village or locality or our community we have 
children who don’t have school uniform. 
Here, Stella positioned herself as insider within the community through her consistent use 
of the first person and as a collaborative facilitator, closely replicating the language of AI 
as a community mobilizer. At the same time Stella, originally from inland Iringa, was 
also an outsider, bringing in new ideas: 
                                                             




In this community it’s hard, because people differ. It’s not everyone who has the 
awareness [mwamko lit. awakening] of the situations of others.210 
Stella’s counterpart Aasim, the second CDF for Kiharaka and replacement for the 
village chairperson, drew some authority from his assumption of this post. His 
authoritative tone was captured in this exchange, when I asked him if there were 
challenges in working in his community: 
Many villagers like it [working with them], only that many of them as I’ve said before 
is that they don’t understand. With everything that you tell someone, they see that it 
gets in the way of doing their own thing…time is money and yes, these resources are 
theirs but they must be used at a certain time and for something important.211 
The collaborative element discernible in Stella’s comments did not feature in how Aasim 
described his interactions within the community. Aasim was more authoritative, using 
the verb to tell rather than, for example, to discuss. His tone was thus instructional, 
aspiring to direct Others as to how they would better allocate their own time and 
resources for a developmental good. Aasim in constructing his authority emphasized his 
training with and recognition from AI, as well as his replacement of the village 
chairperson into the CDF role. He was also a member of several other committees 
within village governance. Implicit in such detail was AI’s close proximity to, and 
endorsement by, Kiharaka’s leaders. Nevertheless, Aasim was assuming a clear need to 
act on behalf of aberrant Others. 
In summary, NGOs’ representational practice is situational and ephemeral, melding 
positions of proximity and alterity. Proximity via insidership conferred in different ways: 
inversion of hierarchies through attentive relationship-building with village leaders, 
thereby understanding and amplifying their needs, overlooked by government; social, or 
Pitkin’s descriptive, representation, looking ‘inside out’ from the perspective of 
communities; placing volunteers at the heart of the village’s governance, successfully 
inducted into a developmental value system. At the same time, the converse is also true, 
whereby local communities do not understand or articulate their own interests, requiring 
input from outside. NGOs are thus obliged to provide these skilled outsiders, to the 
point where they inevitably recycle colonial-like tropes and staff’s own prejudices 
towards those perceived to have failed in their own progress. This movement towards 
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acting for Others was replicated by volunteers themselves. Volunteers surmised, to 
audiences like myself, the failure of Others to engage with their work as part of a 
broader developmental malaise amongst their communities. Developmental 
intervention, as its colonial and missionary forbearers, melds claims to stand and to act 
for the people, the latter winning out when situations of uncertainty solicit a more 
authoritative stance. This colonial-like encounter, therefore, is ‘nested’ (Bakić-Hayden 
1995) at scales, from the global to the village, as young volunteers negotiate their 
shifting stances amongst peers. 
 
Voluntarism and virtue: ‘it wasn’t my goal to volunteer’ 
 
The negotiation of voluntarism and its claims was integral to the experiences of 
volunteers as well as leaders at the village and ward level. All organizations, as will be 
examined, had at one time demanded the participation of village volunteers within the 
ward. To be recruited as a volunteer was formally permanent, with no means of exit. 
The contestation of voluntarism played out in my very first visit to Kerege ward, 
shadowing Voluntary Partnership International monitor their women and child rights 
programme. As we waited for the monitoring meeting to begin, one volunteer, a 
Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) named Maya, began to take VPI staff through 
pictures of children on the walls, previously identified as living in challenging 
circumstances, explaining where they now were. This kind of information is critical for 
reporting and the staff members wrote detailed notes. Suddenly, the woman tired of the 
topic and the questions to which she did not always have the answers. She sat down and 
declared, ‘I’ve been doing this work since 2005. I’m tired; I want to stop!’212 In this all 
too common situation, voluntarism’s ambiguous and multifaceted compacts in this 
context had broken down. 
Voluntarism, via its recent incarnation within NGO interventions, plays on hybridized 
registers in this context.213 The ‘voluntary sector’, on the one hand, often used 
synonymously with civil society in Western contexts, is perceived as an institutional 
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space distinct from, and counterweight to, both state and market. In Tanzania, on the 
other hand, the symbolism regarding voluntarism has been entwined historically with 
the post-independence socialist project of the state. As the AI coordinator reflected in 
the previous chapter, communities were deemed ‘one big family’, with public works or 
msaragambo instilled as a weekly graft that outlived Nyerere’s time in office. This 
institutionalized form of voluntarism, and its virtuous association with the shared public 
good, was an everyday part of state discourse and practice, spearheaded by Nyerere’s 
speeches and works (Hunter 2008; 2015; Marsland 2006). Whilst the AI coordinator 
asserted these activities as willing and ‘voluntary’ on the one hand, they were still 
sanctioned by the state on the other, with penalties for non-compliance. 
These variegated registers and their supporting claims presented more facets for 
negotiation and contestation. VPI’s moralizing on voluntarism, for example, served as a 
persistent point of antagonism when directed downwards ‘to the communities’ in 
workshops. Whilst it was true that VPI staff received lower salaries than their INGO 
counterparts, it was ambitious at best that this would forge affinity with their volunteers. 
In one workshop, a programme officer was forced to respond to angry questioning that 
the sheer scale of his work visiting all villages demanded a salary.214 In another, a Maasai 
leader angrily rejected that VPI staff and village recruits were working on the same 
terms, strongly echoing the Maasai’s rejection of colonial interventionism on that basis 
(Hodgson 2001).215 Another volunteer wrote directly to the district council to refuse to 
continue working under ‘voluntary’ terms. These incidents disclosed an interrogation, at 
times outright rejection, of this presentation of public authority and its supporting 
claims downwards by government and non-government alike. 
For the AI programme coordinator, in contrast, voluntarism was part and parcel of 
state-led socialism and so fell from grace as the pillars of Nyerere’s project began to 
crumble. In his words, the ‘spirit of community’ work died, as it was no longer clear as 
to what people were volunteering.216 Nevertheless, despite voluntarism fatigue and 
scepticism concerning ‘community’ activism, symbolic remnants of Nyerere’s socialism 
remained. Kiharaka leaders, for example, in petitioning the district for funding, signed 
their letter ‘yours, in building our nation’. Nyerere’s portrait is still displayed in every 
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government-affiliated venue and his name and teachings still referred to in public 
forums as part of state ‘representations of power’ (Green 2010; also Becker 2013; 
Kamat 2008). Msaragambo continues in many villages, meaning an association between 
the state and volunteering remains, despite its increased contestation. Such paternalist 
symbolism helps ‘produce a sense of historical continuity’ (Phillips 2010, p114) within 
the state architecture, rather than indicative of anything new. 
This enduring association and indeed identification with the state was discernible among 
the Community Justice Facilitators (CJFs), who in theory reported directly to the district 
council, affording variable symbolic capital in this regard. When I spoke to Togo, CJF of 
Kerege ward, as to how she perceived the CJF programme and VPI’s subsequent 
involvement, she emphasized positively regarding state association: 
The CJF plan didn’t start with VPI, OK? CJF [project] started in the district council, 
that we are endorsed [lit. sponsored or guaranteed] by the Community Development 
Office.217 
This strong association was very different to how Kiharaka’s chairperson described 
CJFs as a ‘product of VPI’. In Kiharaka’s case, as explored, VPI’s close relationship with 
the district council, and CJFs’ association with both, prompted the leadership’s rejection 
of these initiatives across the board. The move to coalesce these as one ‘district’ elite 
was part of that delegitimation, whilst proving, as explored in Chapter Five, a mainstay 
of VPI’s legitimation elsewhere. 
The negotiation of voluntarism and its constituent claims and pressures was thus an 
enduring feature of the experiences of volunteers, as captured in this section’s opening 
vignette. Whilst operation styles differed between organizations, all had at one time 
demanded the participation of village volunteers within the ward. This had left this 
extraordinary patchwork of voluntary initiatives, which had waxed and waned 
depending on funding fortunes. This often left volunteers’ roles in suspended 
animation, in the absence of communications, for extended periods. It also led to the 
situation whereby the same individuals were recruited for multiple organizations, either 
concurrently or consecutively after a project lapsed. Changes in project status were 
rarely communicated to volunteers. Such changes generated uncertainty, confusion and, 
at times, contradictory pressures for the volunteers concerned. Most importantly, 
                                                             




voluntarism in Tanzania is not necessarily an issue of consent, with recruitment 
sanctioned by the state and with no means to exit. 
This context explains Maya’s fatigue in the incident before the VPI monitoring meeting: 
‘I’m tired; I want to stop!’218 The issue of voluntarism arose again at the start of the 
meeting as greetings were exchanged between international volunteer Julia and the 
Village Executive Officer. ‘Ah’ said the officer with a wry smile, ‘you have volunteered, 
like me’. ‘I have volunteered’, she countered, ‘I don’t yet know about you’ to which the 
group laughed. There was a considerable use of irony in the term volunteer by both 
parties, given the context of volunteering was so very different. As the international 
volunteer commented later, ‘I have volunteered because I have the power to make that 
choice’. The volunteer was also playing, however, with the fact that the meeting had not 
yet been presented with evidence of the man’s efforts, instantiating a state-like 
hierarchy. It disclosed that whilst the term might be invoked to support claims of parity, 
voluntarism in fact has multiple connotations, which also serve to highlight difference. 
The issue of voluntarism re-emerged for a third time under less humorous 
circumstances at the end of the meeting, as the organization’s monitoring and evaluation 
forms were distributed to the volunteers. This sparked complaints that the information 
took time to amass and there were many organizations, each with their own forms. The 
discussion quickly returned to allowances and Maya reiterated she had been volunteering 
since 2005 and the difficulties of conducting that kind of work given the time and travel. 
A staff member countered that their organization was also voluntary and that people 
had come from overseas to help the communities of Tanzania. He added that those 
who wanted nothing but allowances were those who just wanted to ‘eat until they 
became too large to board even a bus’. At this point, the comparison was angrily 
rejected by the attending villagers, discussion descended into argument and the staff 
withdrew to complete other work. 
Whilst VPI placed voluntarism and virtue at the centre of its downward legitimation, 
with varying success, AI’s coordinator, on assuming the post in Bagamoyo in 2011, 
quickly abandoned the practice of village-wide recruits and the language of 
                                                             




voluntarism.219 Their Community Development Facilitators (CDFs) were no longer 
supported or contacted beyond a handful of villages, like Kiharaka, where they had 
gained traction. This caused confusion in other Kerege villages for seasoned volunteers 
like Akili, whereby CDFs suddenly ceased to be, left hanging in a state of uncertainty. 
Such changes brought the ambiguity, tensions and contestation of different forms of 
voluntarism to the fore. Volunteers own motivations and expectations often differed 
from those assumed of them. 
The tensions around voluntarism, altruism and virtue were thus understood differently 
by volunteers, living in degrees of poverty themselves, thus with their costs keenly 
evaluated. There was no contradiction, therefore, in being remunerated for voluntary 
work. I draw here on interviews with two highly experienced Kerege volunteers who 
had been selected repeatedly by different village leaderships for different NGO work: 
Akili since 2003 and Zawadi since 1997. Both volunteers were skilled and 
knowledgeable about their work. For Akili especially, this has made him a desirable 
recruit for a range of health initiatives. Both volunteers, interestingly, had also been 
rejected by the Kiharaka leadership: Akili by virtue of living in a now separate village 
and Zawadi by virtue of his association with VPI. 
Akili, as noted, was volunteering with multiple organizations including Red Cross, AI, 
Community Health, Kidz and Pathfinders International as a health volunteer. The 
different organizations came with different priorities, which translated into various 
pressures on and requirements of volunteers. As Akili noted of his most recent 
recruiter: 
Kidz has really tough obligations. They only want us to work with children and child 
services. They don’t like to cooperate with the other programmes. They don’t interact 
with each other – Kidz works with children, Pathfinders with sick people [i.e. 
PLWHA]. Kidz doesn’t like to receive reports of both but just children but they are 
living in the same houses! I like to do all work – I like to work with children and with 
sick people but Kidz only wants to work with children. They gave us a contract form 
to sign to agree to stop working with sick people and Pathfinder. If you agree, you 
sign, but I refused to sign. [Why don’t they want you to work with both?] They said 
you cannot receive two allowances. Now I receive 55,000 (Tanzanian shillings) – 
Pathfinder pay 25,000 by Mpesa and Kidz 30,000 when we go every 3 months to 
report. If I was made to choose I would choose sick people because I received a lot of 
training for that and I am experienced and I’m known to government for that work.220 
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In this instance, the ‘verticality’ of project pressures inhibited the ability to look laterally 
at the context of people’s lives. The organizations rebuffed the complex motivations for 
volunteering, strongly manifested in their deep scepticism over petitions for allowances. 
I spent a day with Akili on the back of his motorcycle as he visited people living with 
HIV and AIDs across Mapinga village, both children and adults, some of whom were 
house or bedbound. His relations with these household members were warm, unlike in 
Kiharaka, and it was clear he was a regular and welcomed visitor. It became clear during 
our discussions over the day that the key for Akili was being able to do something 
highly practical to help others in their plight. He had a basic medical kit bag from which 
he dispensed medications, mainly for pain or skin lesions. At one point he was moved 
by the plight of a sick relative who was not on his ‘books’ and so gave them medicinal 
cream, telling me he would record it against someone else’s name. 
In addition to the satisfaction of being able to take practical action was the time 
invested, through training and experience, in becoming a ward expert and also to have 
that role recognized by others: being ‘known to government’. His comments echo those 
of Togo, the CJF for Kerege Ward, who emphasized the direct relationship with the 
district, underscoring the overlap between voluntarism and the state. 
Whilst many of these volunteers had garnered recognition amongst key stakeholders, 
Zawadi’s situation was somewhat different. Zawadi, the Community Justice Facilitator 
(CJF) for Kiharaka, had also ‘volunteered’ with UNICEF and VPI in rights work and 
another small organization in health. For him, the lack of recognition had stymied his 
efforts and ultimately his motivation: 
The village leadership of Mapinga chose me [as a CJF] in 2008. They were looking for 
someone with good qualities to engage themselves with these kinds of voluntary 
activities. There followed two weeks of training where we came to understand the 
meaning of the CJF as a facilitator of the community, particularly regarding legal 
matters and knowledge of rights…After we got the training we returned to the 
communities to educate the villagers in order that they know their rights. It wasn’t that 
hard work at that time but for the fact that there was no allowance – you just 
volunteer…After Mapinga split about two or three years ago I went to a refresher 
training. I reported back to the village [of Kiharaka] but I have not yet been presented 
to the village…So now every three months I continue to report to Kerege [ward] - I 
am still working, but I have reduced the amount of work for volunteering.221 
                                                             




The need for acknowledgement was reflected in the comments of VPI’s director on the 
frustration in directing their volunteers’ efforts away from the organization and towards 
their community. She conceded: 
[Y]ou know the community itself maybe it’s not always recognising this figure in the 
community…And then they say…that they need to feel part of something so they say 
‘OK we are working for VPI’ but the facilitator says ‘no you are not working for VPI, 
you are working for your community’; this is the mentality that we want to pass. 
Clearly, this is something of a vicious circle whereby lack of community recognition 
leads to the need for greater acknowledgement elsewhere. Whilst Zawadi had originally 
bought into district-sanctioned voluntarism, his efforts were stymied by his immediate 
leadership. The lack of acknowledgement in Kiharaka meant that the opportunity cost 
of his time was more keenly felt: 
If I got an allowance from the district for my time…if I use my time for those 
activities you see I can’t get anything for me. For my children…You know, it wasn’t 
my goal to volunteer. I was chosen by the village for the CBD training in 1997. I was 
chosen by the village for the training there at Montep [training centre]. The training 
was to help mothers with family planning. We got given contraceptives to distribute 
or we would advise people to go to the hospital. Then after time it was seen that I can 
do this kind of work, I had the heart [motivation] to volunteer. At that time ten were 
interviewed at the ward level and finally three were chosen to go to the training. I 
think I was shown to have this ability for this kind of work, but then, after 5 years, I 
stopped.’ [Did you see many changes?] ‘I can see that this project [CJF project] helps 
them – it helps the villagers to recognise their rights. It can work. But I ask the 
government to give an allowance to help keep us motivated – not a salary – but 
because each person has their own responsibilities. I have my wife and children. [Are 
you tired?] To get tired is to be tired in your head. That is where we decide. I need to 
do research to find out about, perhaps if a particular child has a problem or if this 
woman has an issue at home. But if I go here or there on this issue or that, what 
happens when I come home [gestures empty hands]? So often these days I no longer 
follow up. When the time comes to get my information I feel bad that perhaps I have 
not followed up. But then, I have still not been introduced to the community.222 
Voluntarism for Zawadi did not differentiate state from non-state: quite the contrary. 
The civic discourse of voluntarism, for some time, had continued to find sufficient 
resonance to motivate him to act for the benefit of others, even if not originally of his 
volition. Consent, therefore, was not the decisive issue but the ongoing negotiation of 
recognition, reciprocity and exchange, long broken down. 
Whilst an organization like VPI, therefore, seeks a permanent governance infrastructure 
at the heart of every community, legitimated by a language of voluntarism and 
                                                             




community spirit, it is unwilling, or unable, to acknowledge the impact of this on 
individual volunteers. Clearly, for these volunteers themselves the issue was not whether 
they were suitably capable of the work, nor whether the project goals were contestable: 
the simple language of project ‘success’ or ‘failure’. The question was how to navigate 
the demands of multiple NGO and district players on their time, each with their own 
approach and demands, each with a varying level of symbolic capital with their peers as 
well as village and ward government. This contrasted strongly with the NGO account, 
therefore, of industrious volunteers at the ‘heart’ of the village, endorsed and 
acknowledged by their community. 
To summarize, Zawadi and Akili were not, by any means, representative of volunteers in 
Bagamoyo as a whole. In some respects, their motivations and tenacity for volunteering 
were exceptional, strongly subscribing to an ethic of community, or civic responsibility. 
Their comments, however, captured elements of voluntarism applicable more broadly. 
The first was the congruity of voluntarism with the developmental state, manifestly the 
district but co-produced by NGOs day-to-day. The second, related, element is the 
somewhat insidious, conscripted nature of voluntarism, underwritten by state coercion. 
Kujitolea, literally ‘to give oneself’, was work assigned by leaders in the service of the 
community. Such assignments were compelled by state sanction and its moralizing on 
community engagement, rendered permanent with no formal exit. Whilst this framing 
has faltered, it nonetheless retains resonance for some, subject to the fulfilment of 
particular criteria. This leads to the third element: that legitimation demands a continual 
negotiation, in this case between developmental actors and their subjects of 
intervention. If this breaks down, people inevitably seek strategies of withdrawal, 




This chapter sought to foreground downward legitimation as a negotiated practice. Public 
authority, as the legitimated use of power, is not simply put out for consumption on the 
part of the masses but is continually appraised and contested. The chapter brought such 




crowded developmental environment, and one politicized further on the issue of land 
sales and acquisitions. With a relatively large number of key players vying for influence, 
the negotiation of legitimation at this ‘interface’ (Long 1989) between fields is rendered 
visible by the ethnographic sensibility at the village and ward level. This helps to unveil 
what is concealed by vertical epistemologies that shadow the logic of the development 
project. 
With regard to extensity, district-level claims of going ‘to the communities’, often by 
proxy via networks of volunteers posited as located at the heart of every village, are thus 
negotiated and contested at the village level by different groups. In the Kiharaka 
context, Voluntary Partnership International’s extensity, a key legitimation device 
elsewhere, was usurped by a more territorial relationship with primarily Advocates 
International. Territoriality, as the creation and enforcement of boundaries within a 
larger system, admits of strong ideational components as much as material, as in the 
case of the women who continued to align themselves with Care. Such practices are not 
solely the purview of the state, although they are indeed intricately interwoven into state 
relations. 
The cases of VPI and AI thus highlight that relations with the state are ambivalent; 
legitimation may indeed comprise being ‘part of government’ (Green 2010, p19) but 
equally of its negation. In the case of Kiharaka, VPI’s positioning as part of the district 
apparatus strongly served to delegitimate it from the village leadership, seen as part of 
one unified, ineffectual elite. AI’s distance from government was therefore a more 
productive legitimation practice in this context. At the same time, AI nonetheless drew 
on the symbolic power of the state in certain circumstances, for instance in introducing 
itself to a new village in another part of the district. Relations with the state are not 
static, therefore, but continually recalibrated. This occurs even within the village, as 
highlighted by the contestation of the leadership’s claims of inactivity and ‘silence’ by 
volunteers themselves. 
Representational practice is also predicated on ambivalence: the melding of claims to 
stand for and to act for Others. Claims to stand for, or to be proximate to, the people 
are key for all political actors but are existentially core to unelected NGOs. In most 
situations, however, the logic of the persistent need to act for the Other wins out, 




Such dynamics are indeed replicated by volunteers themselves as they assume positions 
of authority over their peers. Representation is therefore a negotiation between these 
two, strongly symbolic positionalities that have endured within developmentalism for 
centuries. 
Lastly, voluntarism also retains a strong ideational component that is interwoven with 
the symbolism of the post-independence state in Tanzania. Unsalaried public works 
formed a key part of ‘building the nation’, but which has faltered in recent years as the 
touchstones of Nyerere’s socialism eroded. Nevertheless, volunteers often still subscribe 
to a strong ethic of civic responsibility but one that must of course be acknowledged 
and reciprocated. When development actors, particularly NGOs, do not adequately 
acknowledge or fulfil their own responsibilities to volunteers, such volunteers are 
compelled to adopt their own informal strategies of silence or withdrawal. Voluntarism 
thus becomes a constant negotiation between development ‘outsider’ and village 
volunteer, but one that is fragile and prone to breaking down. 
In summary, the negotiation of legitimation practice thus runs through the key practices of 
this thesis, rendered visible by ethnography at the interface of vertical development 
interventions. The claims that comprise legitimation are not, contrary to Barker, solely 
self-affirmations amongst peers and put out for unequivocal consumption on the part of 
the masses, but are affirmed and contested in the everyday. Village level leadership and 
NGO volunteer recruits are themselves part of Lund’s ‘countervailing currents’ (2006b, 
p699): legitimation as the construction and contestation of public authority. This 
demands the active construction, entreaty and repudiation of the Other, but with none 














Legitimation on the edge: 
Space to govern 
 
They’ve never arrived here, not even once! 223 
Legitimation, as explored, is a practice that shifts in configuration, depending on the 
conditions of the ‘field’, geographical or notional. This chapter seeks to show the impact 
of such conditions through foregrounding a far less congested domain of activity. Its 
geographical focus is Kibindu ward, which is in many ways the converse of Kerege. 
Kibindu is the furthest from Bagamoyo town, the most remote, the least densely 
populated and one of the most underserved with regard to government and NGO 
service provision. As such, attitudes to developmental outsiders, whether government or 
NGO initiatives, notably diverged between Kerege and Kibindu. In Kibindu, where 
feelings of isolation and exclusion were high, district and NGO development workers 
were welcomed by leaders with cautious optimism. In Kibindu, there was considerable 
legitimation by virtue of arriving at all. 
This chapter therefore spotlights this more open playing field, affording increased ‘space 
to govern’. It retains a similar methodological standpoint to the preceding chapter, but 
under these different conditions. Fewer development organizations vying for influence 
meant that legitimation claims became clearer cut. Legitimation was less diffuse, giving 
way instead to starker divisions between different agencies and their legitimation techne. 
As a result, one key legitimation theme explored in the two previous empirical chapters, 
that of territoriality between organizations, proved mainly redundant in this context. 
Territoriality was rather subsumed by the importance of extensity, arrival and their 
more harmonious interplay with the state. After providing background to the Kibindu 
context, the chapter again examines vertical legitimation practices and their negotiation 
in the everyday. Whilst these are curated under the same themes, they hold very 
different results for Kibindu’s development entrepreneurs. 
                                                             





Kibindu: on the edge 
 
The chapter is based on four weeks’ fieldwork in Kibindu ward, primarily April-May 
2013 but with additional visits accompanying NGO staff from late 2012. Kibindu, as 
one of the remotest areas in the district (see Figure 5.1), has unreliable transport links. 
Whilst it is only 160 kilometres from Bagamoyo town, it takes five to seven hours by 
public transport. 100 kilometres of the journey is served by tar road, including the main 
Dar–Arusha artery, and so plied throughout the day. The final 60 kilometres, however, 
is served by a reasonable dirt road but one that navigates undulating hillside, meaning 
sections become unpassable during the rains. There is a daily bus link between Kibindu 
and Ubungo station in Dar, leaving at 2am in order to make the return trip the same 
day. There are no direct links to Bagamoyo. For those who wish to travel outside of this 
schedule, there are piki piki motorcycle taxis, which are expensive (more than three 
times the bus fare) and hazardous. The villagers of Kibindu were, at the time of 
fieldwork, mourning the loss of their highly respected counsellor who died in a piki piki 
accident on the road some weeks before my arrival. The bus comes with its own 
hazards, subject to robberies by bandits on isolated stretches at night. 
Kibindu’s commercial links run primarily to Dar es Salaam, which is seven to nine hours 
by bus, and secondarily to Morogoro, lying three to five hours southwest. Bagamoyo is 
at best a tertiary link, most important for the women who sell dried fish in Kibindu 
village. Kibindu itself serves as a commercial hub for the two other villages in the ward, 
Kwamsanja and Kwamduma, but also for the various pastoralist communities, with a 
weekly market attracting several hundred from the surrounding areas. The ward is 
expansive, as the second largest in the district, with an area ten times that of Kerege. Its 
population density, as of the 2012 census, registered a mere 15 inhabitants per km2, 
which is less than half of the district mean and a mere 7% of populous Kerege. The 
three official ‘villages’, Kibindu, Kwamsanja and Kwamduma, each has its own network 
of sub-villages, but distance between sub-villages is substantial – sometimes over 20km. 
This posed obvious administrative and communicative challenges, particularly given that 






Figure 5.1: Map showing Kibindu ward in relation to Bagamoyo & Dar es 
Salaam 
 
Kibindu’s remoteness is palpable within everyday life. The schools and clinic are indeed 
understaffed, with Kibindu an predictably undesirable posting for public workers. In 
addition to this neglect, however, there is also a feeling on arrival that you have reached 
some kind of frontier. It is bordered by three different districts, which are located in 
turn in two other regions: Morogoro and Tanga. ‘We’re on the edge’ (lit. ‘in the corner’), 
people would bemoan, which equated to a lack of services but also administrative 
oversight. This sense of isolation translates into one of vulnerability, with issues of 
security and policing strongly vocalized by Kibindu informants. ‘People can hide!’ they 
complain, in the absence of a local police station, suggesting an issue with unmonitored 
incursions from other regions. Whilst movement between districts is of course 
commonplace in Tanzania, the fear of less desirable, possibly criminal, elements 





In a similar vein, illicit land appropriation provided the other perceived threat to local 
security. Pastoralist groups, predominantly Wamang’ati (or Barabaig) but also Maasai, as 
well as non-pastoralist groups, were seen to appropriate land illicitly, either through 
backdoor payments to officials or by squatting on land over long periods.224 Local 
residents had been recently incensed by the uncovering of the misuse of public office 
regarding land sales over a prolonged period by the Kibindu Village Executive Officer, 
who was from outside the area. The villagers, somewhat unusually, had entreated their 
right to have the officer revoked by the district, which was acquiesced.225 The villagers 
had since appointed ‘one of their own’ as the new VEO: a quiet, apprehensive man who 
served as a suitable mouthpiece to recite powerful villagers’ demands to outsiders. The 
acting Ward Executive Officer, in contrast, was a highly respected man who had lived 
and worked resolutely in Kibindu for over ten years. He had been adopted as one of 
Kibindu’s own, at least for the sake of government business, holding considerable 
influence and clout. 
Whilst there were, therefore, obvious differences between the Kibindu and Kerege 
contexts, there were still some overlap in the concerns expressed by those who lived 
there, which have resonance more broadly in Tanzania. The key issue in both contexts 
was that of land, namely fears of its illicit appropriation by more mobile ‘outsiders’. 
Whilst in Kerege, however, the main perpetrators were wealthy Dar commuters or 
commercial interests, in Kibindu disputes centred on access to increasingly scarce fertile 
land for subsistence and small-scale agriculture. Kibindu, despite its small population in 
absolute terms, was experiencing the fastest rate of growth in the district, increasing 
60% since the previous census, which included a great many incomers. This, in addition 
to the sizeable areas of forest reserve as well as culturally protected land in the ward, 
bisected by the main road and freely used by the Wamang’ati to herd cows, placed ever-
increasing pressure on land access. Tensions continued to rise with the pastoralists. 
There was certainly a shared concern, therefore, between Kerege and Kibindu regarding 
‘outsiders’ and their efforts to access, indeed exploit, village resources. However, 
crucially for this chapter, attitudes to district as well as NGO developmentalists, as 
discernible outsiders, diverged between Kerege and Kibindu. In Chapter Four’s Kerege, 
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distrust of the district council was high and, by association, of NGOs perceived as 
proximate to the arms of local government. In Kibindu, by contrast, feelings of isolation 
and exclusion meant that district and NGO development workers who ‘arrived’ were 
cautiously welcomed by local leaders, affording them greater space to govern. 
 
Extensity: ‘They come right to the villages’ 
 
Extensity, as the projection of scale as constituted in space and time, came to the fore 
under such conditions. The challenging distances, terrain and isolation of Kibindu posed 
one of the greatest challenges to its inhabitants in terms of everyday socio-economic life 
and well-being. In this context, ‘presence and proximity matter’ decidedly (Allen 2003, 
p3), whereby the sheer act of arriving in Kibindu town in person was far more visible in 
comparison to Kerege’s daily flow of visitors. Arrival was an event that afforded 
considerable symbolic capital: even more so if on a regular basis. Visits were typically 
short, as guests, due to the lack of lodgings as well as the distance, opted to return to the 
tar road by evening, leaving their hosts feeling unable to host their guests properly. 
Nevertheless, despite their brevity, such visits had considerably more impact than in 
Kerege. 
In this way, it was relatively straightforward for those in Kibindu ward in contact with 
various NGOs to differentiate between those that travelled to the provinces and those 
that simply hung around or ‘played with’ the district in Bagamoyo town.226 In the words 
of the acting Ward Executive Officer (WEO), who held considerable sway after his 
decade of service: 
You have these NGOs that come to the district, they cover the long distance to offer 
[services] from our ward, Kibindu, right up to their district headquarter, that is 
Bagamoyo. There are other NGOs that don’t arrive here; they live there in town, they 
conduct their activities there, day to day. So now you get very few here, than if you 
compare with those in town, so that’s what I meant when I said that this distance is a 
challenge.227 
Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), one of Bagamoyo’s two key international 
organizations, had the capacity, and tenacity, to extend to this remote area. This 
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extensity placed VPI, for the WEO, head and shoulders above other NGOs in the 
district. When asked regarding the key NGOs operating in the area he responded: 
Out of those NGOs that are here, that are working…with us here, I think maybe it’s 
VPI that gives training so often, they strive to come to us here, and even those that 
they’ve enabled [empowered] to help us, their TOTs [trainer of trainers] or animators 
[volunteers trained by VPI], they are here and every time, they try to educate others to 
help. So, in truth, if talking about a particular contribution to the villages here, they 
remember us a lot. VPI, we could say, is an organization that is really alive.228 
VPI’s extensive presence, either directly or by proxy via its extensive network of trainees 
and volunteers, stood in stark contrast to Youth Health’s physical absence from 
Kibindu. Youth Health had burst onto the district stage (see Chapter Three), becoming 
highly prominent in a short space of time. Youth Health’s manager made persistent 
written and verbal claims at district level, laterally and ultimately upwards, about the 
scale and extensity of the organization’s operations, reporting activities across the 
breadth of the district and in all 22 of its wards. The WEO, however, was subtly 
disparaging of Youth Health’s approach of requesting and training volunteers centrally 
in Bagamoyo town, subsequently communicating with these volunteers directly and 
avoiding travel. As he listed out NGOs claiming operations in the ward: 
And then…Youth Health. Youth Health from them I just got a letter…Physically, 
they themselves have never arrived here. I speak to them, they called my 
phone…[iterating later] So Youth Health, they’ve never arrived here, not even once!229 
The WEO’s contrasting acclamation of VPI’s presence in the ward was echoed by 
various NGO interlocutors in the village, whether working directly with VPI or not. 
When discussing with Haamid, the ward youth network representative, the relative 
merits of organizations he had been in contact with, he commented: 
VPI, their strength is that they come right to the villages, yeah that’s the beauty of 
VPI. So I mean they might stay put for maybe two months and then bang, they come 
- say to Kibindu, they decide to do a training in Kibindu, they call people from 
Kwamduma and Kwamsanja [neighbouring villages], then they come do the 
training!230 
In a similar vein, ward Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) Athumani, seasoned 
Kibindu volunteer, noted: 
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[B]etween the organizations…VPI – there is no other organization that leads the way 
in giving training like VPI. If we gathered all of those who’ve been trained by VPI, I 
think across the ward it might approach three hundred.231 
Athumani was originally recruited by UNICEF but remained sceptical of successor VPI. 
The extensity of VPI, however, both spatially and temporally, was nonetheless 
acknowledged by such leaders who worked with NGOs on a regular basis. This 
extensity as legitimation thus stood alone, separate to the question of the relevance of 
VPI’s training (see representation) or of VPI’s promoted voluntary ethos (see 
voluntarism), each negotiated separately. VPI’s extensity, the symbolic capital of 
arrival, thus remained an independent and pervasive basis for legitimation. Mosi, for 
instance, a CJF recruited by VPI in neighbouring village Kwamduma, found this 
extensity practiced by VPI, bolstered by the coverage given by its volunteers, had a 
positive effect: 
[VPI’s strategy] is good. It is good because firstly it’s an organization that strives to 
educate time after time, and then, its education is given to many. So, I mean if you 
take in my village, we are more than five or six, so carrying out the work becomes 
easier.232 
For Mosi, having growing numbers associated with VPI within Kwamduma village built 
a momentum, legitimating their volunteering efforts as well as obviously providing more 
people amongst whom to distribute the burden. In addition, he alludes to the role of 
temporal extensity, whereby VPI can be relied upon ‘time after time’, providing 
continuity of presence. His reference to temporal extensity was shared by his peers and 
the WEO, which legitimated the efforts of VPI over and above its contemporaries. 
Haamid, in comparing VPI’s extensity to the departed UNICEF, also alluded to the 
importance of temporal extensity: 
I can see that VPI are really working hard. When UNICEF were working here it was 
also non-stop, but these days they’ve slowed down a bit. 
For Haamid, the abrupt discontinuation of UNICEF remained a source of confusion: 
The people from UNICEF, for a while, we haven’t heard from them. I don’t know 
now, within the district…I guess we’re far here. 
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Whilst the temporal break did not preclude UNICEF’s return subject to a future 
negotiation, as explored previously in Kerege, it had served to delegitimate the 
organization to a certain degree in the meantime. 
In the face of changing players in the ward, therefore, volunteers consistently 
emphasized VPI’s relative spatio-temporal extensity over others, in and of itself. This was 
separate to the actual relevance and efficacy of the kinds of education delivered. VPI, in 
close conjunction with the district government (see state), made efforts to serve 
Kibindu ward as any other: to incorporate it into district governance from the 
geographical margins. 
Whilst VPI’s temporal extensity allowed it to institute itself within the ward to a certain 
degree, however, the product of legitimation is only ever partial. The Village Executive 
Officer, as in Kiharaka, denied the presence of VPI.233 For ward CJF Athumani, there 
were limits to the pursuit of coverage for coverage’s sake, particularly via trainings. He 
suggested how the seemingly constant training of new people, without proper follow-
up, could lead to a dilution or lack of focus in efforts. When asked if there were 
confusion as to who would lead on what aspect, he replied: 
Yes, it’s an issue, because for example they would take, like last year, peer educators 
from within the ward, maybe six. They go do the training, but still without follow up 
to ensure things run smoothly. That’s not done, so they just take six more for training. 
So you’re doing all that training work without implementation, no results of the 
training and that’s where the problem is. But they try to train a lot of people!234 
Whilst Athumani did not name VPI directly here, the comments were made in 
conjunction with his earlier commentary on the unique scale that VPI pursued. Other 
small to mid-sized NGOs, such as Youth Health, eschewed investing in physical 
extensity despite its claims to the contrary, to their detriment in the eyes of local leaders. 
One small local NGO illustrated the interplay between extensity and other forms of 
legitimation, chiefly representation. Gender-Net indeed had its primary source of 
legitimation rooted in representation, as a network of women across the district 
governed ostensibly by themselves, aided uniquely by district, NGO and national 
funding. Gender-Net’s primarily representational legitimation, via its membership 
model, thus demanded in turn that of extensity. There was therefore the need for its 
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district leadership to demonstrate presence in all wards equitably, if not equally. Gender-
Net, with considerably less resource than VPI, attempted to extend to Kibindu with 
conflicting results. 
I accompanied Gender-Net on my very first visit to Kibindu ward in October 2012, 
accompanying its secretary (who was partially salaried by donors), the chairperson (who 
received travel and subsistence allowances), and a paid consultant from Dar. The trip to 
Kwamsanja village specifically was with the purpose of delivering two days of training 
on entrepreneurship, the first day facilitated almost entirely by the consultant. The 
rationale to cover Kwamsanja, which Gender-Net’s secretary set out clearly in the days 
before departure, was that its focus to date had been on Kibindu village. There was a 
need to cover Kwamsanja also ‘so that they may get something’; indeed the women of 
Kwamsanja had been in regular contact to query why they had been overlooked.235 The 
visitors thus received a warm reception from the women, highly motivated to learn but 
also expectant of the availability of Gender-Net’s revolving loan fund. One woman 
intimated to me on the second day the group had hopes of purchasing a tractor. 
The loan, however, had not materialized by the end of my fieldwork a year later, despite 
women of Kibindu village having received their tranche more than a year earlier. On my 
next trip to Kibindu one week after the training, a local Gender-Net leader asked me 
why there had been training in Kwamsanja with no such training given to Kibindu. 
What eventually transpired was that some groups in Kibindu had received their share of 
the revolving fund but little in the way of training; the women in Kwamsanja, 
conversely, had received training but awaited the funds. This point of contention grew 
until it culminated in an angry emergency meeting between the villages’ respective 
leaders in May 2013, demanding answers from the Kibindu ward secretary as to the 
missing loan, which were not forthcoming. In this way, the Gender-Net district 
leadership’s decision had rather unwittingly served to exacerbate tensions and 
resentment between the two villages. It had wielded its various project instruments 
inconsistently and unpredictably in the service of coverage, or rather extensity. 
The feelings of neglect and marginalization, therefore, of Kibindu within Bagamoyo 
district were replicated at scales between Kibindu’s villages. Kibindu village was seen as 
                                                             




the focus of activity, to the detriment of Kwamsanja and Kwamduma. For many 
volunteers, NGOs were not sensitive to the geography of the ward and distances 
between villages, and so there was added potential symbolic value to NGOs extending 
their outreach beyond Kibindu village. As the ward’s youth network volunteer Haamid 
urged, even of the extensive VPI: 
If it is possible, it’s better they deliver training in Kibindu, they pay a certain amount, 
then they go to Kwamduma, and educate there, they pay a certain amount, then if 
possible they go to Kwamsanja. So all villages finish together, better than calling 
Kwamduma and Kwamsamja to come to Kibindu.236 
For Haamid, it was as much about equal recognition on the part of NGOs of the 
autonomous villages in the ward, and indeed those villagers’ time, as it was about 
logistics. VPI’s relative extensity, therefore, vis-à-vis its district contemporaries, was still 
only partial in the eyes of those from villages outside of Kibindu. 
To summarize, with few developmentalists serving Kibindu, the arrival of those who 
made the journey was a highly visible event and one that helped to legitimate those 
NGOs in the eyes of those it aimed to work with. This extensity, the ability of NGOs to 
project presence, indeed to ‘encompass’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) the margins of the 
district as equitably as the oppidan, carried symbolic weight in and of itself. It was thus 
appraised independently to the quality, relevance and efficacy of NGOs’ actual 
programmatic content. In this setting, the supervision and oversight of the Tanzanian 
state was cautiously welcomed and solicited, either directly or via the organizations it 
sanctioned, rather than deflected as in Kiharaka. Extensity, however, as legitimation 
more broadly, is only ever relative and partial, with smaller villages feeling similar 
distance from Kibindu centre. As a whole, extensity must be accrued and maintained 
over time, with VPI’s spatio-temporal extensity proving somewhat exceptional in this 
context. 
 
Territoriality: ‘we want new people’ 
 
                                                             




The creation and control of boundaries is a primary form of spatial power (Sack, p26). 
It is therefore (inversely) related to extensity in creating and maintaining geographical 
sub-spheres of influence. Under the conditions of isolated Kibindu, where development 
workers arriving in the ward were so few, extensity, and indeed the equity it signified, 
eclipsed the legitimation proffered by territoriality. This redundancy contrasted strongly 
with Chapter Four’s Kiharaka village, which was immersed in the legitimation of a large 
number of NGOs: one organization’s legitimation served to exclude another. As 
explored, Advocates International’s substantial symbolic capital in that context, 
particularly amongst the Kiharaka leadership, compounded the repudiation of VPI and 
the district council. In such a competitive environment, relationships become more 
exclusionary, whereby NGOs like AI draw boundaries around their sphere of intervention. 
Those they interact with similarly sanction such lines of inclusion or exclusion. One 
organization’s legitimation, in such crowded environments, is at the expense of another. 
Whilst Kibindu’s environment was much more sparsely populated, the recent entry of 
Community Development Innovation Professionals (CDIP) into Kibindu was duly 
accompanied by the familiar impetus to demarcate turf via their ‘own people’. Some of 
the existing network of volunteers had begun to experience this dynamic. This would 
confuse coordination efforts on the part of the Ward Executive Officer and other 
leaders to track volunteers’ activity, or to have key people leading on identifiable areas. 
As Haamid explained: 
These CDIP folk, we asked ‘why don’t we use those existing peer educators who 
already went for training?’ they said ‘we don’t want them – we want new young people 
to come so that we train them ourselves.’237 
Despite this nascent territoriality, however, there remained space across Kibindu as a 
whole for increased NGO and district developmental activity, which was cautiously 
solicited. The question was not, therefore, how one NGO could oust its competitors, 
via the staking of more attractive and robust claims over its constituents. The more 
pressing question was rather which NGOs and government initiatives passed the basic 
litmus test of equitable extensity, to Kibindu ward as any other. Whilst, therefore, there 
was an element of territoriality between villages in Kibindu, it did not override extensity 
as the primary form of spatial power. An NGO staking territorialized claims to work 
                                                             




exclusively with neighbouring villages Kwamsanja or Kwamduma, to the exclusion of 
Kibindu, would be well placed to legitimate itself in the eyes of those with whom it 
wished to work with. In the current climate, however, in the absence of pronounced 
competitiveness between NGOs, territoriality fell away as a basis for legitimation claims 
in the Kibindu context. 
 
Working state capital: ‘everyone’s goal is the same’ 
 
Working relations with the state, which looms large in the political imagination, formed 
one of the starkest forms of legitimation in Kibindu. Tanzania’s developmental state 
retained particularly strong symbolic capital in that context. Its oversight was cautiously 
solicited, either directly or through its ‘co-production’ (Dodworth 2015) via the NGOs 
it sanctioned. In the words of one prominent Kibindu volunteer, multiple initiatives, if 
under the purview of the state, could co-exist harmoniously in a single direction: 
‘everyone’s goal is the same’. This contrasted starkly with Kiharaka, of the previous 
chapter, whereby VPI and AI’s opposing positionalities vis-à-vis the state precipitated 
strongly divergent fortunes. VPI’s proximity to the district, borrowing and indeed co-
producing governmental authority in an attempt to compel others to act, was inimical 
due to antagonism between Kiharaka and district leaders. AI, in contrast, leveraged 
discord to its advantage, positioning itself at a distance from the district machinery and 
more proximate to ‘the people’.  
Kibindu’s solicitation of the state therefore contrasted with the situation in Kiharaka, 
but it was not without qualification. There was still some apprehension regarding the 
competency of ‘external’ district intervention in certain matters. With regard to Kibindu 
village, this had most recently manifested itself via illicit land sales, whereby the district-
appointed Village Executive Officer had been recalled at the request of the villagers. To 
some extent, therefore, both Kerege and Kibindu shared a perception that outsiders 
including the district, unfamiliar with the local environment, may be hindered in their 
attempts to act in the interests of its inhabitants. This is a well-worn adage for any 
development context (see representation) and one rarely addressed in a meaningful 




levels of optimism that the developmental state held at least the potential to alleviate 
service and infrastructural issues. There was considerably more confidence in the roles 
that ‘government’ could and should play in Kibindu’s development.238 The state, 
therefore, was not intrinsically ill-placed to act on behalf of Kibindu’s residents, as in 
Kiharaka, but rather there was space and appetite for considerably ‘more government’ 
to fulfil its developmental remit within Kibindu. The state’s spatial extensity, co-
produced by VPI, was thus continued grounds for sanguinity where other development 
actors had failed. 
The state’s extensity admits of, in the words of one informant, many ‘streams’ of 
government.239 In the case of Kibindu, the influence of the Ward Executive Officer 
(WEO) ensured that the state’s bureaucratic arm, that of the district council, retained a 
strong presence. The WEO, given Kibindu’s remoteness, was resident and therefore, 
unlike Kerege, assumed a strong coordination, advocacy and authorizing role within his 
adopted community. The WEO had the best aerial view of the patchwork of initiatives 
in place across the ward. He was familiar with each NGO’s operations but also with 
their various volunteers. He had selected most of the volunteers himself, was aware of 
their circumstances and, to a degree, up to date with their levels of project activity. 
There was no other person with such knowledge of ward initiatives, endeavouring to 
assimilate and connect them. He also served as a significant gatekeeper and, indeed, 
source of sanction. 
Whilst the WEO’s predominance reflected his own competency and personal attributes, 
it was also in concordance with the increased space to govern. The symbolic capital of 
the state - so central to its anthropology in the everyday (e.g. Bayart 2009 [1993]; Cohn 
1996; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Migdal 2001; Migdal & Schlichte 
2005; Mitchell 1991; Scott 1998) - resounded clearly in these circumstances, paving the 
way for the WEO’s pre-eminence. The WEO, and those NGO collaborators who 
conformed to his idea of the state as patron and disciplinarian, were part of ‘doing the 
state’ (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, p14). Such practices, which included the creation and 
endorsement of particular networks of volunteers, in turn created and endorsed 
particular hierarchies. 
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The WEO, by way of illustration, was somewhat agitated with Youth Health’s non-state, 
‘remote control’ approach in which young volunteers were called to training centrally. In 
addition, it was a point of consternation that volunteers were selected without face to 
face consultation with ward representatives. Lastly, neither the volunteers nor the Youth 
Health managers kept administrative officers abreast of developments in the project 
along state reporting lines. For the WEO, Youth Health compared unfavourably to 
another youth-led HIV initiative, run by CDIP: 
When CDIP came, they visited my office. I was impressed by them because first, they 
called us to Bagamoyo, the WEOs from all wards. We spoke with them there, and 
when they came here, they weren’t officially my guests [i.e. an impromptu visit], but 
we spoke with them, I told them ‘here there are two youths with Youth Health, but 
their work is like yours’, and they said ‘we’d like to see them’. So they spoke with 
them, that their goal was one and the same, so that when they do these works they 
might cooperate with each other; we’re all in the same place, so there CDIP satisfied 
me, they left their young people behind, with heart [motivation]. But Youth Health, 
they’ve never arrived here, not even once.240 
For those volunteers not endorsed by the WEO, such as those of Youth Health, their 
role became more challenging still, as they were compelled to legitimate their presence 
by other means. 
The role of WEO as coordinating gatekeeper was a conspicuous one and important 
given the confusion and uncertainty surrounding certain NGOs’ approaches, 
particularly that of Youth Health. Instead of the same people being recruited for 
multiple project initiatives, as was often the case in the Kerege villages, the WEO strove 
for coverage of volunteers across the three villages and that different people were 
recruited for different projects, as part of the extensity of state-making: 
I spread them around…So CDIP here they have two people, Kwamduma one, and 
Youth Health here they have one and Kwamsanja one. So every village has one 
person to teach this [subject], because it is the goal of our ward. So, they don’t 
overlap; that one when he goes to Kwamsanja he asks the Kwamsanja one ‘where 
have you been, what kind of person have you spoken to, what difficulties have you 
had?’ They can explain so they can then do something else.241 
Some volunteers, in turn, attempted to work with each other, with the WEO providing 
a welcome steer, point of contact and source of recognition with regard to their 
endeavours. As Haamid, the youth coordinator described: 
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So it was me, cooperating with the ward CJF…then me and the animator, a friend 
who went to training, so eventually it became necessary for us then to meet, we do the 
training, all of us [to plan] together. So the animator does her work and the CJF does 
his work and me, the peer educator, I do my work. So we proceeded well…I’ll have, 
perhaps a discussion with these young people, we’ll give our education, we’ll prepare a 
summary of the matters we taught on, we write in the file, when I finish there I take 
the issue to the WEO ‘sir, here’s the summary of the meeting’, maybe when I did it 
and he’ll tell you ‘fine, when you are required at the district you can go with the 
feedback’. 
Haamid, as the WEO before, was speaking as much in aspiration as recollection, as 
coordination between volunteers was again beset with challenges stemming from 
divergent project strategies, timeframes and organizational interests. Nevertheless, the 
potential was acknowledged whereby the state, and the NGO practices which co-
produced it, ultimately pulled in the same direction. Haamid was indeed keen for more 
rigorous state sanction at the apex of this development assemblage: 
Maybe here’s a thought, for example, VPI were doing good work, meaning we were 
working in a formal contract with the district. Then when you leave the training, 
there’s a paper to sign when you do the work, then we [VPI] will come, we’ll inspect. 
Let’s see then if you don’t do the work: if not then it’s necessary to bring charges. 
Why did our fellow come to get training and then not work in the village? So people, 
when they came from there, they were motivated to work, and we ourselves worked 
well, but we saw that our fellows have stayed silent, until today, so we don’t know 
what the problem is.242 
Haamid’s comments noted the lack of coordination as well as alluded to the need for 
recognition (see voluntarism). More pertinent to the current discussion, however, was 
that Haamid was soliciting a greater role for government in surveying and sanctioning 
the harmonious development activities of all agencies. In this example, there is again 
little daylight between VPI and the district, once relations are formalized. Haamid’s 
comments echoed the appetite for increased centralization and bureaucratization for 
these villagers who felt neglect at the very fringes of governmental oversight. His 
language was forceful, emphasizing the formalizing power of the written contract. 
Ultimately, Haamid was calling for government not to only ‘own’ this data, but to 
incorporate disparate volunteering efforts into a single developmental drive, with the 
full force of state sanction. When reflecting, however, on the reality of government 
inertia: 
                                                             




VPI can decide to do this [training], but government they just sit; they don’t know that 
we give trainings there or that maybe capacity has grown a little. They are restricted. 
So these organizations they help us to push government, to push our government.243 
Here, Haamid highlighted the lethargy of government but also the potential of NGOs, 
particularly VPI, to supplement and ‘push’ government’s efforts but ultimately working 
towards the same ends. VPI thus still co-produces the state, extending its existential 
tidemark. 
Whilst VPI eclipsed all others in their capacity to co-produce the state, other volunteers 
agreed it feasible that multiple initiatives, if under the purview of government, could co-
exist harmoniously and pull evermore strongly in a single direction. As Fatuma 
commented, a long-recruited VPI ‘trainer of trainers’ (TOT): 
[VPI] are close, they really work close to government. They work really close to 
government, because many issues, how I see it, they involve the district council…this 
is good, because we don’t want them to say ‘we don’t know about that’, because 
everything they [VPI] are doing, they [government] must also know. 
She later added, when asked if it was difficult to coordinate, or for villagers to recognize, 
the efforts of volunteers from multiple organizations: 
I think that everyone’s goal is the same, the goal is one, the wish to educate the 
community member, so he knows, he recognizes if there is an issue with HIV, with 
AIDS, he knows his rights.244 
In the Kibindu context, therefore, the validation conferred by working close to the 
district council was an asset. Fatuma, having worked for many years as a WEO herself 
in other wards before returning home to Kibindu, saw no dissonance between the goals 
of NGOs and the district council. In this way, Haamid, and more clearly Fatuma, 
replicated the language of the district Community Development Officer, and indeed the 
Tanzanian government more broadly, whereby legitimate, or ‘serious’, civil society and 
local government were complementary. They remained thus insofar as the politically 
neutral language of rights, educating and mobilizing communities and poverty reduction 
was maintained. 
VPI again fitted neatly into this mould. VPI monitoring visit to Kibindu, which took 
place in conjunction with district officers, took on its familiar authoritative tone. I 
accompanied staff on one such visit in October 2012, which aimed to evaluate the 
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activities of a range of rights and welfare committees, particularly the village HIV/AIDS 
committee, the Woman and Child Rights committee as well as of other key leaders and 
representatives. After a long wait, whilst the HIV/AIDS committee completed business 
with another visiting NGO conducting baseline research, the meeting got underway. 
The tone was terse from the outset, as VPI and district representatives requested a range 
of plans and documents, including the village development plan, none of which was 
available. It transpired the last village meeting had taken place in January, some nine 
months earlier. 
Part of this stemmed from the recent governance issues, whereby the sitting VEO had 
been recalled and a gap left before his replacement was found. Part of the issue, as 
volunteers subsequently told me, lay with the time of year and the farming calendar, 
which prevented regular meetings from taking place. The distances within sub-villages, 
in addition, was a constant challenge to internal governance. The visiting district staff 
became quickly frustrated at the lack of meetings and the failure to produce the required 
plans or proof of activities. Some representatives, such as the village CJF, were not 
present at the meeting and the staff were told she was ill at home. The CDO took an 
increasingly reprimanding tone with the assembled group, asking ‘when these 
programmes finish, who will help you?’ He emphasised the need to report on all groups 
and initiatives. At one point, requests were made for so many roles – TOTs, TOAs, 
CJFs and so on – that the group started laughing at the sheer number of acronyms, each 
with attendant demands. The group hesitated as they recollected who was who. 
Whilst the stringent hierarchy of the exchange resonated with the monitoring meeting in 
Kiharaka of the same month, the outcomes in the two settings diverged. In Kiharaka, 
the authority of the district council, and by association VPI, was challenged before, 
during and after the meeting by absence, silence and withdrawal. The exchanges that 
followed the meeting were perhaps the most revealing, as the group broke up laughing 
about the demands that had been made of them and the claims that they were ‘failing’ to 
administer the various initiatives. In Kibindu, however, the group endeavoured to 
defend their record more strenuously, even in the absence of the correct paperwork. 
‘We are here’, replied one, ‘we are together; we are educating others’. The group was 
frustrated at one point with the focus on formalized groups and reporting, which 




CDO said, ‘without a plan you can’t move forward’. A woman pointed out the existence 
of a local theatre group, which was not associated with these particular roles, nor did it 
plan or report in a formalized way. ‘We are here’, she emphasized, ‘and we are trying 
very hard’. 
Whilst the group gently probed these accusations of failure, with their protestations 
mainly silenced, they nonetheless remained inside this process. There was no question 
that the authority of the CDO, and by extension VPI, might not be recognized nor 
abided by. The reprimands were taken seriously and were ultimately demoralizing for 
the assembled group. In this sense, the role of these external developmentalists was 
recognized and endorsed. This was confirmed in later interviews by the level of profile 
that VPI held across the ward, with the majority of leaders and volunteers aware of their 
work and their proximity to government. For friends Adira and Ruwa, VPI and CDIP 
volunteers respectively, the difference between their two organizations was clear: 
Adira: CDIP is far, far from government 
Kathy: And VPI? 
A: At the moment, they are close to government, VPI 
K: So the approach is different…? 
A: A little…CDIP is a private outfit [lit. private person].245 
Whilst both agencies were legitimate in the eyes of their recruits, it was on the bases of 
different claims. In VPI’s case, its proximity to the district council served as a 
legitimation asset in the spacious Kibindu context. This proximity bolstered its ability to 
wield public authority to compel others to act, rather than conferring liability as played 
out in Kiharaka. The more ‘private’ CDIP’s legitimation, however, given its perceived 
distance from government, lay elsewhere. 
In summary, Tanzania’s developmental state loomed large in remote Kibindu, whereby 
the appetite for remained strong. Government’s role was indeed ‘to achieve 
development for their people’.246 This resonated strongly with contemporaneous 
development discourses whereby civil society, most vociferously NGOs, supplement 
governmental efforts to bring such development to the people. Indeed, in extending the 
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reach of government, as explored under extensity, NGOs like VPI are part of ‘doing 
the state’ (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, p14), which can be as ‘state-like’ in aspect as much 
as in content. In this context, dominant development discourses, including that of the 
ostensibly bottom-up, rights-based approach, in practice supplemented that of top-
down development, identifying once again failure, absence and deficiency at the hands 
of villages. This perceived unity allowed civil society and government’s developmental 
efforts to co-extend and indeed co-produce. In such a context, quite unlike Kiharaka, 
VPI’s association with the district afforded it considerable traction and influence in the 
absence of visible competitors. Green’s ‘legitimation as being part of government’ 
(2010, p19) was at its most pronounced, allowing VPI to craft considerable space in 
which to govern. 
 
Representation: ‘that’s not how it is here’ 
 
Contemporary representational practice visibly melds positionalities of distance and 
proximity: to act for and stand for Others. Newer theories of political representation, as 
Holzscheiter details, have helped to recalibrate representation as a ‘dialectic of 
performative practices between representatives and their real or imagined 
constituencies’ (2016, p205). When understood as a performance, representation is 
revealed as an ongoing collection of claims and attendant positionalities. It is not, 
therefore, whether institutions or organizations choose either to stand for or to act for 
others, often disaggregated in political theory, but rather how agencies oscillate between 
such claims, negotiating and reconciling their contradictions over time. In Kibindu, 
where the developmental state predominated the space for public authority, there was 
less scope for its exiguous NGOs to leverage an oppositional stance via claims to stand 
for the people. The extension of the state, as examined, co-produced by VPI in 
particular, itself conferred an appearance of proximity in the face of geographical 
isolation. This was quite unlike Kiharaka, which housed growing opposition to 
government intervention in any shape or form. 
This courting of the state resonated with the rather stable consensus amongst village 




infrastructure. In their formulation, the main obstacle to Kibindu’s development 
remained the lack of education and understanding around key issues, including rights. 
To return to Fatuma’s comments, all development agents were able to pull in the same 
direction to tackle this shortfall: 
I think that their goals are the same, the wish that education can reach the community 
member, he at the absolute lowest level, who doesn’t know anything. I think everyone 
has that goal, that that person gains education, that he knows himself, who he is and 
he has rights and is obligated to do this or that. I think all projects that have come 
focus a lot on that.247 
This unison echoed the comments of the WEO, whereby the supply of quality, relevant 
training by VPI would be met by commensurate demand: 
The training itself was good, and accessible, because that which we learnt was those 
very issues, gender-based violence, issues that have caused women [lit. mothers] to be 
kept behind. So, we sat for a long time on that and it was pleasing for people from 
here, if they [volunteers who were trained] come, it’s wanted, it’s really useful here in 
our place.248 
Haamid, the youth coordinator, also reiterated that the challenge to ensure that the right 
education reached ‘the people’ in order to tackle key developmental challenges: 
So I urge organizations to intensify their efforts; come with new things to teach, for 
example life skills; there are many subjects possible to teach. 
These comments collectively affirm that the onus of development must be placed firmly 
at the feet of ‘the people’, albeit under state direction. The ‘problem’, as extensively 
explored in postcolonial literature,249 is constructed as a lack of expertise and 
understanding on the part of local people: in Fatuma’s words, he ‘who doesn’t know 
anything’. This lack, in turn, demands intervention on the part of developers to impart 
the right kind of education, in the right way, to the right people. Whilst the extensity of 
the Tanzanian state, therefore, here co-produced by VPI and its volunteers, resembles 
prima facie a proximity to the people, in reality it forms the basis for distance and 
disassociation. Extensity to the very furthest outreaches of the district bolsters 
knowledge claims of ‘gaps’, juxtaposed with the VPI’s expertise. Such gaps sustain the 
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case for intervention, whereby it is the responsibility of the developers to act for the 
interests of those unable to develop themselves. Post-colonial ‘development authority’, 
therefore, is ‘responsible for not to the rural population’ (Schneider 2014, p83, emphasis 
added). These developmentalists are, as their colonial and missionary forbearers, the 
custodians of their subjects’ wellbeing, present and future. 
Claims to act for Others, replicated at a number of scales, therefore predominated in the 
Kibindu setting. Volunteers themselves, as Fatuma who was a VPI volunteer and ex-
government employee, similarly took up the developmental mantle to counter the 
dearth of relevant knowledge and understanding in their own communities. On Rose’s 
Foucauldian reading, the disciplinary form of ‘community’ became both the cause and 
solution of governmental problems (1999), so-defined at a distance. This was not, 
however, a narrative acceded to or consumed without question by those subjected to 
such interventions. Villagers exercised strategies of withdrawal, silence or dissent to 
good effect. For some, for example, it was not sufficient that these various volunteers 
had been selected by the WEO, sanctioned by the relevant village committee, nor that 
they had received a particular training; their efforts to educate their fellow villagers were 
repelled all the same. Their charge as educators was questioned or at times not 
recognized, with suspicions of volunteers’ own interests. As Adira and Ruwa described 
it: 
A: There are many challenges. Because many, they are malicious, those troublemakers. 
You get them if you go and you want to educate them, they say ‘ah, you you’ve spent 
[lit. eaten] the money’. 
R: ‘You come to educate us!’ 
A: ‘You’re annoying us, we don’t want it!’ 
R: So it’s really hard 
A: So some, when you find them, they don’t want it, others if you go there you 
educate them and they agree… 
R: You can leave here, if you go to them there, you want to educate them but they tell 
you ‘ah you, go back to where you come from, we don’t want it, you’ve eaten the 
money you, and then you come to annoy us!’ 
They later described other strategies of withdrawal, when attempting to incorporate 




Say you get someone, you call him to the public meeting, that person comes and you 
give him your education, it could be that there’s no problem and the person 
understands you. But [others] they boycott it. You can call come someone, and when 
you get to that part of the agenda where you educate them, they leave. So you’re left 
with just you and the executive officer; who are you going to educate then? So yes, 
they boycott it, especially at this time of hunger when they really don’t want to hear 
that there’s another meeting.250 
This was echoed by similar experiences for Haamid and the other young peer educators: 
We tried to run with this initiative but we failed, because the WEO he was supervising 
overall, but we ourselves were running it, we managed this well at the beginning; we 
convened our meetings, we met every month. But after some time, every time you 
convene a meeting people don’t turn up. Say you go around ‘guys let’s have a 
meeting’, you give them the info but people don’t come to the meeting.251 
These recollections demonstrated one of the strongest, overt forms of withdrawal, at 
the same time raising questions regarding the relevance of the training. The interests of 
the NGOs, the volunteers and the villagers were not perceived to align. Volunteers were 
thus not seen to be standing for the interests of Others. Indeed, the question of the 
relevance of interventions came up in subtler ways in volunteers’ own commentary. For 
Mosi, CJF of adjacent Kwamduma village: 
Education is indeed the backbone on which we depend, but there are many issues; we 
do advise them [the communities] but when we then ask communities ‘what do you 
say?’, they say ‘we’ve been advised to do this, but also we ask if possible for 
government to invest in farming’.252 
He went on to explain that regular droughts in the area, whereby the soil had been 
exhausted and compounded by lack of rains, had led the crops to fail. Life skills and 
human rights work found little traction in this context. Despite his belief in the 
importance of education, Mosi was clearly sensitive to the needs articulated by his fellow 
villagers, as well as to whether his own developer role aligned with such. 
Furthermore, given Mosi’s CJF work required him to advise others on their rights, for 
example when to escalate a complaint to the authorities, the lack of a nearby police 
station reduced potential for sanction and enforcement. The nearest police station was 
at Mbwewe, located approximately 60 kilometres from Kibindu. Whilst community-
based solutions were encouraged, with the Mbwewe police indeed advising Mosi not to 
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escalate low-level complaints, the lack of police oversight had at times very serious 
consequences. As Adira and Ruwa described: 
R: In February this year, in Mbele village, a woman was beaten until she died…The 
husband did a runner [lit. fled into the forest].  
A: To the forest, so she was just buried and there was no case. 
K: Goodness, is that true. Because there’s no police? 
A: There’s no police. 
K: But couldn’t someone go and report in Mbwewe? 
A: They went! 
R: You can go and report but that person himself wasn’t around anymore, he’d done a 
runner. 
Such a context is inevitably more complicated for those trained to encourage vulnerable 
groups to advocate for their rights. Police diligence in rural Tanzania is inevitably 
patchy, but for Kibindu the complete absence of oversight of even the most serious 
crimes exacerbated feelings of isolation and vulnerability. Teaching villagers to advocate 
for rights, therefore, in the absence of basic formal institutions, felt futile and misplaced. 
Such advocacy added little to community incidents that would continue to be resolved 
internally by the village government. Indeed, human rights work, in continually asking 
whether villagers fulfil their civic duties in demanding rights, masks broader question as 
to whether government has fulfilled its basic duty to supply the means to protect their 
citizens. 
Villagers’ strategies of withdrawal, therefore, marked a questioning of the priorities of 
external development actors. Even Haamid, who was previously zealous in stating the 
need for external education, questioned the repetitive messages of NGOs regarding 
HIV/AIDS: 
So we’re trying, organizations are trying to increase so that we can try to educate 
others on many subjects, to be able to teach ourselves here. So people are trying; our 
fellows, they come, but maybe don’t come every day solely on the issue of AIDS, 
AIDS, AIDS. Every day, people understand, when they sleep, when they wake, they 
get what’s going on there [with HIV/AIDS]. There are other things that are more 
hidden, deep issues that are well hidden. For example, as we discussed, this male 
[patriarchal] system, where we force women to work so hard.253 
                                                             




Each time the relevance of a training or intervention was questioned in this way, it 
served to highlight distance and dissonance between the interests of external 
developmentalists and those of the villagers they claim to represent. The discursive 
practices of NGOs, including via their volunteers, highlighted gaps in education and 
understanding between those deemed ‘behind’ and those deemed developmentally 
advanced. This distance, however, was camouflaged by claims of proximity to, and 
intimacy with, the concerns of ‘the people’, on which NGOs existentially depend. 
This oscillation between proximity and distance, even over the course of a single 
encounter, was demonstrated clearly within Gender-Net’s two-day entrepreneurship 
training with the women in Kwamsanja village. As explored under extensity, this 
training was organized by Gender-Net with the aim of providing wider coverage across 
Kibindu ward. This expansion was in light of Kibindu village having been recipient to a 
greater number of interventions than Kwamsanja, including first access to revolving 
funds. The training went ahead so that Kwamsanja women too could ‘get something’. 
Gender-Net, as a network of Bagamoyo women governed ostensibly by themselves, 
generated powerful feelings of identification and surmised to be strongly representative, 
descriptively, substantively and symbolically. Whilst Gender-Net had been established 
by Advocates International in a drive to work with local partners, its presence had 
become institutionalized within the district; its endorsement by the district was manifest 
in a rare financial contribution from their budget. As such, larger NGOs would often 
solicit Gender-Net’s involvement including ‘women’ or ‘gender’ components in their 
projects: legitimation ‘out of the box’. 
The Gender-Net leaders and external consultant were excitedly welcomed to the village, 
despite arriving almost three hours late. Interpersonal relations were strong, particularly 
towards the charismatic secretary Aisha who was known to all, liked and respected. The 
strength and genuine feeling in this welcome stood in notable contrast to the 
formalized, hierarchical exchanges that characterized most NGO interactions at village 
level. The women were highly animated by the prospect of the training and roused by 
the Gender-Net slogans and mottos, such as ‘women, we can do it!’, already familiar to 
all. The secretary quickly fell into her role as orator and animator, tapping into the 




comradery between women from across Bagamoyo, with their shared sense of the 
additional burdens and hardships that they faced, was very real. 
The smartly dressed consultant from Dar, who delivered the first day’s training, sought 
to capitalise on this fervour. He made an early pitch regarding the relevance of this 
training in entrepreneurship, as opposed to typical NGO interventions. As he opened, 
after the formal opening and introductions: 
We know you have had so many trainings: trainings on malaria, on health, on 
HIV/AIDS, women and children’s rights. There are so many issues these days…but 
has anyone ever given you training on entrepreneurship?254 
He received an emphatic chorus of ‘no, we’ve nothing here!’ in response, with others 
exclaiming ‘with entrepreneurship we’ll profit more’ and ‘entrepreneurship will make us 
money’. Whilst there was an initial appetite for this training, however, the divergence in 
interests and expectations became increasingly clear throughout the workshop. The 
women hoped, as they shared their expectations in the opening session, to improve their 
business, to gain understanding of entrepreneurship, to help their family and, above all, 
to access a loan. 
The training started, after sharing expectations, with a discussion of the meaning of 
entrepreneurship itself, with the trainer eliciting ideas from the group. Some of the 
women suggested it was someone who committed themselves to different kinds of 
work, frequently mentioning ‘small businesses’. This alluded to a diversification of 
economic activities, which in the Kibindu context included small eateries, basket-making 
and selling goods sourced perhaps in Dar. The consultant, however, emphasized a much 
stronger ethos of risk-taking, breaking down the Swahili word ujasiriamali into its 
component ‘bravery’ (ujasiri) with ‘resources’, or capital (mali). He continually returned 
to the need to forge and seize opportunities locally, being creative, decisive and self-
confident in doing so. This resonated with Nadai and Maeder’s governing of the 
‘entrepreneurial self’, rationalizing one’s whole life ‘according to market imperatives’ 
(2009, p235; drawing on Foucault via Burchell et el. 1991; also Dolan & Rajak 2016). 
The women became increasingly hesitant in their responses to the trainer’s questions, 
struggling to populate his desired list of ‘entrepreneurial qualities’. They began to ask for 
                                                             




help in coming up with the right answers, even though the workshop purported to be 
based on ‘facilitated’ learning. When the consultant moved on to how to select a 
particular business idea, the women resisted, saying their business choices were shaped, 
even determined, by their local environment. Local demand was low as well as seasonal. 
The consultant catalogued determining factors, such as the availability of raw materials, 
investment capital and the running costs of particular business options. Again, the 
women resisted the relevance of ‘selecting’ a new business in that few choices were 
open to them, adding that every woman has a stake in a tea shop for that very reason. 
‘That’s not how it is here’, (lit. that’s not our environment) one leader rued; ‘there is no 
capital here’. The women reiterated the demands of the agricultural calendar, which 
determines the time available for other activities, questioning if the trainer’s suggestions 
were feasible in their context. 
Nevertheless, the trainer stayed on message, insisting that opportunities were there. The 
women increasingly questioned his assertions, with subtle but discernible refutations. 
The Gender-Net leadership, observing the growing distance between the women and 
the trainer, began to intervene. The chairperson echoed the trainer’s words, adding ‘you 
will awaken’, see reason or ‘come to your senses’, which restated the distance between 
the workshop leaders and the women. It resonated with the notion that the barriers to 
development lay primarily with the attitudes and attributes of local people themselves. 
After the issue of capital had arisen, it later served to reignite the dispute regarding the 
missing Gender-Net loan. A long, heated discussion ensued, questioning the actions of 
Gender-Net and the discrepancy in loan access between Kibindu and Kwamsanja. The 
leaders replied that each group would receive the loan once they were ‘ready’, with little 
explanation as to how a group would be deemed such and by whom. 
The first day’s training was thus a highly demotivating experience for the women, who 
withdrew into silence in response to the trainer’s questions. It was becoming 
increasingly apparent that initial expectations would remain unfulfilled. The distance 
between the ‘life worlds’ of the women and the young Dar consultant was increasingly 
visible, if not insurmountable. The next morning one of the group’s leaders told me: 
Many organizations come with big words. Like Gender-Net said we are here to work 
with women so we thought we will organize ourselves and perhaps we will get a loan 




The women went on to cite ‘discrimination’ against Kwamsanja, adding: 
The Kibindu leadership they say they represent all of the ward but they don’t 
represent us. They took the loan for the ward and distributed it amongst 
themselves.255 
The second day’s training was led by the charismatic Gender-Net secretary Aisha, 
following the consultant’s departure. This improved the tone of proceedings, but the 
underlying dissonance and dissatisfaction with the training remained. Aisha led a curious 
exercise whereby the women calculated the various costs and profits of their small 
business, predominantly of running a teashop. Each one of these exercises appeared to 
demonstrate the business was running at a loss, which was likely due to miscalculations 
along the way. Nevertheless, Aisha drew water from the exercise in a bid to demonstrate 
the lack of entrepreneurial skill in the area. Once again, this accentuated distance 
between herself, as Gender-Net leadership, with those hindered in their own 
development. 
Whilst the women frequently questioned the relevance and applicability of the training 
in subtle ways, therefore, their doubts were deflected back through questioning the 
abilities of the individual women. ‘You will see’ or ‘you will awaken’ was part of a claim 
by the leaders to represent the future wellbeing and interests of these women. The 
women could not help, over the course of the long anticipated training, to begin to 
internalize these professed shortcomings. Despite the increased dissonance and 
incongruity between themselves and the leaders, the women asked at the end of the final 
session ‘when will we get education again? When will we be back in the classroom?’256 
Deflecting failure from the tutors to the tutees, as explored in previous chapters, 
encapsulated an age-old (post)colonial dynamic of the need to act for the Other. Indeed, 
for Said, the construction of the Other formed the very condition of such intervention 
(1978, p39). This practice incorporated familiar tropes around the poor work ethic of 
local people. As a VPI programme officer, unusually from Bagamoyo herself, lamented 
of their village volunteers during my first visit to Kibindu ward: 
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They are supposed to train and educate others but they don’t...We try to explain that 
the wazungu will return to their own place but the problems will still be here in the 
village’.257 
VPI, as external developer, was unable or unwilling to address the various 
representational issues and gaps at various stages in the chain of command they sought 
to institute. VPI’s ability to reflect critically on its approach existed informally, over 
morning tea or evening beers, but without space for its formal incorporation. Its 
formally sanctioned narrative of community self-help, co-produced with local 
government, thus remained intact. 
This conflict, as part of the broader struggle between representational proximity and 
distance, was indeed embodied in the experience of recruited volunteers themselves. 
The Kibindu leaders reiterated the importance of the community selecting their own 
volunteers, sanctioned by a public meeting. The WEO was particularly forceful, 
explaining that others were obliged to give them an audience in their new roles: 
They listen, they are happy and I told them ‘guys, these young people are from our 
area, we selected them, so when they come to your homes, don’t be surprised; listen 
to them.’258 
Describing the volunteers in this way bolstered claims that they stood for the people, as 
‘descriptively representative’ (Pitkin 1967) of their community. At the same time, in 
both Kibindu and Kiharaka, such volunteers were simultaneously agents of change, 
privy to specialist knowledge and expertise and thus poised to act for others. 
To summarize, there was thus much in common regarding representational practice in 
the Kibindu and Kiharaka domains. The key difference, however, was that in Kiharaka 
there was additional representational space in opposition to government, bolstering 
claims of standing proximate to ‘the life of the people’. In Kibindu, however, where the 
idea of the omnipotent developmental state resonated more strongly, there was little 
symbolic capital to be garnered from an oppositional stance from NGOs, given 
‘everyone’s goal is the same’. Representational practice thus diverged substantially in 
content. Nevertheless, such practice shared an intrinsic ambivalence between claims to 
stand for and act for the Other. This was evident in vacillating positionality, both of 
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organizations like VPI and Gender-Net as well as their volunteers: of proximity and 
distance as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699). The latter 
stance of distance, expert and outsider, central to the (post)colonial condition, ultimately 
won out in forging the authority to act. These tensions played out in everyday 
experiences of such work, with volunteers reflecting on the relevance of their training, 
their frustrations with the limits to effect change and, in some instances, their ultimate 
repudiation by Others in their community. It is to these challenges in navigating 
voluntarism I now return. 
 
Voluntarism: ‘we don’t have the means to volunteer’ 
 
Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving of time and effort towards a claimed common good, 
has had enduring resonance in the Tanzanian political imagination. It has proven a core 
legitimation device for public action, from the colonial to the contemporary, but one 
intertwined with extensity, state and representation, as explored throughout this 
thesis. In addition, voluntarism has incorporated new repertoires, including more 
recently that of neoliberalism. Rather than being fixed in content, therefore, voluntarism 
is a template in which multiple, at times conflicting, registers are at play. In this way, it 
has the potential to both bolster and inhibit other legitimation practices, depending on 
emphasis or aspect at any one time. Chapter Three examined how voluntarism as virtue, 
differentiated from the Tanzanian state, legitimated piecemeal-paid district NGO staff 
to a limited degree: ‘I don’t eat’. Chapter Four examined the alignment of the non-state 
VPI with the district council in their shared instantiation of voluntarism, to the 
consternation and eventual rejection of the local leadership. 
For Kibindu’s volunteers and their leaders, however, the enduring congruence between 
the omnipotent developmental state and voluntarism remained paramount in 
legitimating action on the part of volunteers. There are, as examined, insidious, indeed 
illiberal, forms of coercion at play in exacting people’s time. However, the Lockean ideal 
of consent, which underpins the Westernized notion of civil society conferred upwards 
to donors and the international community through representations of voluntary 




in being chosen to undertake voluntary work and indeed chosen by the state, via the 
village leadership. Open refusal to undertake voluntary work was not possible, and the 
‘resignation’ or replacement of volunteers rare, except in the event of chronic illness or 
moving out of the area. Voluntarism, therefore, whether government or non-
government, was therefore underwritten by state sanction, challenging any neoliberal, 
donor-oriented presentation of voluntarism as consent. 
Whilst the Lockean, transactional notion of consent was therefore mainly absent from 
such a negotiation, volunteers nevertheless had their own motivations for undertaking 
such work. This underscored that selection was not necessarily undesirable, and that 
Kibindu’s volunteers crafted their own strategies of engagement. Many of the volunteers 
endorsed elements of the prevailing self-help, community-led development discourse, 
promoted by state and non-state alike. They were therefore quite explicit about their 
motivations to offer time and effort within this co-produced civic sphere, but also to 
further their own personal ‘development’. Haamid, who was a particularly strong 
advocate of NGO initiatives and had been a volunteer for three years, was mindful of 
the positive impact of education on volunteers themselves. When asked if people felt 
reluctant when selected to go for training, he replied: 
No, they go; they go. Because when you go there, you meet with your peers and you 
exchange ideas. You’re able to gain something that you didn’t already know - another 
will give you their ideas, so when you get back, you can share with others, it’s good. So 
people like to go, because you are surrounded by ideas, and you feel positive.259 
Similarly, Safia, a recent VPI Trainer of Trainers (TOT) and herself a primary school 
teacher, enthused about her initial training: 
I gained something. You know, because I knew about AIDS but…I didn’t know 
about gender abuse, woman and child rights; I learnt something there. So, I gained 
something new, at least.260 
Their words echoed that of Mosi, CJF for neighbouring Kwamduma since 2004. 
Despite having volunteered for almost a decade, Mosi remained strongly committed to 
continue his voluntary work going forward: 
K: So you’ve been doing work like this for nine years? How do you see it? How do 
you feel? 
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A: I still feel good in myself, I don’t yet have the heart to say ‘ah this work, that’s it, 
enough.’ Because I can see that it has many benefits, firstly at times I get education so 
that I can know a lot on issues of advocacy of various groups. So these benefits I see 
firstly help me, but then the very same will help the community that surrounds me. 
Yeah, so I still have loads of energy, to keep helping the community, though those 
issues themselves are voluntary.261 
Mosi was reflecting how voluntary work on net, even when offset by the costs incurred, 
was beneficial for the community as a whole. ‘Voluntary’ in this instance was a 
somewhat negative inference to non-payment, separate to the positive benefits of 
community-based work. Similarly, for Fatuma, seasoned volunteer and former 
government worker, volunteering came with inevitable costs, but such costs were no 
surprise to her vis-à-vis the demands of servicing a perceived public good: 
We decided to volunteer, because the organization said it didn’t have any money, and 
villages themselves are like that. So me, myself I made my contribution, as TOT 
[trainer of trainers], together with others, we volunteered and we didn’t get even five 
cents for it, so that the project’s message of education could reach those community 
members.262 
For these volunteers, as in the Kiharaka context, voluntarism’s legitimation as civic 
virtue retained sufficient significance to influence the decision to act. Even for Adira 
and Ruwa, who were relatively new recruits but had already experienced many 
challenges to fulfilling their work, the issue was not that of voluntary work per se. They 
were strongly motivated by the aims of the project, particularly that of reducing violence 
against women, and when asked if they enjoyed volunteering replied: 
R: I love volunteering a lot. 
A: I love it. 
K: How come? 
R: Because it helps us reduce these kinds of epidemics. 
Once again, there was no contradiction between being selected to volunteer, with little 
meaningful consent, and the enduring value that such work was seen to hold. In 
addition, volunteers acknowledged the almost inevitability of their being requested to 
volunteer, in light of their demonstrable disposition for such. As such, the voluntarism 
paradigm was not questioned per se, which meant in the Kibindu context that the 
Tanzanian developmental state remained intact. The issues that volunteers encountered 
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related rather to some of voluntarism’s ancillary assumptions, on the part of external 
developers but also on the part of the village community, of which I note three. 
The first and foremost assumption in Kibindu, as in Kiharaka, was the failure on the 
part of government and non-government agents alike to acknowledge the opportunity 
costs of volunteering. This manifested itself primarily through the perennial debate on 
allowances. Voluntary Partnership International’s model of engagement was the clearest 
target of criticism in this regard, in that they recruited large numbers of volunteers but 
without providing what was perceived as the necessary support to do the task. Indeed, 
one VPI officer drew on its district council sanction to deflect demands for allowances 
in Kibindu. 
The knock-on costs of this stance were compounded, in the Kibindu context, by the 
sheer geographical scale of the ward, requiring volunteers to cover scores of kilometres 
whilst nominally remaining in the same village. As the WEO remarked: 
These TOTs and animators, when they go to these seminars, when they return here 
they don’t have the means to undertake their activities. They are ready, with the 
material in their heads and they have the ability to do it, but to go from one place to 
another, to move to the village, they don’t have any support.263 
Furthermore, as Athumani detailed, VPI’s lack of allowance provision outside of 
training inevitably led to an erosion of motivation as well as ability to undertake the 
work. When asked whether the Most Vulnerable Children (MVC) committee was 
functioning, to which his role was central, he responded: 
A: The committee is working, but not to a big degree, because already the terms of 
volunteering are hard. 
K: They are tired…? 
A: They are tired. It’s got to the point where people are tired, for example if you go 
from here to get to another sub-village, at the border, it’s 24 kilometres. 
Athumani emphasized strongly the decrease in motivation following UNICEF’s 
departure, who recruited the first CJFs, and VPI’s subsequent entry and adoption: 
In truth, after UNICEF left, VPI came in - but with VPI, it’s got to the point where 
they are undermining motivation, because you can’t do that and have a normal life 
[…] so in truth their approach is good, in that education has already reached lots of 
people, but already those empowered [to train], they should have better conditions, to 
                                                             




energize them to take the message to the community. Now what’s missing is when 
they come, they lose motivation, I go and there’s nothing even to eat, it’s a problem, 
so now what you get is people just taking the exercise books [where they record 
activity], looks at it himself and then just puts it somewhere [laughs].264 
Fatuma, less sceptical of the voluntarism ethos than Athumani, had a similar view over 
the lack of allowances. When asked how she viewed VPI’s approach she responded at 
length, as a Trainer of Trainers (TOT), i.e. recruited to train others as facilitators: 
OK, so VPI have volunteered for a long time and us too, we’ve volunteered for a long 
time. But the issue that’s intensified is that VPI, as VPI, is a voluntary organization, 
meaning when you leave the training, say you’ve already been trained in how to take 
the message again to the targeted groups, it becomes tough. You’ve been to the 
training, you get maybe six thousand [shillings] per day, to sleep five thousand, and 
whatever else, it totals fifteen thousand that you get there in Lugoba, when you return 
you get your fare to get you back, but when you get back here you’re stuck! 
Kwamduma you need a piki piki, fifteen thousand there and back, to go to Kwamsanja 
the same. You need to get the piki piki fare, otherwise the empowerment of the 
villages will be low. We complained that we that we wanted the villages [covered] 
also…So, we want them [VPI] to visit these village leaderships, so that they know that 
there are TOTs, there are animators [facilitators] so that when they ask for help that 
they are actually there, working, when they need any assistance from them, that they 
help us so we can reach the community. Otherwise, it’s the opposite, we’re stuck. VPI 
doesn’t give support to say that ‘you’ll go around your ward, maybe we’ll give you 
something, we’ll support you with some shillings’ – there’s nothing. And then, us 
TOTs, because for those upcoming seminars in this area, our ward, they could use us 
as facilitators, then you get some money to leave your other business, but it’s started 
now that even for facilitation, the facilitators come from Bagamoyo or Lugoba, or 
where, so you, you just remain behind as a TOT, waiting for information […] So, this 
too really damages morale to work, you know it’s my work completely, but I can’t do 
what’s expected.265 
Fatuma was highlighting the lack of recognition, of reciprocity, on the part of VPI but also 
local village governments, with regard to the financial and opportunity costs volunteers 
are asked to bear. This served to delegitimate the intervention to some degree over time. 
In addition, there was a lack of logical integrity within the project, whereby VPI seen to 
be investing in training but not implementation. 
Several volunteers highlighted this disparity of conditions or assumptions. For seasoned 
volunteer Mosi, for example, VPI was not necessarily practising what they would have 
their volunteers preach: 
We do voluntary work but it’s different now…if you look at VPI when they started, 
we were the first animators in Bagamoyo, but that time when it started it was much 
more intense…But now, that strength has decreased. And if you look at what we’re 
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talking about, issues of various rights etc., of mothers, of women and children, but 
those rights we’re talking about, they should be extended to those called to the training, that he 
gets his rights!266 
Haamid noted a similar disjuncture: 
I can see that they [VPI] go through a lot of expenditure, but then their allowances are 
really low.267 
This disparity in how external agencies viewed allowances as compared to volunteers 
themselves was underpinned by a number of interrelated assumptions: firstly that there 
were fewer demands on villagers’ time, both volunteers and their intended audience. 
This often collapsed, as explored, into time-old tropes regarding laziness and an inability 
to self-help. As the government Community Development Officer asked rhetorically, 
‘when these programmes finish, who will help you?’ Similarly, to return to the words of 
the VPI programme officer on my first trip to Kibindu: 
They are supposed to train and educate others but at the end of the day, they don’t sit 
[i.e. convene]. When the wazungu come they [volunteers] expect to be paid, to receive 
allowances, even to volunteer here in Tanzania. It’s a big problem. We try to explain 
that the wazungu will return to their own place but the problems will still be here in the 
village. 
The staff here alluded to the familiar (post-)colonial tropes of community inertia, greed 
and materialism, short-sightedness and ignorance. These tropes depend in turn on the 
devaluation of people’s time, whereby training and voluntary work do not incur a 
significant opportunity cost. These assumptions are inevitably repackaged in the 
language of an aspirational ‘sustainability’, whereby the project is set to continue after 
funding has ceased. In such cases, the contradiction of development agencies 
establishing claims of both their indispensability and expendability is not recognized. 
The devaluation of people’s time was particularly acute in the case of young people. 
Community Development Innovation Professionals (CDIP), as noted, took a ‘peer 
education’ approach and had recruited three young people in their late teens in Kibindu, 
again via the WEO. CDIP had had several visits to Kibindu, which had, in the eyes of 
the WEO at least, served to differentiate itself from the deficient approach of Youth 
Health. In the middle of May 2013, a key time for working the fields and preparing for 
harvest, a CDIP programme officer called one volunteer, Mavuto, to tell them of his 
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visit. The three did not go to the fields that day, staying close to home and the village 
waiting for him to arrive. The officer, however, did not arrive that day. This extract is 
taken from fieldnotes on the following day: 
I called Mavuto several times and he said in the morning that they [CDIP] were 
coming but by the afternoon they had had information that it had been postponed 
until the following day [the 16th]. Again, I spoke with Mavuto in the morning and at 
that point he said he had no further information. By the time I called again around 
2.30pm he said he had heard that the contact had left Mbwewe and was heading 
towards Kibindu. ‘Great’ I said, ‘I’ll be there in half an hour’. 
When I arrived at Rahema’s house, she and Mavuto were already there and Majuto 
arrived soon after. This time they were confident the CDIP contact had got on a piki 
piki from Mbwewe and was en route. They had the form, they were all wearing their 
[CDIP] t-shirts; we seemed set. For the first hour, we sat chatting happily. Majuto had 
some more questions: whether our monarchical system was democratic; whether neo-
colonialism was still at work in Tanzania, given how people were still so poor as the 
few got very rich; whether I had experienced any kinds of racial discrimination. Four 
o’clock came and went – a short shower of rain prompted us to return to speculate on 
the CDIP staff’s travel. They still seemed confident he would arrive but I was starting 
to have my doubts that the return trip would be possible by this time […] 
Finally, at 5.30pm Rahema received a call. She listened and at one point exclaimed in 
surprise. The CDIP was still at Kwamsanja, saying he had had three punctures, he was 
tired and he had no money to continue the journey. He was asking Rahema or one of 
the volunteers to board a piki piki to take the form to Kwamsanja. ‘How much is it?’ 
Rahema asked the others. I said five [thousand shillings]. The others said seven one 
way. Eventually the CDIP rep said he would call back. 
After the call, the three young vols looked frustrated at each other. ‘Ah, it’s so 
annoying’, said Mavuto. ‘Majakumu!’ exclaimed Rahema, ‘responsibilities!’ ‘You know’, 
said Mavuto, ‘this is a hard time for work. It’s the season of hunger, we have a lot of 
responsibilities, our families. Two days ago, they said tomorrow morning. We were 
here, we were waiting. Then they said this morning…and now…’ 
As we walked back, I commented how I thought these things happen but how people 
should always give information. ‘Ah it’s normal’ he responded, ‘that’s how it is’, the 
irritation already leaving his shoulders. ‘You asked us the challenges!’ he laughed, 
‘these are the challenges’. Another call came in – the form should be given to the bus 
driver leaving at 1am to be received by the CDIP officer at the bus stop in Dar. So, 
still more communications to be done and the work of submitting the form stretches 
into a third day.268 
The second assumption, in conjunction with this devaluation of volunteers’ time on the 
part of developers, was the familiar expectation that communities themselves would 
provide the necessary recognition and endorsement of volunteers’ efforts. Given the 
questions that arose regarding the relevance of training initiatives, in relation to villagers’ 
own priorities, explored under representation, volunteers did not often experience 
                                                             




endorsement from the broader communities; indeed, it was often the contrary. The 
Village Executive Officer, for instance, denied VPI’s existence in the village at all, which 
the WEO surmised was due to VPI not offering a specific ‘service’.269 This lack of 
recognition reaffirmed the need to look to external developers for such, which in turn 
augmented the debate over allowances. 
The third assumption, related to both of these, was that communities formed an organic 
whole, of which volunteers formed a seamless part. The very notion of a community 
volunteer requires that such community both pre-exists and also can be moved in a 
particular direction on a set of issues. This further assumes that volunteers can endlessly 
detach themselves from and relocate themselves back into that context. As such, the 
individualistic liberalism of the human rights framework clashes with the simultaneous 
invocation of the community collective and its imputed conservative fabric. 
The tension between these two positions was experienced, if not embodied, by 
volunteers in the day to day. Mosi, as explored in representation, was an ardent 
supporter of rights-based education, and yet mindful of the disjuncture with what 
members of his community told him they actually wanted, namely agricultural inputs. 
Similarly, Haamid was frustrated with the lacklustre efforts of his fellow trainees and 
their ‘slowness’ to uptake such education. He distanced himself from those who failed 
to embrace these new areas of learning: 
You get these ideas that stick, my dad did this, so I’ll do this as well, so the ideas get 
stuck in your head. Now, if we get education, we can increase, that the next 
generations come to know that, hey, there is this [alternative], then bam, people can 
adjust themselves.270 
At the same time, he empathized, in the case of HIV/AIDS, with a more general 
experience of ‘message fatigue’, to the neglect of other issues. Adira and Ruwa, who 
were keen to share their new education with peers, were continually thwarted by those 
who did not recognize or trust their efforts. Whilst the WEO, therefore emphasized that 
volunteers were ‘one of our own’, bolstering claims of descriptive representation, the 
work was often obstructed or denigrated by Others in the community. It is, of course, a 
truism to state that any given ‘community’, particularly one as geographically dispersed 
as Kibindu, has disparate interests, allegiances and expectations. Such diffusion is not, 
                                                             
269 Fieldnotes, Kibindu VEO, 29 April 2013. 




however, a reality that a community volunteer model accommodates well, especially 
with regard to an intervention as intangible as human rights. 
To summarize, voluntarism is a powerful template of public action and one that 
proffers a considerable amount of symbolic capital in different forums as virtue; as 
consent; as reciprocity; as extensity; and/or as representation. Whilst voluntarism as 
virtue was a limited register in the district forum, highlighting a disparity of resource and 
capacity between those positioned as voluntary and those they solicited, it formed a 
strong component for volunteers themselves in Kibindu. This comprised both the 
opportunity to contribute to the immediate civic sphere, but also an endorsement of the 
opportunity to learn and share experiences with others. Such a civic, public realm is no 
longer given adequate consideration in much analysis of African state and society 
(Dodworth, forthcoming) and yet is resilient in the Tanzanian political imagination 
(Hunter 2014). The important addendum, however, in Kibindu as much of Tanzania, is 
that the civic, virtuous sphere is shared, and indeed co-produced, by state and non-state 
actors like.  
In such a context, the (neo)liberal ideal of consent falls away, again replaced by concerns 
of reciprocity and recognition of one’s civic efforts. The challenge for volunteers, 
therefore, as projects progressed, was in the conditions of such work and the 
distribution of the fruits of their labour. NGOs package community based volunteers to 
donors as key to long-term, sustainable strategies of behavioural change. Volunteers 
bestow an institutionalized presence, extensity by proxy, bolstering claims of scale, 
reciprocity and of course consent. Despite the benefits conferred to organizations, 
however, volunteers in Kibindu as in Kiharaka shared their frustrations at the lack of 
recognition, most manifest in the debate over allowances. The disparity between 
upwards representations of voluntary work and the perceptions of volunteers in the 
everyday served to delegitimate NGOs to a certain degree. Most volunteers alluded to 
the unfairness of resource allocation, where the personhood they advocate for others is 
denied to them. Such dynamics were often replicated as volunteers sought to work 
within their communities, at times thwarted or rejected as interests were seen to diverge. 
Such events laid bare the contradiction for volunteers to both remove and relocate 
themselves into their community environment in a bid to both act for and stand for 







This chapter sought to foreground legitimation as a negotiated practice, but one that 
reconfigures in response to local conditions. Within the sparsely populated, 
geographically expansive ward of Kibindu, located at the furthest outreaches of 
Bagamoyo district, there lay considerable legitimation through the sheer act of arrival. 
Those few organizations who made the journey, especially if on a regular basis, 
experienced considerably more ‘room to govern’ than in Kiharaka of the preceding 
chapter. Legitimation, although intrinsically ephemeral and partial in product, 
nevertheless became clearer cut, with stronger contrast between those that successfully 
crafted such space and those who remained ‘playing with’ or hanging out in the district.  
Extensity, therefore, as the projection of scale and presence primarily through the 
monitoring visit, proved a crucial legitimation practice that divided NGOs into those 
who arrived frequently, those who had arrived at one time and those, like Youth Health, 
who had never done so. Arrival under such circumstances was a highly visible event, 
legitimating in and of itself, symbolic in conveying an egalitarianism between the more 
urban and most remote wards within the district. In this respect, Tanzania’s socialist 
past continued to resonate strongly in the present, whereby egalitarianism across rural 
areas was still anticipated and solicited (Aminzade 2013, p163; also Kamat 2008). 
Extensity’s counterpoint territoriality, therefore, as the creation and enforcement of 
boundaries around sub-spheres of influence within Kibindu, was not as pertinent under 
such conditions. Whilst there was indeed potential for such, given currents between the 
ward’s three villages, on the whole this practice fell away as a basis for legitimation 
practice. 
Furthermore, under these conditions and again in contrast to Kiharaka, the state’s 
oversight and intervention was solicited and welcomed by many of its leaders and 
volunteers. This meant that VPI’s positioning as part of the district apparatus served to 
legitimate it strongly to these leaders, as part of the enduring, highly symbolic 
developmental state. Under such conditions, there was considerably less demand for an 




net effect was quite the contrary, with VPI co-extending and thus co-producing the 
Tanzanian state in effecting ‘development for their people’. This is part of what Migdal 
and Schlichte would term ‘doing the state’ (2005, p14), although such techne are 
situational and never fixed in form. 
VPI’s extensity in arriving in Kibindu, in conjunction with the district council as the 
bureaucratic arm of the state, conveyed an egalitarianism between wards reminiscent of 
the purported comradery of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. This, in turn, proffered claims of a 
representational proximity ‘to the people’, which were of high legitimation value to 
VPI in district and international forums. In practice, however, as Nyerere’s project 
before it, alignment with the state replicates strong hierarchies. In this case, again unlike 
Kiharaka, such hierarchies are in the main acknowledged, endorsed and therefore 
reinforced: ‘he at the absolute lowest level, who doesn’t know anything’. Whilst they 
continue to be negotiated, they are done so from within existing parameters rather than 
rejected outright. This echoes a Bourdieusian conception of the field, whereby existing 
socio-political stratifications are contested but ultimately endure. 
Lastly, voluntarism is a powerful template of public action and one that proffers a 
considerable amount of symbolic capital in different forums. Whilst it is a multifaceted 
legitimation practice at the district and international levels, however, it is one 
predominated in Kibindu by its association with civic virtue. Such a sphere is co-
produced by both state and non-state, blurring divisions between such domains and 
consciously participated in by volunteers themselves. This civic realm is not given 
adequate consideration in many analyses of state and society in Africa, yet remains 
highly visible in the Tanzanian political imagination. Where negotiations within this 
realm break down, however, is not over questions of consent but of value reciprocity; 
where volunteers’ efforts are not acknowledged slowly serves to delegitimate 
organizations over time. 
These practices, in summary, are variegated, melding the material with a strongly 
discernible ideational component. It is important not to neglect the power of such ideas, 
in the rush to render them legible via familiar logics of ‘doing’ African politics. These 
logics include strategies of extraversion, neopatrimonialism and/or (neo)liberal 
governmentality, which foreground elites and their predominately material interests 




augments the continued neglect of the symbolism of the ‘public’ and the variegated 
practices that constitute it. In short, ideas matter (Mkandawire 2015, p598). Ideas are 
critical to understanding how public authority is actualized, legitimated and negotiated in 
the everyday. Whether organizations are legitimate enough to act depends on a 
(positive) balance between these practices, which strongly interrelate. It is therefore to 














Legitimation as spatialized practice 
 
This thesis foregrounded public authority as the legitimation of power; as such, it 
remains intrinsically one of politics. It began with the broadening of understanding 
power in the late modern era, which has been well-theorized and researched. This 
domain, via the practice turn, has benefitted in particular from the legacies of Foucault 
and Bourdieu. What has been neglected, however, is the empirical exposition of the 
ways and means by which such power is legitimated in the everyday. Public authority, at 
least in the Weberian sense, is the legitimated exercise of power that seeks forms of 
behaviour and/or compliance (1968; also Bulkeley 2012, p2429; Lake 2010; Lund 
2006a). If new understandings, or excavations, of the workings of power have been 
conceded in politics, expansively defined, then the study of legitimation must broaden 
accordingly. This can only enrich the study of politics and international relations (PIR), 
bridging cleavages between it and multidisciplinary debates. This is not solely about 
facilitating the ‘travel’ of PIR to its hitherto geographical, and indeed theoretical, 
margins (Death 2013; also Cornelissen et al. 2012). It is rather to return with vigour to 
the centrality of legitimation as experienced by the governed in ‘most of the world’ 
(Chatterjee 2004): to Africa as ‘global condition’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, p125). 
This thesis, therefore, made the case for scrutinizing legitimation as practice: an 
accumulative process of claim-making. It converged with Barker’s exposition of claim-
making only briefly, in its self-declared empiricism regarding this ‘central feature of 
governing’ (2001, p13). The necessary, indeed extensive, addendum to Barker is that 
legitimation is not an insulated, ‘self-referential’ practice of rulers. Conceptions of the 
full breadth of political legitimation, to date, have been confounded by conflations of 
‘governing’ with formal ‘government’. Legitimation is rather undertaken by a range of 
state and non-state actors in a range of forums within the will to govern. It is, 
furthermore, an interactive process, which demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in 
the affirmation or rejection of such claims. Emboldened by the practice turn, I strove to 




its replication and contestation at different scales, remained hitherto absent from work 
that ultimately sought to ground legitimacy in normative universals, not least that of 
Barker. 
In a sense, however, this thesis has a normativism, indeed ‘humanism’ (Denzin 2017, 
p10), of its own. This humanism is grounded in its attempt to incorporate the governed 
as well as governor, or more precisely, relations of governing. Legitimation is negotiated and 
contested; it does not signify the unmediated view of the most powerful, nor its 
automated, ‘primordial’ consumption. Practices are rather a point of meaningful, self-
conscious reflection over pre-reflexivity, for the governed as much as governor. And 
when practices are absent, those who undertake and negotiate them are also absent, 
whether or not I as researcher can represent them as ‘truth’. I advocated, therefore, for 
the arsenal of critical ethnography as part of interpretative praxeology, multi-sited in 
content and form in bringing the ‘how’ of (global) governance to the fore. 
Ethnography’s hallmark participant observation, or rather ‘negotiated interactive 
observation’ (Wind 2008), echoed the multipositionality of (self-)legitimation itself: the 
dual process of moving inside and out. This demanded a degree of reflexivity and meta-
analysis, but also a relinquishing of truth. Its thetical truth, therefore, remains merely 
that legitimation is a necessary condition of authority and the multifarious forms of 
governance it precipitates. Its content, however, remains contingent, shaped by the 
peculiarities of the field and I fully embraced that contingency and, indeed, partiality. 
Aided, therefore, by a working, or ‘informed’ reflexivity (Davies 2012), I sought to bring 
the multipositionality of contemporary legitimation practice to the fore. Placing 
positionality as central to analysis, in turn, highlighted legitimation as a contested, at 
times contradictory process. Lund’s ‘countervailing currents’ (2006b, p699) thus formed 
the empirical mainstay of this project. In addition, its key findings underscored the 
profoundly and symbolically spatialized nature of legitimation in negotiating inside and 
out; proximity and distance; entreaty and repudiation; Us and Others. Legitimation 
comprises a diverse, highly symbolic set of practices. It is deeply performative in 
creating and sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through the symbolic positioning vis-
à-vis other actors. It demands the continual entreaty and repudiation of (re)constructed 




geography are as critical as more purist renderings of ‘politics’ in answering how actors, 
both state and non-state, craft the space in which to govern. 
This demanded that the thesis moved well beyond the technical managerialism that has 
hitherto dominated the debate regarding the legitimacy of non-state actors, especially 
NGOs. The ‘tickbox’ formulation of legitimacy reduces such to a collection of discrete, 
rule-based events such as audits, consultations and evaluations, a ‘democratic deficit’ to 
be redressed. This reduction had rendered the state of the debate distinctly poorer. 
Indeed, it discloses, on interrogation, a Westernized, deliberately abstracted brand of 
liberal democracy at the heart of the established inter-national order. This has proven to 
be at the expense of understanding how ‘global’ actors, including NGOs, create the 
space in which to operate and in which to exercise their own forms of governance. It 
neglects the role that actors under the rubric of development, both nominally state and 
non-state, play in the production and reproduction of subtler forms of legitimacy in 
their everyday work. Legitimation demands substantial, albeit less visible, work and 
indeed creativity on the part of NGOs, As such, this is demonstrably an exercise in 
‘craft over compliance’ (Dodworth 2014, p22). 
The Bagamoyo case study provided ample reasons why a Politics and International 
Relations thesis should care about NGOs and their constituents in coastal Tanzania. 
First and foremost, Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations 
since its ‘liberalization’ in the 1990s, neatly mirrored in Bagamoyo. This proliferation has 
reinserted the global into the local and vice versa, in new and adaptive ways. Such 
insertions haves indeed rearticulated verticalized development hierarchies: the 
‘brokerage’ chain (Bierschenk & Sardan 2003, p163; also Lewis & Mosse 2006) or 
‘contracted cosmopolitanism’ (Mercer & Green 2013). They have also led, however, to 
pronounced lateral collaboration and competition between organizations, particularly at 
the district level, thus precipitating similarly competitive legitimation. This leads to the 
second point, whereby districts themselves provide a distinct ‘field’ of legitimation 
practice, both geographical and notional. ‘Districtization’ in Tanzania, whereby situated 
elites have reconfigured around government centres, demands that development actors 
position themselves laterally vis-à-vis both peers and local government, even if not 
relations of equality. Lastly, Tanzania, as in African Studies more broadly, informs a rich 




lateral as well as vertical aspect. This case thus provides, whilst uniquely Tanzanian, a 
microcosm of the reconstituting public, as experienced in much of the world. Thus, IR’s 
tendency towards abstraction must be tempered by detailed, ‘local’ fieldwork to make 




The thesis asked how NGOs as non-state actors legitimate their authority to act within 
contemporary configurations of governance. The empirical work, across three locales 
and both district and village scales, brought the practices of extensity; territoriality; 
state; representation and voluntarism to the fore. Each of these appeared in some 
guise in each of the three locales. Each of these holds a strong ideational as well as 
material component. Each of these practices, as part of the ideational, has a symbolic 
spatiality, bringing the importance of positionality and locale to the fore. Each of these 
practices, as viewed from the district level, involves the construction and maintenance 
of lateral constituencies, which included other NGOs, the civil society umbrella and 
local government. It also involves vertical practices, upwards towards donors and the 
international but also, not least, towards their intended subjects of rule. These practices 
thus demand a considerable amount of interstitial work, laterally and vertically. Such 
practices, however, are situational, demanding the continued repudiation and 
affirmation of Others, even within the space of a single encounter. Such oscillation 
encapsulates the deeply symbolic and spatialized nature of legitimation’s countervailing 
currents. 
Symbolic spatiality 
Nowhere was symbolic spatiality more prominent than in the practices of extensity, as 
well as its counterpoint territoriality. Extensity, at the district level, comprised claims to 
be operational in, and/or to extend to, all wards and, for some, all villages. NGOs 
projected geographical ubiquity through signs, maps and claims enshrined in district 




scale across as well as at depth into the ward: the capacity ‘to go down’.271 Countervailing 
extensity, however, were territorial practices in constructing and maintaining an 
exclusionary ‘turf’ (Sikor & Lund 2009, p14) or ‘terrain’ (Elden 2010). Such turf could 
admit formal administrative levels, such as the village, which may be ‘imagined’ but 
retain social meaning. Indeed, such levels form part of constructing, claiming and 
counter-claiming the local. Territoriality could also comprise indirect claims via 
particular groups or partners, such as the membership-based UWAMABA or Gender-
Net. Irrespective of content, however, territoriality necessarily comprises an inclusion of 
some to the exclusion of others. As such, territoriality and extensity proved, in these 
cases, to be competing forms of spatial power. 
Chapters Four and Five examined the replication of these spatialized practices at scales. 
In Chapter Four’s Kiharaka, territoriality came to the fore, eclipsing extensity. In such 
a politicized, congested and polarizing environment, claims of spatio-temporal extensity 
resident at the district level strongly contrasted with a picture of flux and discontinuity, 
particularly within Kiharaka village. This strongly contested space, between NGO and 
government, formal and informal, meant that loyalties and turfs mattered. Sometimes 
this ran along the grain of formalized, bureaucratic boundaries; sometimes this was 
informal. Either way, countervailing currents were very much cognizant to leaders and 
volunteers in the day-to-day as they sought to navigate civic sensibilities, organizational 
demands and, most importantly, precarious livelihoods. In Kiharaka, the territorialized 
Advocates International was at the direct expense of Voluntary Partnership 
International (VPI) and its state-like uniformity. 
In distant Kibindu, in Chapter Five, the situation regarding these two international 
NGOs was quite the contrary. There was a distinct lack of ‘arrival’ for the most part of 
those claiming operations throughout the district. This yielded, for those who made the 
journey, increased space to govern. Arrival, primarily the domain of VPI and secondarily 
that of the district council, was a much more symbolic event. This symbolism admitted 
of a perceived equity between village and town; rural and oppidan. Indeed, Tanzania’s 
socialist past resonated in the presence, whereby the egalitarian provision of public 
services across villages was still anticipated and solicited (Aminzade 2013, p163). VPI’s 
arrival, too infrequent in the minds of Kiharaka’s leadership, was thus exceptional in 
                                                             




Kibindu, placing it ahead of its peers as uniquely ‘alive’.272 Whilst there was the potential 
for future territoriality within Kibindu ward, fuelled by inter-village politics, it largely fell 
away in favour of extensity as a basis for legitimation in this context. 
At the nub of these divergent legitimation trajectories were divergent relations between 
these two villages and the state.273 Both villages housed leaderships with natural 
misgivings about the capacity of outsiders to deliver real and relevant benefits to 
residents. In remote Kibindu, however, despite trials with district-appointed officers in 
the past, villagers retained cautious optimism about the potential of the developmental 
state. Developmentalism, via the state and its purported egalitarianism, was thus quietly 
solicited, with Nyerere’s legacy still fundamentally intact. VPI thus contributed 
unproblematically to the state’s co-production in Kibindu, whereby ‘everyone’s goal was 
the same’.274 Many within peri-urban Kiharaka, however, spurned the state-like practices 
of both district and VPI, due to the state’s more limited repercussions for lives and 
livelihoods. The explicit rejection of VPI in that context, manifestly via rejection of its 
volunteers, was an indirect repudiation of the district and, in turn, the development state 
as a template for meaningful improvements in villagers’ lives. 
At the same time, loyalties and hierarchies are fluid and situated. State relations, 
therefore, were not concrete allegiances: some duly exhibiting ‘legitimation as being part 
of government’ (Green 2010, p19), whilst some through its negation in favour of a new 
developmental template. All NGOs partook in the entreaty as well as repudiation of 
Others, a process that necessarily included the state in the form of the district council. 
INGO Advocates International assumed a conciliatory, ‘partnership’ stance alongside 
the district at times, as well as its more familiar antagonistic ‘advocacy’ role at others. 
Voluntary Partnership International could be ‘state-like’, manifest in its ‘verticality’ 
(Gupta & Ferguson 2002) high aloft of Kiharaka, whilst at others through its successful 
proximity and localization, extending deep into Kibindu’s systems of governance. These 
twin processes of entreaty and repudiation, of symbolic proximity and distance, form 
part of ‘how it works: in and out, in and out’.275 
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And so, these spatialized forms of power work though, by and indeed against the state. 
Similarly, the symbolic spatiality of representation, negotiating inside/out, 
proximity/distance and, ultimately, to stand for/act for Others, proved particularly stark 
in this coastal case study. NGO staff at the district level consistently emphasized claims 
of proximity as ‘voice of the people’,276 in the face of government neglect. Yet, in the final 
reckoning, NGOs were similarly bound to concede distance, as the necessary custodians 
of the people and their interests. This persistent need to act for a certain constituency, 
hindered by their own barriers to self-development, is long embedded in the colonial 
and post-colonial discourse. ‘Empire as tutelage’ (Hunter 2015, p88) is to this day 
replicated at scales, as mainlander Tanzanian developmentalists lament of ‘these 
people!’, ‘just sitting’ in the face of benevolent intercession (Dodworth 2016). 
This colonial-like encounter is replicated at times with great subtlety: a movement from 
‘we’ to ‘they’, ‘descriptive’ to ‘substantive’ representation, on the part of even the most 
outwardly progressive NGOs. This vacillation between proximity and distance was in 
turn replicated by individual ward and village volunteers themselves, in legitimating their 
own authority. Volunteers were assumed, and crucially claimed, by district NGOs to be 
at the heart of every community, conferring proximity, extensity and reciprocity. Such 
volunteers, however, were similarly obliged to craft representational distance from their 
peers, as claims to knowledge, interests and ‘civicness’ inevitably diverged. 
Representation thus remains a negotiation between these positionalities that have 
endured within developmentalism for centuries. The distance of acting for Others, 
however, ultimately wins out, particularly when situations of uncertainty solicit a more 
authoritative stance: ‘they cling to their issues of the past’.277 Representational practice, 
however, is not automated in its consumption. It is negotiated, contested and indeed 
rejected: ‘You come to educate us!’278 
Lastly, the words of volunteers have been central throughout the empirical chapters. 
Their testimony demonstrates how voluntarism, a resurgent legitimation device within 
neoliberal development work, is nonetheless variegated and multifaceted in Tanzania. 
Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving unsalaried time and effort towards a common good, 
does indeed resonate with the globalized regime of good governance and its demands of 
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an active citizenry. Nevertheless, it is hybridized in the Tanzanian context, drawing on 
multiple registers; global and local; colonial and contemporary; state and non-state; 
ideational and of course material. At a district level, those who staffed local NGOs, 
typically on a piecemeal, ambiguously ‘voluntary’ basis, may well have legitimated 
themselves upwards via voluntarism to certain constituencies in some respects. 
However, local NGOs that emphasized their voluntary nature brought materially little 
to the district table, thus delegitimating and foreclosing lateral avenues of influence. 
Nonetheless, impecunious local NGOs clung to their voluntary networks in the face of 
sparse funding, as a tidemark of their previous actuality. The social infrastructure of 
voluntary networks proffers institutional spatio-temporal presence, extending beyond 
the life of the conventional project. 
Voluntarism at a village level, however, instilled multifaceted civic compacts, towards 
organizations, the district, village leaderships, communities and even the ‘self’, which 
were difficult to fulfil. It is again spatialized in that volunteers, navigating both civic lives 
and material livelihoods, work ‘interstitially’ (Mercer & Green 2013) to link 
constituencies as well as discursive regimes. Whilst there were key differences between 
the two villages, the twin motifs of community- and self-development were strongly 
discernible amongst both sets of volunteers. Rather than speaking to Lockean ideals of 
consent, volunteers were rather explicit about their motivations to offer time and effort 
within the established, if faltering, civic sphere, as well as towards their own personal 
‘development’. Such work, however, was conditional on both its value 
acknowledgement, via its various constituencies, as well as remaining within the 
boundaries of a ‘normal life’.279 Indeed, the irony that recent interventions in the name 
human rights could circumvent such boundaries was laid bare. Once such social 
compacts erode, volunteers of course find their own strategies of silence, subversion 
and withdrawal, regardless of what formal arrangements remain in place. 
Interstitiality, morality and agency 
Each of these practices, therefore, precipitates the construction and management of 
multiple constituencies. This process of entreaty and repudiation demands ‘interstitial’ 
work not just vertically, as per Mercer & Green (2013) (echoing Ferguson and Gupta 
[2002]), but laterally within villages, wards and districts, as people work to ‘fold in’ 
                                                             




Others (Allen 2016). This is not, as noted, to imply a field of equal players, but rather 
that actors must look laterally as well as vertically up to donors and down towards their 
intended subjects. The notions of space, locale and spatialized politics are thus helpful 
when conceiving of legitimation in the everyday, as crafting the space in which to 
govern. The will to act for/stand for Others, centre stage in representational practice, is 
thus of broader relevance to the (post)colonial condition. Colonialism, or more 
accurately alterity and the practice of Othering that underpins it, admits of scales. In this 
case, it is on the part of inland elites’ efforts to develop the ‘backwater’ of Bagamoyo. It 
is as ubiquitous, however, in the governing of under-served and under-represented 
groups in any part of the world, from The Bronx to Bangladesh, Kenya to Kensington. 
This thesis, however, whilst informed by the insights of post-colonialism and its 
poststructuralist forbearers, does not embark on an unmoderated excavation of 
governmentality and the will to govern. The prevailing thrust of textual poststructuralist 
work, as explored in Chapter One, has not paid sufficient empirical attention to the 
individual, albeit situated, agency of people in their day to day lives. The notion of NGO 
as neo-colonizer, for instance, neglected the appropriation, contestation and reassembly 
of power and authority in context. Furthermore, whilst insights regarding the 
inextricable link between power and knowledge are well-taken, we do people and their 
politics a disservice in reducing public interaction to the pursuit of material interest or 
indeed power. Materiality of course ran through each of the legitimation themes, with 
the ‘politics of distribution’ (Ferguson 2015) playing a crucial role in the 
acknowledgement and reciprocity of value. To render such, however, as subordinate to 
familiar logics of ‘African’ politics, notably strategies of extraversion and its various 
tweaks, serves to sustain the monotonous narrative of the continent’s predatory elites. 
Such analyses lose sight of the enduring symbolism of the public sphere in many 
contexts and, indeed, of the variegated matrices of social action more broadly. 
This thesis thus endeavoured to retain sight of the public, the untold ‘concerns for the 
public good’ (Werbner 2004, p2), and its attendant civic sensibilities, in all their localized 
forms. This is in line with recent, indeed revisionist, efforts to rehabilitate such in the 
face of the corrosive, omnipotent neopatrimonialism (e.g. Englund 2011; Hunter 2008; 
2015; Macola 2010; Werbner 2004). It duly did so at the interface between developers 




particular content, traction and indeed resistance. In this way, it echoes Englund’s call to 
move from the mere ‘celebration of agency and resistance to harder questions’ (2013, 
p685). For Englund, these questions were around ‘the place that the liberal values of 
equality and freedom might have’ (ibid.) in the search for more progressive, but 
localized, forms of politics. For this thesis, the core question was the symbolic means 
more broadly, as ideational as material in content, through which development actors, 
including NGOs, create the space in which to govern. This must not, however, erase the 
governed from that space, but rather foreground how governor and governed enact, 
negotiate and at times contest this space and the claims that precipitated it. 
Whilst there is something demonstrably unique, therefore, in the symbolism of the 
public in Tanzania, there is nothing unique in how the public, and its supporting claims 
and obligations, are affirmed or contested in the everyday. A truly progressive politics 
would indeed be better served by placing the political practices of non-elites as centre 
frame as those of elites: a division that is itself contingent and situational. I argued, as 
others, that a methodological ‘middle way’ enables such a politics. This path applies 
insights from Foucauldian-inspired critical theorists, whilst affording methodological 
space to Bourdieusian-like practices of legitimation ‘claims’ in the everyday. The 
everyday indeed should not be overly romanticized as an ‘inherent locus of resistance’ 
(Guillaume 2011, p460) to presentations of global domination. Some resistance is 
‘volitional’, some ‘intentional’ (Scott 1985, p292) and some actions should not be 
deemed resistance at all, in the rush to aggrandize. Nevertheless, this hybridized sphere 
is inhabited by real, multi-dimensional people who live political and globalized lives, as 
well as localized social, cultural and economic ones. Efforts to foreground such lives’ 
content form an ethical challenge to the purportedly neutral division between high and 
low politics. This division has masked the violence of discursive structures - of 
‘abstraction’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003) – but also the agency of those who negotiate 







Each chapter mapped each legitimation theme along its respective ‘plane’, either laterally 
to peers or vertically towards ‘the governed’ and back, insofar as this geography holds. If 
this planar work at times replicated particular hierarchies, it was never its intention. Its 
intention was rather to bring legitimation and its interstitial work to the fore. 
Legitimation practices, whilst discernibly distinct, are intricately interrelated; they sit in 
congruence and at others in dissonance as the situation demands. 
The interrelationship between the six legitimation themes is portrayed in Figure 6.1 
below. The arrowed lines represent predominant relationships in the Tanzanian context, 
but do not map relationships exhaustively. Whilst materiality, as noted, cross-cuts all 








Figure 6.1: Linking legitimation practices 
 
Extensity and territoriality, for instance, in the case studies explored, appeared to be 
naturally antipodal: the former characterized by scale, depth and inclusivity, its 
counterpoint by boundaries and exclusivity. There are cases, however, principally at the 
level of the imagined nation-state, whereby territoriality and extensity have proven more 
congruous. States, made manifest through diverse practices and indeed actors, strive to 
extend up to and to subsume its purportedly sovereign borders. Indeed, the remote 
hinterlands must be governed even more strenuously than the metropolis; sovereignty, 
conventionally drawn, is challenged by and submit to tracts of fluidity, mobility and 
negotiation, of ‘space-of-flows’ (Ruggie 1993, p172) at the geographical margins. In such 




however, brought out most clearly in Kerege, are firstly that this is not necessarily so. 
Secondly, states are not the only actors to partake in such practices. 
The spatialized practices of extensity and territoriality are nonetheless customarily tied 
to the history of state-making, in all its forms. There is a strong and compelling corpus 
of literature in this regard (e.g. Allen 2003; 2016; Engel & Nugent 2010; Ferguson & 
Gupta 2002; Ruggie 1993; Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 2009), which applies to the 
Tanzanian case as any other. Nominal non-state actors, however, most vociferously 
NGOs, may borrow from existing bureaucratic boundaries in constructing their own 
exclusive turfs or they may move to construct new enclaves. They may choose state-like 
practices of extensity, as in the case of Voluntary Partnership International and, to a 
lesser extent, Youth Health, or they may eschew them as situations and resources allow, 
most notably in the case of Advocates International. Such practices, as Foucault 
illuminated regarding power more broadly, are situated and relational. Whilst the fluidity 
of the non-state is thus ceded, its positionality vis-à-vis the state remains nonetheless 
deliberately visible, interweaving different developmental templates in crafting the space 
to govern. 
The ability to extend to, indeed ‘encompass’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) one’s borders is 
in turn related to crafting superior claims to representation. There was a time when the 
perceived state monolith worked hard to monopolize claims to political representation 
in Tanzania (Aminzade 2013). Trade unions and women’s organizations struggled to 
gain meaningful autonomy from the ruling CCM (ibid., Geiger 1997; Shivji 2004; Tripp 
2000). Even as the numbers of NGOs burgeoned from the mid-1990s, the parameters 
of their engagement were initially policed effectively by CCM (Dodworth 2014, p26; 
Shivji 2004; 2007). There are indications of returning to the discernibly authoritarian 
control of dissent under new President Magufuli’s recent ‘bulldozer’ administration 
(Paget 2017). Nevertheless, contemporary modes of governance are able to fuse 
globalized templates such as ‘civil society’ with localized phenomena such as, in 
Tanzania, ‘districtization’, slowly prising representational claims from the exclusive grasp 
of once highly centralized government. Who now speaks for the ‘the people’ in 
Tanzania? ‘[W]ho is the national interest’ asked a key interlocutor, ‘and where?’280 
                                                             




For some informants, local government, in the form of the bureaucratic arm of the 
district council, extends to, speaks for and thus represents the people. Indeed, some 
claimed the district as authentically local: the ‘real’ grassroots.281 NGOs, such as the 
extensive VPI, are welcome to join in that work, co-producing the district in the eyes of 
its constituents. For others, the now defunct remnants of the development state must 
give way to the more authentic representational claims of burgeoning civil society, 
broadly defined. Thus, the local and its authenticity are constructed, claimed and 
counterclaimed at various scales, including the district, in crafting representational space 
to govern. These claims, however, are inherently partial, regardless of their situation and 
aspect. As Advocacy International staff conceded themselves, its leading-edge brand of 
advocacy was really ‘speaking through others’,282 whereby local champions voice words 
that originated elsewhere. AI thus indeed speaks for the people, but only when 
particular repertoires are successfully aligned. Representational claims must thus 
navigate between the established, state-like developmental template and innovated, 
neoliberal-like competitors. Indeed, as brought out most clearly in Chapter Five’s 
Kibindu, contemporary human rights work, in continually asking villagers to fulfil civic 
duties in demanding rights, masks broader question as to whether government has 
fulfilled its basic duty to protect their citizens. Clouding representation may have real 
knock on effects in clouding responsibility. 
Similarly, in the case of voluntarism, the development orthodoxy in Tanzania 
demanded its congruity with the state. This has been strongly shaped, as most prominent 
in Chapter Five on Kibindu, by Tanzania’s socialist post-independence history, 
contrasting strongly with Westernized, idealized notions of the voluntary sector. 
Nevertheless, the interrelationship between the state and the non-state is not unique to 
the Tanzanian context. The ideas of the state and non-state strongly interrelate in 
(global) political practices more broadly, to the point of their co-production. The 
navigation between orthodox and pioneering developmental templates again demands a 
similar oscillation vis-à-vis voluntarism. This negotiation was manifest in its wholesale 
or partial adoption, as in the case of many of the volunteers whose words populate the 
village case studies of Chapters Four and Five. It was also manifest in the strong 
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interrogation, indeed explicit rejection, of voluntarist claims to public authority, even 
when state-sanctioned, most notably within Chapter Four’s Kerege. 
Lastly, all of these practices hold a strong material, as well as symbolic, component. 
Information itself is a resource: a source of economic capital and the most directly 
fungible into funding contracts. The politics of distribution (Ferguson 2015) was 
replicated at every level, from the construction and contestation of ‘truth’ in reporting 
development work at the village level, to the packaging of project success, innovation 
and exclusivity to international donors and back again. The politics of information-
gathering and sharing, most prominent in the HIV/AIDS district coordination meeting 
of Chapter Three, thus mapped onto that of public authority more broadly: who could 
ask others for ‘their information’. Extensity, territoriality, representation, voluntarism 
and, of course, governing the ostensible state, all have discernible material costs and are 
subject such distributive politics. Nevertheless, a core purpose of this thesis was to 
demonstrate that legitimation and its work is not reducible to material interest. The 
‘public’, in the name of which authority is (re)constructed, layers the ideational on to the 
material and back again, retaining a strong and indeed socio-politically meaningful 
component. 
 
Coda: a return to Politics and International Relations 
 
This thesis aligned itself with a relatively new area of IR research, whereby 
understanding world politics has gravitated away from a rather insular focus on the 
traditional ‘great powers’ (Waltz 1979, p73) and their inter-state relations, towards global 
phenomena as locally articulated. There are indeed established debates on the nature of 
‘Africa’s International Relations’ (Death 2015). Africa-oriented work has varied in 
approach as to whether Africa poses a fundamental ‘challenge’ to established IR theory 
(e.g. Dunn 2000; Dunn & Shaw 2001; Cornelissen et al. 2012; Nkiwane 2001); whether 
there are merely supplemental lessons for IR research (e.g. Lemke 2003, drawing on 
Clapham 1996; Englebert 2000 amongst others); or whether the ire driving much 
Africanist IR literature is something of a misdirect, meant for neorealism rather than an 




however, the hope is that ‘rich local research informed by extensive fieldwork can 
produce theoretical innovations’ (Death 2015, p6), in Africa and beyond. Theory 
production thus increasingly aspires to an ‘ex-centric’ vantage (Comaroff & Comaroff 
2012, p113), without erasing the situatedness of one’s view. 
The centrisms in IR, from which the Comaroffs seek to emancipate, have of course 
most prominently included that of the state. State-centrism, however, has been less 
eclipsed in this thesis than formed one part of legitimation practices in the everyday. This is 
not to reject the continuing efficacy of state power in the global system: far from it. 
Rather, it is an acknowledgement of new nexuses of governmental practice, within 
which both nominally state and non-state actors participate. Thus Migdal’s ‘state-in-
society’ approach points to the ‘process of interaction of groupings with one another and 
with those whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence’ (2001, p23, 
emphasis in original). Indeed, as explored in empirical detail, the once-definitive 
typologies of the state and non-state spheres carry less analytical weight than the ideas, 
norms and practices to which they give rise. There is the capacity within such a practice-
oriented approach to embrace complexity but also avoid pathology. It is more helpful to 
consider not what is exceptional about Africa, but what phenomena may be 
characteristic of broader shifts in the global order of things. 
The litmus test for this research will therefore be its generalizability. This is not, as 
argued in Chapter Two, generalizability in a scientific sense but in relation to the so-
termed single case’s ability to bear the exploration of the global. In this instance, it 
admits of two facets: firstly, that of applicability beyond Tanzania but secondly, and 
more ambitiously, beyond non-governmental organizations. With regard to the first, as 
argued in the opening chapter, the legitimation claims curated in this thesis are part of a 
reconfiguration of (global) governance as experienced by the governed in ‘most of the 
world’ (Chatterjee 2004). Public authority is produced, shared and contested by an 
increasingly disparate range of actors, converging around ‘templates’ of practice (Lund 
2006a, p675; also Best & Gheciu 2014; Collier & Ong 2005; Sassen 2006). Legitimation 
has evolved accordingly, around common symbolic practices, but which are locally 
multivalent in nature.  
With regard to the second, more challenging point of generalizability, insofar as non- 




on similar veins of symbolic capital, rearticulated in accordance with local contexts. 
Whilst it is up to the relevant area studies to give these practices historicized content, 
there will always be configurations of extensity/territoriality; the state/non-state; 
representation/exclusion; voluntarism/virtue; and materiality/resource. For more 
robustly ‘private’, profit-making organizations that increasingly encroach on once-
perceived public roles, such as: private military companies providing specialized security; 
mining and extraction companies contributing to infrastructure; or large-scale 
agriculture catalysing industrialization through local processing; the findings beckon 
additional research. Whilst declared goals and appropriate procedures between agencies 
thus will differ, however, this approach is intrinsically comparative in bringing such 
commonalities to the fore. The ‘how’ of global governance, so often eclipsed by the 
‘why’ of political science, compels us to examine ‘the techniques and practices, 
rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which governing 
operates’ (Dean 2010, p39). Each of these terms must be expansive in its remit but in 
addition, through the explicit and recurrent insertion of the collective, the panopticism 
of unmoderated Bourdieu or Foucault can be circumvented. 
As a final comment, this thesis’ thetical ‘truth’ remained consistent throughout: 
legitimation is a necessary condition of contemporary authority and the multifarious 
forms of governance it precipitates. Its analyses shared the foregrounding of not just 
types of actors, but of particular clusters of activity within the public at any one time. 
Practice, as ‘competent performances’, ‘simultaneously embody, act out, and…reify 
background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (Adler & Pouliot 
2011, p4).The exploration of such practices illuminates how the ‘global condition’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2012) p125) is actualized in the everyday. The public continues 
to evolve as a set of variegated, symbolic practices, in which the material and ideational 
meld. As legitimation as symbolic practice evolves accordingly, it remains crucial to 
closely scrutinize its content. This is in order to understand how public authority is 
actualized but also, most importantly, the repercussions for those whose lives are 
intervened upon on the basis of such claims. 
 
 261 
Appendix A: Preliminary interviews during scoping visit 
 
Interviews held during 2010-11 Masters by Research scoping visit 
Bagamoyo, May – June 2011 
Role(s) Type of organization Date Notes 
 
Senior administrative officer Bagamoyo District Assembly 27/5/2011 Overview on NGO activities, coordination and processes, administrative 
structure in Bagamoyo 
Senior manager INGO 28/5/2011 Overview on INGO’s activities, issues of coordination from INGO 
perspective, district specific challenges 
Senior manager NGO 28/5/2011 Discussion around NGO legitimacy from the village perspective, local 
understandings of legitimacy ‘uhalali’, working with foreigners, local politics 
and administrative structures 
Programme staff (2) INGO 30/5/2011 Programme activities, mainstreaming of governance into all activities at all 
levels, working with local partners 
Acting chairperson Civil Society Association 30/5/2011 Overview of CSA’s activities, coordination and monitoring issues across the 
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district, future aspirations 
Senior manager and 
programme manager (2) 
INGO 30/5/2011 NGO’s approach and philosophy, coordination issues across the district and 
different levels, duplication and gaps, inter-NGO competition and politics, 
challenges with CSA 
Community officer Bagamoyo District Council 1/6/2011 Proliferation of NGOs, inactive NGOs, issues of coordination, duplication 
and gaps, lack of integrated planning or reporting, lack of lateral authority, 
vertical planning and authority mechanisms 




Appendix B: Full list of interviews, with pseudonyms 
 
Interview No Interview Date Interviewee Post Organization Pseudonym Length (Min) Recorded 
1 23/03/2012 Chair CSA 
 
CSA 30 
 2 01/06/2012 District CDO District Council 
 
30 
 3 04/06/2012 Secretary 
 
CSA 48 1 
4 11/06/2012 Programme coordinator 
 
AI 90 
 5 14/06/2012 Programme officer BAGEA 
 
20 
 6 14/06/2012 Secretary BACAO 
 
45 
 7 14/06/2012 Programme manager 
 
Community Health 110 
 8 14/06/2012 Programme manager Life Guide 
 
30 
 9 18/06/2012 Programme volunteer Bagamoyo Young Artists 30 
 10 17/07/2012 Programme manager 
 
Community Health 90 
 11 19/07/2012 (International) volunteer 
 
VPI 63 1 
12 20/07/2012 Technical officer UWAMABA 
 
30 
 13 20/07/2012 Chairperson 
 
Youth-Net 30 






15 24/07/2012 Programme officer 
 
VPI 60 
 16 27/07/2012 Chairperson/Treasurer BAYOICE 
 
45 
 17 27/07/2012 Programme manager 
 
Youth Health 60 
 18 01/08/2012 Secretary 
 
CSA 60 
 19 02/08/2012 Programme officer JEBA 
 
60 
 20 14/08/2012 District CDO District council 
 
42 1 
21 17/08/2012 Director Hope Children Foundation 60 
 22 18/08/2012 Director African Childcare Foundation 80 
 23 20/08/2012 District administrator District Commissioner Office 20 1 
24 26/09/2012 Secretary 
 
CSA 30 
 25 30/09/2012 Director IDC 
 
60 
 26 04/10/2012 Programme officer 
 
VPI 60 1 
27 10/10/2012 Programme coordinator 
 
VPI 103 1 
28 15/10/2012 Programme director 
 
Eco-Coast 60 
 29 22/10/2012 Headteacher Kiharaka Primary School 30 
 30 23/10/2012 Planning Officer District Council 
 
45 
 31 25/10/2012 Chairperson Kiharaka 
 
30 
 32 25/10/2012 WEO Kerege Ward 
 
30 






34 29/10/2012 Doctor/VPI ToT Kerege Ward 
 
44 1 
35 31/10/2012 Volunteer CDF Kiharaka 
 
25 1 
36 31/10/2012 Volunteer CDF/CCA Kerege Ward 
 
60 
 37 02/11/2012 Volunteer CDF Kiharaka 
 
38 1 
38 05/11/2012 District Health Secretary District 
 
15 
 39 05/11/2012 Volunteer CDF Kerege Ward 
 
61 1 
40 05/11/2012 Group chairwoman Kiharaka 
 
60 
 41 06/11/2012 Treasurer Umoja wa Wazee Kerege 20 
 42 06/11/2012 Volunteer CCA Kiharaka 
 
51 1 
43 13/11/2012 Volunteer Kerege Development Organization 40 
 44 15/11/2012 Headteacher Kiharaka 
 
30 
 45 15/11/2012 Programme Director  
 
Eco-Coast 75 
 46 19/11/2012 CJF Ward and Village Kerege Ward 
 
45 
 47 20/11/2012 Secretary BACAFADA 
 
40 
 48 21/11/2012 Member Kerege Development Organization 20 
 49 29/11/2012 Programme Manager 
 
Community Health 60 
 50 29/11/2012 Programme Coordinator TASAF 
 
45 
 51 03/12/2012 Secretary IMUMA 
 
60 






53 11/12/2012 Programme Officer 
 
VPI 52 1 
54 11/12/2012 Country director 
 
VPI 98 1 
55 13/12/2012 Programme officer UNICEF 
 
30 1 
56 17/12/2012 Group member BAWODENE 
 
32 1 
57 18/12/2012 Consultant UNICEF 
 
66 1 
58 08/04/2013 Programme director 
 
Eco-Coast 60 
 59 08/04/2013 Youth leader Saadani (16) 
 
40 
 60 19/04/2013 Programme officer Care International 58 1 
61 23/04/2013 Gender CDO District council 
 
64 1 
62 29/04/2013 CJF Kwamduma Kibindu VPI 51 1 
63 29/04/2013 Kibindu ward secretary Kibindu Gender-Net 42 1 
64 29/04/2013 WEO Kibindu 
 
45 1 
65 29/04/2013 ToT Kibindu 
 
29 1 
66 03/05/2013 Programme coordinator CAMFED 
 
53 1 
67 03/05/2013 Programme officer PSI 
 
32 1 
68 14/05/2013 Kibindu volunteer CAMFED 
 
23 1 
69 15/05/2013 Programme officer 
 
VPI 45 
 70 15/05/2013 Volunteers VPI & CDIP VPI 32 1 





72 16/05/2013 CJF ward and village Kibindu VPI 41 1 
73 16/05/2013 Volunteer Youth Network Kibindu 
 
31 1 
74 16/05/2013 Kibindu ToT Kibindu VPI 41 1 
75 17/05/2013 Village chairperson Kibindu (27) 
 
30 
 76 24/05/2013 Programme director 
 
Eco-Coast 55 
 77 26/05/2013 Programme officer 
 
AI 
  78 27/05/2013 Lecturer in politics University Dar es Salaam 40 
 79 29/05/2013 Programme officer Pathfinders 
 
35 
 80 29/05/2013 Research officer TASAF 
 
35 
 81 29/05/2013 Consultant IDC 
 
75 
 82 01/06/2013 Programme Coordinator 
 
AI 106 1 
83 04/06/2013 Civil society coordinator District 
 
24 1 
84 26/09/2013 Policy coordinator 
 
AI 31 1 
Subtotals 
    
3982 33 
    
Total Interviews (hrs) 66.4 
 
    




Appendix C: List of abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Meaning Notes 
AI Advocates International One of two key international organizations in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome A group of symptoms eventually resulting from HIV. 
CBO Community Based Organizations   
CCA Community Change Agent Volunteers trained by Community Health 
CDF Community Development Facilitator Trained by AI but no longer supperted. 
CDIP Community Development Innovation Professionals   
CDO Community Development Officer 
District employee normally appointed to each ward as well as thematic 
ones at a district level. 
CH Community Health Small local health organization. Pseudonym 
CJF Community Justice Facilitator Originally trained by UNICEF, now monitored by VPI and the district 
CSA Civil Society Association Civil society umbrella organization in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym. 
CSO Civil Society Organizations Includes CBOs, (I)NGOs and FBOs 
DC District Commissioner Presidentially appointed district head. 
DED District Executive Director Head of the bureaucratic arm of the district council. 
ESIA Economic and Social Impact Assessment 
Assessment required by law for large scale national and foreign-owned 
developments 
FBO Faith based organization   
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HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus The virus that leads to AIDS 
INGO International non-government organization In Tanzania this means headquartered outside the country. 
IR International relations   
LGA Local Government Authority 
Precipitated by local government reform in 1999, known as the district 
council. 
NGO Non-government organization   
PIR Politics and international relations   
RAZABA Ranchi ya Zanzibar Area in northern Bagamoyo leased to the Zanzibar government in 1974. 
TACAIDS Tanzanian Commission for HIV/AIDS   
TOA Community animator VPI village level rights-based volunteer. 
TOT Trainer of Trainers Trained by VPI to train other volunteers 
UNICEF 
United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund   
UWAMABA 
Umoja wa Watu Wanaoishi na VVU na Matumaini – 
Bagamoyo 
United People Living with Hope in Bagamoyo: Bagamoyo's HIV/AIDS 
network. 
VEO Village Executive Officer District appointed administrative officer of the village 
VPI  Voluntary Partnership International One of two key international organizations in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym 
WEO Ward Executive Officer District appointed officer of the ward 
YH Youth Health 












I am a student at Edinburgh University in the UK. I am interested in learning more 
about your role and how things are here in x.283 I am interested to hear how you find 
working with non-government organizations and their ways of working. 




If you let me record our discussion it means you’ve agreed to take part and I can use the 
recording for my research. I won’t use your real name, so what you tell me will be in 
confidence. If there’s something you don’t want me to use you can tell me not to 
include it. 
 
You don’t have to remain involved and you can change your mind at any time. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
May I start the recording? (If yes start recording). 
 
“I am with [participant’s name]. I’ve explained the use of the tape. 
Is it ok if I tape this?” 
                                                             
283 [Name of village or district here.] ‘How things are’ is the translation of a question that has 
relevance and meaning. When people travel to new areas they are asked on their return ‘how things 
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